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Andrew Cranfield started his aviation career in free-fall parachuting and designing (with his brother) his own, highly dodgy, hang glider. Having survived that experience, he set a number of unofficial hang gliding records and became an instructor. He was sponsored by Westland Helicopters Ltd (WHL) through his engineering degree. During his time at WHL, He designed and built a Human Power Helicopter and in his spare time flew early, rather unstable, foot-launched microlights. After being awarded a Fellowship at Cranfield University, he left WHL and his subsequent management career has included working at Optica Aircraft, Lucas Aerospace  (on the Osprey V22 project) and running P&M Aviation (The only flexwing designer and manufacturer in the world with UK CAA A1 approval)- an experience that left him seriously out of pocket. He has held senior management positions in other, more profitable, high technology businesses. He currently works as a Non-Executive Director and, amongst other activities, is involved in supporting the Waterbird project (a replica of the UK’s first-ever seaplane) and contributing to an initiative to enhance the skills of UK flexwing microlight pilot.

How on earth do you build a human-powered helicopter and how far did it travel?

I had a massive interest in Human Powered Aircraft and was, at the time, on the RAeS HPA committee. So I was delighted to have the opportunity, in 1980, to build a HPH when I was a graduate apprentice at Westland Helicopters Ltd (WH). The idea was to win the American Helicopter Society $100,000 prize (a huge sum at the time) for the first HPH to fly for a minute, reach a height of 3m (momentarily) and stay within a 10m x 10m square. The pilot was also not allowed to rotate. I spent 5 years designing and building Vertigo, as I called it. I was very fortunate, in that as it was a company-sponsored project, I had access to highly experienced stress people and other capabilities such as the machine shop and composites dept. We tried to model the aerodynamics on the WHL mainframe, but it crashed as it could not cope with the very low Reynolds numbers! I ended up using a Southampton University programme developed programme specifically for contra-rotating rotors. The design we settled on was a single-seat machine with contra-rotating co-axial two-bladed rotors with the pilot mounted above the rotors. It was primarily made of Carbon Fibre (CF) and lightweight foam with the rotors covered in mylar plastic film. Key dimensions and weight were:-

Rotor Diameter 24.56m

Blade Chord 1.5m

Design Rotor Speed 6 r.p.m

Empty Weight 42.41Kg

The transmission had the pitch and coning built into alloy hubs with CF drive shafts driven by steel bevel gears which, in turn, were powered by a chain-driven pinion gear. The undercarriage comprised of 1m length CF tubes with moulded foam feet.

The key to success was the utilisation of ground effect. Without it, it is not physically possible for a human to fly vertically. As it was, we got it skipping around inside the flight shed at Yeovil but it never actually flew. The person who took it over claimed he got it to fly inside the airship hangers at Cardington but I don’t think anyone ever saw any evidence of that. Bits of Vertigo are now in the Helicopter Museum at Weston-Super-Mare.

It was interesting that some heavyweight and eminent members of the RAeS told me, in no uncertain terms, that I was wasting my time as it was simply not feasible. However, I was very gratified to be vindicated some 28 years later by the Atlas HPH winning the prize. They were kind enough to write and thank me for my pioneering work all those years earlier, which was very kind of them and made me feel it was worth the effort.

Does it fall to earth if you stop pedalling? Yes!

What was special about the Optica, and what are your feelings about it today? I worked at Optica as the Materials Manager after it was brought out from receivership. I remember in some offices, it was like walking into the Marie Celeste, as day books were still lying open with pens resting on them. It was like people had just popped out for lunch – quite surreal. The influence of John Edgley was certainly felt all over the place. Interestingly, l didn’t actually meet John until many years later, through my involvement in Human Powered Aircraft. My feeling was that the failure was not so much in the aircraft concept/viability but more in the business model in trying to sell to govt depts such as the MoD and Police. Where there is no specification, there cannot be a budget. So it takes years for a company to persuade the MoD to come up with a specification. Then it is a few more years before it is included in the equipment budget. Also MoD staff officers rotate every three years, so you are always trying to educate people who then disappear to another posting, so it is an uphill struggle. Any equipment budget is, of course, highly competitive so unless it is an Urgent Operational Requirement (in MoD terms) it is always probably going to be at the bottom of the pile. The original company suffered very bad luck when a low time PPL holding policeman crashed and killed himself in one of the early aircraft through point fixation (banking harder and harder to keep the object in sight at slow speed and low altitude-not something to be recommended) which probably put potential sales back a few years. Sadly, I didn’t get to fly in one, but we had about 10 complete aircraft, if memory serves me correctly, in the hangar but no buyers. I was made redundant on a Friday with one hours’ notice and no money after that. I was told that I didn’t have to work the last hour and could leave there and then. It was also the day that my post-dated cheque was cashed for the microlight I had just brought, with a view of flying to work from a field near my house. When I got home walked through the door, somewhat despondent, my wife asked “Did you have a good day at work?”. However, I did enjoy flying the microlight for a good number of years. A few weeks later, the 10 aircraft were destroyed in what was clearly an arson attack – the wing fuel tank drain taps were left open, and material soaked in petrol carefully laid out as fire paths interconnecting each aircraft. The heat was so intense that all that was left was piles of ash in the shape of an aircraft – even the engines were barely recognisable. Because the roof was timber construction (WW1 hangars) they burnt away without pulling in the walls but enabling a ferocious firestorm to be created. Subsequently, all the ex-employees, including yours truly, were interviewed by the Hampshire police. They, of course, asked me if I did it. When I asked what reason they thought I had, they replied that it might be because I believed that the company would need to re-employ me to rebuild them all! The fact there was no money in the company somehow seemed to escape their notice… However, a few years ago I visited John Edgley to talk about his efforts to resurrect the project, as he had brought back all the drawings and some part built aircraft and bits. However, I am not certain where he has got to with it.

What is the Waterbird project? This is a replica of Britain’s first successful seaplane which operated out of the RN’s first Naval Air Station on Lake Windermere in 1911. My role is purely a helper on the flying side and working as groundcrew, as there are many people involved in the hydrodynamics (the area needing improvement at present) and water operations. Edwardian aircraft like this, are not massively dissimilar to the very first canard two seat microlight aircraft I used to instruct on, so it is very interesting project and I like to think I can add value. The aircraft has done short hops as a landplane but has not yet flown from the water. For the historical background on the aircraft and the establishment of naval aviation, please refer to the Waterbird website.

What is your favourite helicopter type and why?

I have two. The Gazelle because it was the aerial equivalent of the original Golf GTI. I first flew in the type when a trainee flight test engineer at WHL. Once, with a WHL test pilot, the late and great Don Farquharson (who wore a monocle), we had an amazing flight from Yeovil to London. He discovered that I flew hang gliders, we decided to loosen off our straps and we then flew most of the way to Battersea heliport by weight shifting the aircraft as we trundled through a very stable inversion layer. I also did some very low level and fast-flying in Army Air Corp Gazelles, during exercises over Salisbury plain, which was also fantastic. I don’t think you will find a pilot who has a bad word to say about the Gazelle. The Agusta 109, on the other hand, was the Ferrari of the sky. Tremendously fast and with a very smooth ride at high speed (unlike the Lynx). The WHL comms flight example also had a panic button in the middle of the dash. If the pilot lost it (suffered vertigo, for example) you could hit it and the aircraft would stabilise itself and then climb out at 50kts forward speed and something like 500 fpm. I felt, at the time, that was quite an innovative safety feature, although the guys at Hereford thought it was just for wimps.

What would you say to those who say the V-22 is not necessary? You have to understand the rationale behind the design. As far as I could make out, the original Statement of Requirement was entirely based around rescuing US hostages from Tehran type missions. The failure of the original rescue seemed to have left a massive scar on the mentality of US Special Operations Command. That failure seemed to dominate the requirements capability all the way through the programme. Only the Americans had sufficient will, money and technology to have developed such a massively complex helicopter successfully, so hats off to them. However, you now have an aircraft which is well suited for certain long-range missions but not so much for other roles, such as traditional SAR work. The key element of this work is being able to hover quite low, while winching people up. Due to the massively high downwash velocities from the extremely highly loaded rotors, this isn’t a really viable operation. That is one example and there are others. But you do have a world-beating aircraft for a relatively small number of tasks that play to its strengths.

What is the biggest myth about helicopters?

That the first generation of commercial helicopters was unreliable and unsafe. This simply wasn’t the case. For example, the Bell 47 (Sioux to the UK Army Air Corps) was, by March 1954, was being operated in forty countries and had logged well over one million hours’ flying time. One American operator, Helicopter Air Service, carried nine million pounds of mail over a total distance of one million miles during three years of operations, using six Bell 47s. Working on three circular routes of between 90 and 100 miles in length, and serving fifty-five suburban communities in the Chicago area, they made 160,000 landings and take-offs without incident, 40,000 of them from a heliport on the roof of the main Chicago post office, 238 feet above ground level! Quite a remarkable achievement.

What should I have asked you – and what is the answer?

Who was responsible for suggesting a prize for the first crossing of the channel by a Human Powered Aircraft? After the Kremer figure of eight prize was won by the Gossamer Condor. We sat around the table at the RAeS and talked about a really stretching, but physically feasible target, for the next competition. I think I said “What about a channel crossing? That should excite everybody. Of course, no one is going to actually achieve it for a very long time”. We all sagely agreed that was a wonderful idea and that indeed it would not happen in the foreseeable future. Within 2 years of Paul MacCready and his team did it with Gossamer Albatross…..

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the site

Wiring work proceeds on the wings of a wooden test model for a large, four-engine flying boat in 1946 at what would become NASA’s Langley Research Center.  Sure, the finished product will be noisy and exciting and get all the attention.  Behind the scenes, though, this is exactly the quiet, patient work that advances engineering and science and that women are great at.    

– Stephen Caulfield

A speculative discussion

Dr Ron Smith joined the British helicopter company Westland in 1975, working in Research Aerodynamics, remotely piloted helicopters, before becoming Head of Future Projects. He had a strong influence on the design of the NH90, and was involved in the assessment of the Apache for Britain. He also explored a variety of exotic future technologies for Westland. Here Ron looks at the role of helicopters in the attempted invasion of Ukraine.

1) General list of helicopter roles in the land battle

• Reconnaissance (enemy locations and apparent intent, location of air defences, command & control centres, logistics)
• Insertion of ground troops, including special forces
• Anti-armour operations, destruction of point and hardened targets
• Suppression of dispersed and soft-skinned targets (typically by rocket or cannon fire)
• Suppression of enemy air defence systems
• Attack of enemy command and control centres
• Electronic intelligence and jamming
• Casualty evacuation

2) Conjectural approach of attacking forces (Russian)

Assumptions – significant superiority of numbers, but faced with general resistance of both trained forces and population in general. The key objectives are to gain control of key cities, particularly Kiev, as the centre of political power.

Currently large bodies of Russian ground forces appear to be largely operating on roads. The expectation is that the defending forces will be preparing defensive positions and (potentially) destroying bridges to further restrict freedom of movement (e.g. across River Dnieper). It is not known whether defensive forces will deploy mines and or IEDs on major routes – not least because of the risk to refugee civil population.

Russia has the capability to deploy helicopters in all of the roles listed in Section 1, above. These reflect a generic approach to combined arms operations in relatively open country. There will, however, be additional challenges as the fight moves into urban environments.

During the approach, bombardment using long range artillery will be used to destroy key administrative buildings, infrastructure and any military installations, as well as to damage the morale of opposition forces and the population, in general. Cruise missiles (and/or special forces – potentially helicopter-inserted)  will be deployed against specific command centres and operating bases / airfields.

With Ukrainian forces being largely on the defensive, I’d anticipate that use of UAVs (armed or not) would be favoured by the Russians for reconnaissance, with helicopters providing a stand-off attack capability against any hardened defensive positions identified. Attack could be by laser-guided missile (potentially with UAVs or special forces providing laser designation) allowing the targets to be engaged from 3 – 5 km range (or more).

Rockets and/or cannon would be used against dispersed or less well-protected targets, particularly if air defence systems have already been suppressed. This mix, with ground infantry moving house to house, would probably be more effective than the use of heavy armour in an urban environment. Routes approaching (and within) cities are ‘canalised’, heavily constraining freedom of movement. In these areas, the destruction of lead units hampers the mobility of the rest of a heavy armour force.

Transport helicopters can be used to increase tempo and mobility, by dispersing troops to encircle locations, although the transports would need to maintain a certain distance and/or have had local air defence systems suppressed first. Also, any Western MANPADS of NLAW type systems (in direct attack mode) could represent a considerable threat, if available. Once on the ground, the troops would still need IFVs to support infantry operations and to suppress resistance.

3) Conjectural approach of defending forces (Ukranian)

The critical concern here will depend on the degree to which an operational helicopter fleet remains available by the time that the Russian net starts to close around the cities. A Russian objective would surely be to achieve significant attrition of Ukranian air assets (including helicopters) before beginning urban operations.

It may well be that helicopter operations would be more effective in the earlier approach phase when there are significant masses of enemy armour and logistic vehicles occupying main routes and suffering from restricted movement. Both armed UAVs and helicopter-launched ATGWs would be effective, subject to the considerable constraints of the large number of enemy vehicles, and the (likely) limited resources of the defensive forces.

Constraining enemy mobility by destroying river crossings and laying explosive charges under approach roads might be attempted with a view to attacking armoured columns at predetermined locations on the city approaches. Any NLAW equipped units might be used in these ambush efforts.

Transport helicopters might be deployed to insert special forces into the enemy rear areas to attack (for example) command and control centres and logistic support formations.

Similarly, NLAW or MANPADS squads could be moved around between locations allowing hit-and-run tactics to be used, with the helicopters acting as a ‘force multiplier’. The fact that both attackers and defenders operate the same types of helicopters may be advantageous in this instance.

Hush-Kit asked me for some thoughts on how a smaller nation should best organise its air defences when confronted with aggression from a numerically superior force. The issue was clearly raised in the context of the ongoing attempted invasion of Ukraine by Russia, but, for several reasons, I will not address the specifics of that conflict. Firstly, the situation is too fluid. Secondly, any discussion of ongoing operations without detailed knowledge of the dispositions and capabilities of respective forces would be foolish. And thirdly, any such discussion, with such knowledge, would risk breaching operational security and relevant security laws.

In my case, I don’t have the detailed knowledge required, and I don’t wish to inadvertently contribute to the ongoing information warfare around the Russia-Ukraine situation.

However, the question can still be considered in the abstract, but using real-world examples to illustrate the possible courses of action, and this piece will consider broader aspects than just air defence. I have identified five distinct possibilities, which I will identify as:

1. The Stand-alone model
2. The Strong Alliance model
3. The Weak Alliance model
4. The Non-military Deterrence model; and
5. The Hunker Down, Endure and Resist model

This article will provide an insight into the realities of these models, or more accurately, those realities as I perceive them. Along the way, I expect to upset pretty much everyone, and just in case I haven’t, I might also end this piece by considering Great Power approaches to Defence.

The Stand-alone Model

The model here is essentially derived, and extended from, the air defence of Great Britain, in the period from June 1940 – the retreat from Dunkirk, to December 1941, the entry of the USA into World War II.

In this period, the RAF faced a numerically superior Luftwaffe, with broadly similar technical capabilities. A mix of aircraft was available to the RAF, with a greater number of Hurricanes than Spitfires, and these faced a mix of bomber aircraft, and Messerschmitt 109 and 110 fighters and bomber escorts. Again, in general terms, the Spitfires were a match to the Bf 109s, and the Hurricanes could deal with the bombers and the Messerschmitt 110s.

The critical needs, for the out-numbered British, was to prevent invasion by retaining air superiority, while husbanding their resources of aircraft and pilots. The following precepts of the stand-alone air defence model reflect this:

1. Launch your aircraft only when you need to;
2. Alert your aircraft so that they can be positioned to meet the threat, preferably at a tactically advantageous altitude;
3. Seek to match aircraft against threats they can deal with – in our exemplar, Spitfires against fighters and Hurricanes against bombers;
4. Where possible recover and repair damaged aircraft, and rescue and return pilots to the fight.

The combined use of radar, ground observers, and telephone and radio reports enabled all this. Critically, information on enemy raids and RAF responses was brought together as time-stamped tracks in Fighter Control Centres, enabling a real-time appreciation to be gained of the ongoing air picture. This in turn allowed commanders to position fighters to respond directly to specific raids, as well as providing coordination with other assets such as ground-based anti-aircraft defences. This avoided wasted effort in random patrolling, and conserved airframes, engines and pilots, reserving these precious resources for air combat.

Today, we might refer to this approach as an integrated air Defence system, and we would add other components if possible. In particular, ground-based radars would be supplemented by Airborne Early Warning and Control systems; communications would be shared in real-time between AEW assets, fighters and ground systems using secure datalinks; and our fighter aircraft would carry a mix of long-range radar-guided missiles and shorter-range imaging infra-red weapons. In addition, and if possible, we would disperse our aircraft to hidden hardened positions, and, if possible, provide support for refuelling, re-arming and servicing in those hardened locations.

As an example of such an approach today, Sweden operates this type of integrated air defence system, using the relatively small and agile Gripen fighter, out-ranging potential adversaries with the Meteor Missile, and using the IRIS-T for any within visual range engagements. Independently developed technical solutions are available for AEW systems and ground-based radars, datalinks, and electronic combat systems, and this is important because reliance on third-party support systems in time of ongoing combat is never a good look. This approach is carried across into other branches of the Defence Forces, reducing external dependencies wherever possible.

The UK used to aspire to this capability, and, in an architectural sense, still achieves this for air defence. However, it does not have the same degree of self-sufficiency in the air domain as Sweden, or, perhaps France, and has not for many years. Almost all equipment is either co-produced across a number of Nations or sourced from overseas, including critical capabilities such as AEW&C, fighter and strike aircraft, and many other sensors and systems.

The Strong Alliance Model

Strong alliances are often cited as of great importance by the weaker parties in such alliances. Truly strong alliances, which are regarded as important by the stronger party, and where resources are committed and, perhaps, bloodshed for others, are, in my view, rather rare. But examples do exist. I suggest the relationship between the United States and Israel is such an alliance, even though it shares some asymmetric features which appear to be somewhat common to the other strong alliances I can identify, those between the US and several Pacific Nations, but excluding Taiwan.

What does the US get out of the relationship with Israel? An ability to shape affairs in the Middle East through a surrogate Nation representing democracy and a ‘rules-based’ order. Well, also having influence and presence in a region which has been a critical source of oil resources. The US also enjoys certain secondary advantages in domestic politics; Israel gets equipment, technology and a partner that appears willingly unquestioning about the treatment of Palestinians. So, it is not simply a military relationship, it is also deeply political.

But there is no doubt, that if you can swing it, being able to share in US technology, to be re-equipped in time of tension, to receive (some) US Intelligence products and so on is a great way of bolstering your defences if you are feeling edgy about your neighbours, and if you can position yourself as much more acceptable to the US than they are.

The US alliances in the Pacific are interesting. Essentially, they all follow the same model, and provide mutual Defence guarantees between the US and Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and Korea intended to ensure that should any of those Nations be attacked, the US will provide defence assistance, and should the US be attacked, the other parties would do their best to assist.

The price for this is the right for the US to maintain US defence facilities in those nations. There are clear benefits to the US in so doing, as this enables them to maintain a Defence presence and logistic chain across and around the Pacific, and there are significant benefits to the participating Nations, not just in the mutual Defence provisions, but also (at the time of their agreement) a greater sense of security from possible future Japanese expansionism.

Fast forward to today, and the concerns are about Chinese expansionism, the South China Sea and Taiwan. I have identified this as a strong alliance, but the recent Trumpist adventure in the US, combined with a historical reluctance from Democrat governments to get embroiled in foreign conflicts, is perhaps now causing some countries to question the willingness of the US to come to the party should aggression occur.

In a strong alliance model, the defence approach is essential to maintain enough capability, through your own assets, and your ally, assuming they have an ongoing Defence presence, to first deter, and then hold off any aggression until the US (or other strong ally) appears over the horizon with defence support. Would this work? Well, it has for Israel, but these relationships have not been tested in the Pacific.

The Weak Alliance Model

Continuing my theme of upsetting everyone, we will start with Taiwan. Taiwan used to be recognised as China by the US, but world realities have now changed, and the US recognised the People’s Republic of China, and has its diplomatic representation in Beijing. Along with this, it has abandoned the notion of ‘Two Chinas’, and maintains a deliberate diplomatic state of ambiguity regarding Taiwan. In reading this, readers should note the Chinese position that Taiwan remains a PRC province, albeit a recalcitrant one.

This certainly precludes the type of mutual defence agreement in place with other Pacific nations, but does not preclude the US from being the principal source of Defence materiel for Taiwan. Despite edginess regarding China’s stated intention to integrate Taiwan fully within the PRC, and despite assurances of support, provision of military equipment, and so on, there is no way this could be considered anything other than a weak alliance.

How do you defend Taiwan against the PRC, should they wish to fully integrate Taiwan into China? In my view, you have three assets, two of which are rather weak. The first resembles that of Britain in the stand-alone phase of the Second World War. As an island, defence against invasion must be a priority. Surface and sub-surface naval forces and coastal defences, supplemented by well-integrated Air Defence systems to deter, and prevent, or delay for as long as possible, airborne assault. And then hope for assistance from your friends – the US, and their friends, as the US would certainly look to Australia (who would actually have little to offer). You would also be looking, probably in vain, for assistance from the UN. Which would not be forthcoming, as China and Russia would veto any Resolutions calling for action to support Taiwan.

My second weak alliance is NATO. Current events are showing the impotence of NATO in taking meaningful action outside the boundaries of its member Nations. Partly, this is because the mutual defence provisions of NATO do not extend to the defence of non-NATO Nations. But partly, there is also a recognition that should NATO get involved, for example in seeking to enforce a no-fly zone, or even to try to stabilize an evacuation route for civilians, such acts would be interpreted as hostile by Russia.

This would then lead to a situation not unlike the First World War, where alliances between smaller Nations and the Great Powers transformed a regional conflict into a World-wide War. Suppose NATO, or possibly a single NATO member country, assists Ukraine – Russia is likely to declare this a hostile act and perhaps conduct a strike against one NATO country – then the whole of NATO, including the US, may be drawn in by mutual Defence provisions in Article 5 of the NATO Charter – and the apocalypse awaits.

In practice, any participation by the US would be dependent on Congressional approval and is thus not automatic. In addition, while an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on them all, each member has the right to decide on its own course of action in response. While these provisions are appropriate, they do weaken the alliance somewhat, as the scale and scope of a NATO response is indeterminate and dependent on each Nation’s view of the situation.

A third weakened alliance is the position in which the UK now finds itself. Decades of collaborative defence programmes with EU countries, and a strong contribution to NATO, have encouraged a mutually cooperative approach, where UK defence capabilities are strongly dependent on systems and support coming from the US and across Europe, and the once strong UK defence industry is but a partner in major projects, rather than the lead.

However, Brexit has undoubtedly complicated both relationships and supply chains. I don’t propose to press this point further, because any crisis involving NATO would undoubtedly draw on the strong defence bonds between NATO countries.

Britain does have advantages and advanced capabilities in intelligence, and through those capabilities, is likely to have better access to US intelligence assets than most. It also has highly professional armed forces, although these have been under tight budgetary constraints for many years. I do wonder what freedom of action remains for the UK operating outside of a NATO or US-led coalition.

Defence in these circumstances? Start with Diplomacy. Maintain old friendships. Cultivate new ones. Deter, delay, obstruct and confuse. If conflict erupts, do the best you can with what you have, and seek support from your allies.

The Non-military Deterrence model

This is a very successful strategy, employed by two Nations, Switzerland, and the Cayman Islands.

It may be otherwise expressed as “Don’t touch us – we’ve got your money”.

The Hunker Down, Endure and Resist Model

This is an unpalatable option of last resort. But if you are unable to successfully counter foreign invasion, it is a proven strategy whereby even the most powerful Nations can eventually be persuaded to go away, through a mix of passive and active resistance.

Successful examples include Afghanistan, which has repeatedly forced the British to withdraw. And the Russians. And the Americans, complete with a large ‘coalition of the willing’.

This approach has also been successfully employed in Vietnam and in Iraq.

The US, Russia and China

The recent rapprochement between Russia and China has created a new dynamic.

The US approach of setting up alliances across strategic areas of interest, so that should conflict erupt, it will at least not touch on the US homeland, has been remarkably successful, but paradoxically is leading to a sense of disconnection and isolation. After all, if all military adventures are foreign adventures, why are we risking our boys’ lives?

Russia now appears to be entering on the full Resurgent Russia scenario, with the added bonus of having secured its South-Eastern boundary with China. Should the Ukraine adventure succeed, there is the possibility that Russia would then look to many of the states that were formerly part of the USSR. However, most of these are now NATO members. Recent events are likely to have greatly stiffened NATO resolve. They may be impotent in Ukraine, but any attack on a NATO state is likely to bring a rapid response. One can only hope that there would be no conflict, and no use of nuclear capabilities.

China is biding its time. When the dust settles on Ukraine, and perhaps particularly if tension keeps the focus on Europe for a bit, a move on Taiwan, and on the disputed areas of the South China Sea can be expected. The technical capability of Chinese forces is rising extremely rapidly, and China will be watching the US closely over the next decade.

China is also pursuing its Belt and Road initiative, a mechanism for strengthening commercial, diplomatic and industrial ties with many Nations, not just in the Pacific.

What about Australia?

As I am writing this in Australia, I should not miss the opportunity to cast doubt on the current Australian position. In the approach to an election, the least competent Australian administration in decades is playing the National Security card in an attempt to impress its electoral base. The focus will be to further constrain migration from unacceptable countries (those with non-white skins, because they might be terrorists), and to continue the process of offending our largest trading partner, China.

The AUKUS partnership around the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia is at least 20 years too late to have the desired effect, which is presumably to make China pay attention to Australia as a possible threat. Had AUKUS been implemented 20 years ago, such submarines might just about be in Service. But implemented now, the probable result will be a Chinese attempt to further damage the Australian economy over the next 20 years, by seeking alternate sources for its iron ore and coal.

From a Chinese perspective, with a bit of luck, ongoing climate change, and the loss of resources from a one-horse economy, will then ensure the Australian Defence force remains an insignificant player on the world stage.

The Australian Government, however, imagines AUKUS as an enduring means of strengthening ties with the US and the UK, perhaps not noticing that when Australia has lost markets in China, they have generally been replaced as suppliers by the US.

– Jim Smith

The best fighter of the Second World War started life as an insurance policy. In late 1940 Grumman was asked to develop an upgrade of the F4-F Wildcat with a 1600hp Twin Cyclone engine as an interim measure due to ‘issues’ with Vought’s XF4U-1 that would require considerable work to resolve. Instead, Bob Hall proposed a new design using knowledge gained from talking to pilots who had fought in the Battle of Britain. This would become the F6F Hellcat, or Gannet if you’re in the niche of Fleet Air Arm pilots to fly it before the beginning of 1944 when sanity prevailed. The USN gave approval for work to start on 30 June 1941, the first prototype flew just under a year later with a 1600hp Wright Cyclone, the first aircraft equipped with a 2000hp Pratt & Whitney Double Wasp flew a month later and demonstrated a 30mph speed advantage over a recently captured Mitsubishi Zero. The first production F6F-3 flew in October of 1942 with deliveries commencing shortly afterwards. In the next two years, 11,000 of a final total of 12,275 Hellcats were built by Grumman’s Bethpage factory. [1] As an indication of quite how right the Hellcat’s design was there were only two production versions, the -3 and the -5 which featured another 200hp, a flat windscreen integrating the armoured glass, and a few other minor modifications. In fact, only two airframes seem to have not been built as -3 or -5s. Which makes Supermarine look like they didn’t know what they were doing with their twenty-odd attempts at getting the Spitfire ‘right’.

As a fighter the Hellcat’s main opponent was the aforementioned Zero, against which it was faster, better armed, and better armoured. The majority of Hellcats had six 0.50 calibre machine guns with 400 rounds per gun providing a balance of bullet mass with rate of fire. A more elegant solution than the mix of small calibre guns and large calibre cannon used by many European fighters it also had the advantage of simplifying the logistics tail. This is an important consideration for any aircraft, but especially one that’s going to be operating half a world away while being supplied by a chain of ships. The six guns allowed the Hellcat to achieve a borderline terrifying kill rate against aircraft of the Japanese Navy and Army with claims as high as 13:1 against the Mitsubishi Zero. Nor did it fair badly in the European theatre shooting down two Me-109s, two He-115, and an FW-190 for one loss with the FAA while the USN’s Hellcats also managed to shoot down three He-111s, three Ju-52, a Ju-88, and a Do-217 during the invasion of Southern France. In the latter case while operating off tiny Escort Carriers and calling fall of shot for naval gunfire. [2] A further 5215 aircraft fell to the Hellcat in the Indian and Pacific theatres.

In addition to operating as a fighter the -5 Hellcats could carry six 5” rockets or up to 4000lb of bombs enabling it to carry out attack operations, with an equivalent payload to the Curtiss Helldiver making the latter somewhat redundant. Which was probably a relief to the Helldiver crews. Both Marks of Hellcat also saw service as Night Fighters fitted with the AN/APS-4 or -6 radar in a pod on the starboard outer wing. A reconnaissance version of the F6F-5 was produced by the simple expedient of placing windows on the port and starboard sides of the fuselage just aft of the wing root. If that’s not multi-role enough for you the East Indies Fleet also used Hellcats in a mine-hunting role off Penang. Aircraft being directed by their carrier’s fighter controllers to conduct visual sweeps of set areas. [3] Try doing that in a Bf 109 or, well pretty much anything with an inline engine if you want to actually see the mines.

Grumman’s factory gained a reputation as the ‘Ironworks’ due to the strength of its aircraft. In an attempt to demonstrate why this moniker was deserved an F6F-5P of VF-8 flying from the Bunker Hill carrier was tasked to obtain photos of a headquarters and training base in the Marianas Islands. After being hit by radar laid anti-aircraft fire at 4000’ the Hellcat was missing rudder trim and the port stabiliser and elevator. Ignoring these minor flesh wounds, the pilot, Lt Edward ‘Whitey’ Feightner, flew down the bases’ runway at low-level to get photos of the guns that had just hit him. Taking umbrage, they managed to hit his aircraft in the port wing as he was making his egress. After the smoke, flames, and a small explosion cleared our intrepid aviator discovered his port wing was missing from the wing fold outwards aft of the main spar. The Hellcat was still controllable though if the speed was kept between 90 and 105kts. With the Bunker Hill visible about 40 miles ahead and with nothing better to do he headed towards it. Although the port main gear was, understandably, absent the rest of the undercarriage was available and after being given the option to land on ‘Whitey’ took it, mindful of the hard-earned photo-intelligence he’d acquired. Not only was no further damage incurred during the landing but the aircraft itself was repaired and within 10 days was back on the flight schedule. [4] Try doing that in a P-51.

Importantly for a naval fighter the Hellcat was relatively easy to land on a carrier. This was due to the large wing, which allowed it to outturn a Bf-109, and the well-placed cockpit raised up above the fuselage fuel tank. Which explains its much better landing accident record than say the Corsair or Seafire which helpfully had the pilot so far back he was unable to see the ship on finals. As an illustration during Operation ICEBERG II off the island of Sakishima Gun to the carriers of the British Pacific Fleet lost 7% of their original allocation of Hellcats to landing accidents, versus 21% of the Corsairs, and a trifling 70% of the Seafires. [5] It probably helped that Grumman designed the big cat to be literally dropped onto the deck from 20’. General competence at landing may not be the kind of thing that gets the pulse racing, but to be a great fighter it’s useful if you can make more than a handful of sorties before being written off. It’s also worth pointing out that although the similarly engined Corsair is frequently cited as being faster than the Hellcat by around 20 knots when Grumman were loaned one of Vought’s aircraft to study this turned-out not to be the case. Test pilot Corky Meyer flew multiple runs in formation with the Corsair, both aircraft using the same engine settings. Above 5000’ they were broadly stabilised against each other and maintained formation. The Corsair however indicated it was going 20 knots faster. After a bit of work on the pitot static system so did the Hellcat. [6]

When it comes to the point of a fighter, shooting down enemy aircraft, the Hellcat was clearly superior to the Corsair with 5223 kills to 2140. Some may claim the Spitfire as the highest-scoring Allied fighter of WW2, but then they built 20000 odd of them in a desperate attempt to stay relevant. In fact, the Hellcat scored 0.42 kills per airframe built while the Spitfire only managed 0.31 less than the oft-forgot Hurricane.

Aircraft Built-Kills Ratio

Hellcats then were more likely to have shot something down, better at surviving damage, better at landing, and more versatile than any other fighter of WW2. At the same time this was all achieved with only two basic Marks all of which were built in one factory. Like all great performers, Grumman also knew to leave them wanting more so as the war drew to a close so did Hellcat production

[1] Aeroplane Database – Grumman F6F Hellcat, Thomas Cleaver, Aeroplane Dec 2021
[2] “When Hellcats Took the Fight to the Luftwaffe.” Historynet – Accessed 2/28/2022. https://www.historynet.com/when-hellcats-took-the-fight-to-the-luftwaffe/
[3] WO 203/4782, Report of Proceedings – Operation Livery, The National Archives, 1945
[4] Wings of Gold, R Adm Feightner, Summer 2005
[5] The Forgotten Fleet, John Winton, 1969
[6] Hellcat vs Corsair, Corky Meyer, Flight Journal, Annual 2020

Bing Chandler is a former Lynx Observer and current Wildcat Air Safety Officer. He has a Red Bubble store riddled with aircraft. It will shortly include a Hellcat once the tricky colouring-in stage is finished.

The Spitfire was the greatest fighter of the Second World War, and indeed ever.

By Edward Rippeth

The case is simple. It was born a winner back in 1936, and kept winning, even when all else was going wrong, and winning and winning. Dunkirk, Battle of Britain, Malta, North Africa, Australia, Burma, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, the crumbling Reich, even the final days over Japan, all ended up with the Spitfire triumphant.

At Dunkirk, with Britain facing absolute disaster, Spitfires were deployed in significant numbers for the first time. Despite facing the greatest air force ever seen at that time, hell-bent on destroying our army, navy (and our pleasure cruisers), Spitfires faced them down and shot them down, doing enough to enable the ‘miracle’ of evacuating 338,000 men – in the hands of legends like Al Deere, Bob Stanford Tuck and Sailor Malan.

Just around the corner was the Battle of Britain. Yes, there was radar, and yes, there were Hurricanes, but when the Luftwaffe wondered what was going wrong, Spitfires were uppermost in their thoughts. Yes, Hurricanes were more numerous and shot down more planes, but it was the Spitfire they really feared – because it abused the Luftwaffe pilot’s sense of entitlement, knocked them off their perch, and showed they could be beaten. It led to Spitfire snobbery with pilots refusing to accept the lesser Hurricane had shot them down, and sparked a trend for massive overclaiming of Spitfires by Luftwaffe pilots – by a factor of four or five in the first three years of the war. In the greatest and most consequential air battle of all time, the Spitfire was the star.

The flipside, of course, was that when the Spitfire wasn’t there, Britain tended to lose. France, Greece, Crete, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, the early desert campaign – all bravely contested by Hurricanes, Gladiators, P-40s, not to mention Brewster Buffalos, Blochs, Moranes, Curtiss Hawks etc etc. One disaster after another as the Bf 109s, Zeros and Oscars reigned supreme. It needed a very special fighter to turn this around. And that fighter was the Spitfire, brilliantly in Malta, then North Africa, then even in Burma. After two years of hideous beatings at the hands of an apparently invincible Japanese foe, General Slim worked out the tactics of victory involved his troops standing fast during encirclement, and airdrops. The only problem being that the Japanese still dominated the skies, with Nakajima Oscars running circles around the RAF’s Hurricanes and Buffaloes. Two newly introduced squadrons of the new Mark VIIIs and several Mark Vs took just three days to maul and remove the IJA from the skies during the battle of the Admin Box. Victory followed as Dakotas were able to make their supply drops unhindered. The course of the war in the East was irrevocably turned.

Ah, but it didn’t get as many kills as the P-51 Mustang or the Hellcat? Actually, it did. It’s just nobody counted them – until now. But it was too short-ranged? Indeed it was, for a fighter escort. But range and big fuel capacity was of no use in times of enemy air superiority – it needed to be up to altitude, manoeuvrable and fast, which is why it was the only fighter in the world in 1942 which could have saved Malta. But the Focke-Wulf Fw1 90 was better? For several months yes it was, but along came the Spitfire IX and the Spitfire was back on top, and thereafter it was a fully competitive front-line fighter until the war’s end. The constant ability to develop the Spitfire’s airframe and upgrade with more powerful versions of the Merlin engine and ultimately the Griffon through the war meant the last aces of the war in Europe, such as Ian Ponsford (who scored six kills in the last eleven days of April 1945), were piloting the superb Mark XIV.

But it wasn’t very good at ground attack? The Spitfire did a decent and underrated job, but that’s not the main point of a fighter.

But the Seafire? Certainly, it had a lot of problems landing on heaving decks with the narrow and fragile undercarriage, but it was able to get among kamikazes like no other aircraft, and ended up grabbing seven kills in the last dogfight of the war on August 15^th – and if the war had gone on, it had the performance to take on Japan’s superb new fighters for home defence, the Ki-84 and Ki-100, which had notably roughed up a squadron of Hellcats in one of its encounters. And of course the Seafire would be developed into the Seafire Mk 47, one of the fastest piston-engined fighters of all time which served off aircraft carriers until the late 1950s.

It didn’t just look the part – it looked beautiful. It captured people’s imagination. It even captured the Luftwaffe’s imaginations. It made Adolf Galland green with envy. And it won the war. That’s why the Spitfire is the greatest fighter of World War 2.

Edward Rippet

Head of Primary Publishing, International schools
Cambridge University Press

In the first of a series of articles presenting cases for the best fighter aircraft of World War II, we start with Jim Smith’s case for the Messerchmitt Bf 109. Let us know your thoughts in the comments section below.

The Messerschmitt Bf 109 was the greatest fighter of the Second World War.

A simple, bold statement, which many will question, based on their knowledge that other aircraft, in particular variants, were superior to particular variants of the Bf 109.

Nevertheless, if we look at the big picture, of duration in service, of numbers built, and of victories claimed, there can be little doubt that the Bf 109 deserves this accolade.

Firstly, the aircraft design ensured its initial success and immediate superiority. Messerschmitt combined all the available technologies of 1934 to design a stressed-skin, retractable undercarriage fighter with the smallest and lightest possible airframe, around the most powerful available engine. Sharing many of these features with its great rival, the Spitfire, Messerschmitt took advantage of wing leading edge slots, and slotted flaps to reduce wing size without compromising landing speed and controllability at low speeds.

The aircraft enjoyed an initial operational period of superiority over all its competitors, with no match in combat in Spain, or in the initial campaigns of the Second World War in Poland and in France, where its superiority over the Hurricane was evident. Air combat with its British match, the Spitfire, did not occur until May 1940, during the evacuation of Dunkirk.

Contemporary comparisons of the Bf 109E with the Mk 1 Spitfire showed these aircraft to be closely competitive in air combat, with the Spitfire offering greater manoeuvrability due to its lower wing loading, and the Messerschmitt slightly higher speed, a higher climb rate up to 20,000 ft, and the ability to disengage from air combat at will by diving away, thanks to its fuel-injected engine.

Secondly, continuous development kept the Bf 109 competitive with its opponents in the Western Theatre, and superior to its opposition in North Africa, and on the Eastern Front, at least until late in the war. Naturally, both the Spitfire and Messerschmitt were rapidly developed, each in an effort to out-perform their dangerous opponent, and this competitive development resulted in the Spitfire V, with two-stage supercharging, and cannon armament, appearing in 1941. The Bf 109 received extensive aerodynamic refinements and engine development, resulting in the Bf 109F, which came into service at about the same time as the Spitfire V.

Significant improvements to the Bf 109F included refinements to its cooling system, lowering drag, and improvements to flaps, slats and ailerons. The armament was revised to remove the wing-mounted cannon in favour of an engine mounted 20 mm cannon, and two fuselage-mounted 7.9mm machine guns. These changes improved both the manoeuvrability and climb rate of the aircraft, and later models incorporated Nitrous Oxide injection to increase power, and a variety of armament modifications.

The opening of hostilities against the Soviet Union in June 1941 involved large numbers of Bf 109E and Bf 109F aircraft, and resulted in very high numbers of kills of Soviet aircraft. Soviet losses by midday on the second day of the Operation Barbarossa campaign amounted to 1200 aircraft, of which slightly more than 800 were destroyed on the ground. The campaign on the Eastern Front presented the opportunity for experienced fighter pilots, flying the Bf 109 in conditions of air superiority against relatively poorly equipped and trained opposition, to score enormous numbers of kills.

This constitutes the third element in the case for the Bf 109 being the greatest fighter of the Second World War, and is illustrated by some compelling statistics. The top 3 fighter pilots of WW2, all flying Bf 109s on the Eastern Front, claimed a total of 928 victories, 352 falling to Erich Hartmann, 301 to Gerhard Barkhorn, and 275 to Günter Rall. In North Africa, Hans-Joachim Marseille accounted for 158 allied aircraft, and no less than 105 Bf 109 pilots claimed more than 100 aircraft kills.

Development of the Bf 109 continued, with the more powerful, heavier and faster Bf 109G, powered by the Daimler-Benz DB 605 engine. The Bf 109G was substantially heavier than earlier models, though, and the increased weight did impact on stability and control, handling qualities and manoeuvrability. Nonetheless, the Bf 109G became the most produced version of the aircraft and, when it entered service in April 1942, was superior to the Spitfire V, particularly when using Nitrous-oxide (GM-1) boost, which was fitted as standard.

While gradually supplemented, by the FW 190 in the West, large numbers of Bf 109G continued to serve on the Eastern and other fronts, and, from mid-1943, increasing use was made of the type as a reconnaissance aircraft, for ground attack, and as a night fighter.

Appearance of the Bf 109F and G, coupled with the entry to service of the Focke-Wulf 190, added urgency to the development of the Spitfire Mk IX, powered by the two-speed, two-stage supercharged Merlin 60, and this aircraft became operational with the RAF in July 1942.

The advent of the Spitfire IX, and from 1944, the P-51 Mustang, Griffon-powered Spitfire variants, and, in the East, the Lavochkin La-7 and Yak-3, placed the Bf 109 in a difficult position. Nevertheless, large numbers of aircraft continued to serve with the Luftwaffe, with the focus of their operations gradually shifting towards homeland defence as Allied forces advanced, following their successes in North Africa, in the invasion of France and Italy, and Soviet advances on the Eastern Front.

The final few months of the war essentially left the Luftwaffe in a defensive situation, with the Messerschmitt 109 now lacking performance against the best of the Allied fighters, and advanced aircraft like the Messerschmitt 262 only available in small numbers. All of the available fighters, principally Bf 109s and Focke-Wulf Fw 190s, were badly affected by logistical issues, particularly shortages of fuel and spare parts.

The fourth and final element of the case for the Bf 109 being the greatest fighter of the Second World War rests simply on the number built and its longevity in service. With continuous development from design initiation in 1934, through innumerable variations up to the end of the conflict in Europe, and beyond, the Bf 109 demonstrated both adaptability and longevity. Post-war variants came from Czechoslovakia with the Avia S-99 and developments, and from Spain, where the Hispano HA 1109 and ultimately the HA 1112 Buchon remained operational up to the end of 1965.

A total of 33,984 Messerschmitt Bf 109 were built, with additional production of about 600 Avia S-99/199 aircraft in Czechoslovakia, and a further 200 or so Hispano 1112 aircraft in Spain.  Nearly 14,000 Bf 109G were manufactured in 1944 alone, and overall, Bf 109 production amounted to about a quarter of all aircraft built for the Luftwaffe. By comparison, production of the Spitfire, which also occurred throughout the conflict, amounted to 22,759 airframes.

The Bf 109 was the greatest fighter of the Second World War because:

• Its advanced design resulted in periods of superiority over its opponents, particularly for early variants in the Spanish Civil War, and for the Bf 109E, which was superior to all opposition up to May 1940, from which time the Spitfire 1 achieved broad parity with the Bf 109E;
• The aerodynamic and engine improvements introduced with the Bf 109F gave that aircraft superiority over the Spitfire V, over Allied fighters in the early part of the North Africa campaign, and over Soviet aircraft in the first year of the campaign on the Eastern Front;
• The number of victories claimed by Bf 109 pilots far exceeds the numbers achieved by pilots of any other aircraft, largely due to the superiority enjoyed by Luftwaffe pilots over Soviet aircraft and pilots on the Eastern Front, but also due to the aircraft’s successes in other Theatres;
• The number of aircraft produced and fielded exceeded that of all other military aircraft, with the exception of the Ilyushin Il 2 armoured attack aircraft. The Bf 109, like the Spitfire, was manufactured from before WW2 through to the end of hostilities and beyond. The final related version, the Merlin-engined Buchon, first flew in 1954, and was operational until the end of 1965, 30 years after the prototype Bf 109’s first flight.

Sources:

Warplanes of the Third Reich, William Green, 1970

Warplanes of the Second World War – Fighters Vol 1 & 2, William Green, 1960

Wings of Fame Volume 4: Messerschmitt Bf 109 early variants, David Donald, 1996

Wings of Fame Volume 11: Messerschmitt Bf 109: the later variants, David Donald, 1998

Wikipedia

The P-51 Mustang‘s good looks and hygienically clean aerodynamics were often callously mistreated at the hands of wayward engineers and assorted warmongers. We asked Matthew Willis, author of ‘Mustang, The Untold Story‘, to introduce us to the 10 weirdest Mustangs.

10. RAF ground attack variant

What do you do when you’re the RAF and you find yourself in receipt of “undoubtedly the best American fighter to have reached this country”? Why try to turn it into a mud-mover of course. The Mustang was an aircraft with a wing of unparalleled aerodynamic efficiency, which evidently so angered Their Airships that they tried to ruin it with a pair of 40mm cannon in ungainly pods or a battery of 3in rocket projectiles and associated ironmongery with more drag than Santa Pod. To be fair, the early Mustang had a superlative low-level performance which made it attractive as an attack aircraft, but the RAF’s test programme into a ‘universal wing’ plumbed for every kind of ordnance imaginable went further than most proposals.

9. US tank-obliterator

…Apart, that is, from North American Aviation themselves, who in their efforts to find a use for their new aircraft for a sceptical USAAF came up with numerous ideas involving plenty of pounds for air-to-ground. One of these became the A-36 dive-bomber (don’t call it an Apache unless you want a very disagreeable reaction from this author), but in amongst the slew of offers were a couple that included the same 37mm Oldsmobile cannon that was the primary weapon of the P-39 Airacobra. One version included a relatively sensible pair of 37mm guns. Another was to have four, two slung beneath each wing, for what would surely have made the most powerful gun armament of any single-engined aircraft during WW2. It would have made mincemeat of Axis tanks and nervous wrecks of the pilots, assuming they could have got the machine off the ground in the first place.

8. Jet

One of the most well-known features of the Mustang is its carefully designed radiator duct designed to recover pressure and add a small but significant amount of thrust from the air heated by the radiator. This was not enough for the boffins at the Royal Aircraft Establishment who proposed fitting a bundle of ramjets behind the radiator to give that much more oomph. Frank Whittle’s Power Jets company designed an installation that clustered twelve burner tubes within a cylindrical heat shield to fit into the Mustang’s radiator scoop exit, and carried out extensive static testing in 1944. The installation may have flown briefly towards the end of the war but by then it seemed more sensible for Whittle to focus on turbojet engines. The USAAF also liked the idea of a ramjet assisted Mustang, and fitted a P-51D with a ramjet on each wingtip. It briefly boosted top speed to 480mph before blowing up spectacularly – fortunately, the pilot escaped.

7. Beguine

The standard, very efficient Mustang radiator was also not good enough for J.D. Reed, who purchased surplus P-51C 42-103757 in 1947, and former test pilot Paul Penrose who encouraged Reed to have it extensively modified by NAA engineers for racing and record-setting. Gone was the belly scoop and instead, coolant and oil radiators were located in a large pod on each wingtip. The similarity to the ramjet pods mentioned above has often been noted. Sadly, the fate of this aircraft, named Beguine (after the dance) at the request of Reed’s wife, was also rather too similar. Penrose had complained of unpleasant roll characteristics but he and Reed fell out before they could be addressed, and Reed sold Beguine to Jaqueline Cochran. Bill Odom flew Beguine for Cochran, winning the Sohio Trophy at a canter, but during the Thompson Trophy race, Odom was having difficulty following the course, and while attempting to correct, rolled inverted and crashed into a house, killing a woman and child as well as Odom. The disaster led to a 13-year break in the National Air Races.

6. Twin Trouble

The Twin Mustang was an unusual concept at the time  – two complete Mustang-derived fuselages, each with their own full cockpit, attached to a single wing, the concept being an ultra-long range escort fighter with a pair of pilots to share the workload. There was much more that was weird about the Twin Mustang though. First of all, the complete inability of the prototype to leave the ground, until it was realised that the counter-rotating propellers were creating negative lift at the centre-section. The rotation of the engines was swapped and the problem solved. The next oddity was that the model used for training and development, the F-82B, had a somewhat better performance than the variant intended for service use, the F-82E. This was due to the end of wartime technology sharing agreements and the wide availability of licence-built Rolls-Royce Merlin engines. As a result, the small number of F-82Bs were the last to be powered by Merlins, and the service variants all had Allison V-1710 power. In many ways a fine engine, Allison never satisfactorily solved the problem of two-stage supercharging, and the model adopted for the F-82E had to be de-tuned for reliability. The Twin Mustang proved most useful as a night-fighter, never fulfilling its initial promise.

5. Mid-mounted mania

Rolls-Royce was impressed with the Mustang from the outset, thanks to test pilot Ronald Harker singing its praises after a flight at the Air Fighting Development Unit. For a while there was a plan for Rolls to re-engine existing RAF Mustangs with Merlin 61s in-house as it had done with the early Spitfire Mk IXs, but alongside that the company was developing far more ambitious ideas to get the best from Edgar Schmued’s creation. The company favoured a mid-mounted engine like the Bell P-39 and P-63, with a 2,000hp+ Griffon or the insane 4,000hp Crecy, a two-stroke monster combined with a jet turbine to recover energy from the fearsome exhaust flow. Neither the engine nor the aircraft flew, but it’s a truly intriguing what-if.

4. Wet feet

The British made a qualified success of turning the Supermarine Spitfire into a carrier fighter so why not try the same with the Mustang? On paper, the American fighter had a lot more going for it, with a much more heavily built airframe, a stable wide-track undercarriage and a better view. More to the point, it had peerless range, which was of great value in the Pacific war, especially when the B-29 came into play without a land-based fighter with the range to escort it.

The Mustang was completely against the typical form of USN fighters, which tended to be big, straightforward and powered by large air-cooled radial engines. The sleeker, subtler Mustang would have represented a big change in approach. Nevertheless, a P-51D was navalised and took part in deck-landing trials aboard USS Shangri-La in late 1944, proving that the fighter was easy to operate from a carrier. The US Navy was lukewarm about the Mustang, and even the test pilot on the programme was less than keen, citing the narrow margin between landing speed and stalling speed. NAA prepared designs for a naval Mustang, based on the P-51H, but the rapid US advance through the Pacific soon provided land bases for escort fighters – including Mustangs, and the USN stuck with big, bulky air-cooled fighters.

3. Turbo snoot

The Mustang’s many positive features kept it attractive as a military aircraft long after it was superseded in its primary role. F-51Ds were still popular in the ground attack role in the Korean War, and sought-after by smaller countries’ air arms. The US Department of Defense even showed interest in an updated Mustang for the export market and counter-insurgency work as late as 1967, approaching a company that had produced a popular civilian P-51 conversion, the Cavalier. These proved a modest success, and Cavalier considered truly modernising the type by fitting a more up-to-date turboprop powerplant. The result was certainly the oddest Mustang variant for looks, as the long, slim R-R Dart gave the Turbo Mustang a distinctly proboscis-like snout. Despite this monstrosity, a taller tail and the lack of a belly scoop, the aircraft was still recognisably a Mustang. It offered great close-air-support and counter-insurgency performance at a low operating cost, but Cavalier failed to gain any customers so sold the programme to a company that could put more resource behind it. Piper bought in and developed the Turbo Mustang into the PA-48 Enforcer, which was less inelegant but ultimately no more successful.

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2. Cowboy

Mustangs wielded a lot of different weapons over the years – machine-guns, cannon, bombs, rockets, even supply cannisters and napalm, but the oddest modification has to be for the weapon used by the First Air Commando in Burma from its P-51As – a lasso. Ironically, given the number of Mustang horses that found themselves on the receiving end of one. In the insurgent war fought by the Chindits and supported by the Air Commando, cutting enemy communications was a vital task. Someone had the bright idea to suspend a 450ft cable at each end from the Mustang’s bomb racks with a weight in the middle. The pilot, exercising great skill, had to drag the cable across telegraph lines in such a way that the weight wrapped around them…and as the aircraft flew on, the cables would break, or even uproot the telegraph poles. When enough telegraph wires had been cut, the pilot would jettison the cable. Simple, and quite mad.

1. Not A Mustang

When is a Mustang not a Mustang? And when is not-a-Mustang a Mustang. When Hollywood gets involved of course! The use of Mustangs to play enemy fighters started quite early, probably influenced by the old canard that they resembled a Messerschmitt Bf 109, which they do a bit if you squint and then keep squinting until your eyes are closed altogether and then imagine a Bf 109. Allison-engined Mustangs play the part Bf 109s in the 1943 pictures ‘Sahara’ and ‘A Guy Named Joe,’ while an RAF Mustang I (still in its RAF markings) does the same in the 1944 British film ‘For Those In Peril.’ Weirdly, a squadron of Air National Guard P-51Ds play the role of a squadron of Messerschmitts in the 1948 technicolour flick ‘Fighter Squadron.’ The practice of Luftwaffering up Mustangs was still going as late as 1992 when Planes of Fame’s P-51A once again donned Balkenkreutzes in ‘Iron Eagle III.’ The Messerschmitt got its own back, though, when a trio of Hispano Ha 1112 Búchons, relatively fresh from playing 109s and the occasional Hurricane in ‘Battle of Britain’ were recruited for the 1970 biopic ‘Patton.’ The preservation movement had barely started, and Mustangs weren’t available in Europe at the time. The Búchons were therefore dressed up with fibreglass belly scoops and USAAF markings to act as P-51Bs. They allegedly had some novel handling characteristics, and ultimately didn’t make the final cut of the film.

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There cannot be many aircraft that have had the misfortune to be lumbered with such unflattering nicknames as The Flying Coffin, Widow-Maker, B-Dash-Crash, Winged Coffin, Marter Murderer, The Flying Prostitute* and, last but not least, The Baltimore Whore.  The last two because it had no visible means of support and  ‘Baltimore’ because that was where the Glen L. Martin Company made the B-26. But did the Marauder deserve the abuse?

Despite these highly derogatory views, the Marauder deserves better. Not only did it meet, and exceed, the original specification, as laid down by the US Army Air Corps (USAAC) in January 1939, for a high-speed medium bomber, but its service record is probably second to none. Certainly, the pilots who flew it operationally hold it in very high regard. 

*No offence to sex workers

The design pushed the aerodynamic state of the art, at that time, to its limits. Not only that, the construction and manufacturing methods were also leading edge. Many of the production techniques proved on the Marauder went on to become the de facto standard for the building of post-war jet airliners.  So, in many ways, it was a genuine pioneering design.

The perfect aircraft has yet to be built and the Marauder suffered failings, just like any other piece of complex machinery. But it can be strongly argued that they were not as fundamental as the critics at the time would have you believe.

To understand many of the main issues behind this outstanding aircraft, one has to go back to the original specification, Circular Proposal 39-640, issued on March 11 1939, when storm clouds were already rapidly brewing over Europe. 

This called for a new class of medium bomber, which could carry a 3000lb bomb load (same as a B-17) but could fly straight and level at 323 mph.  It would have less range (1000 miles at 265mph) and service ceiling (23,000 ft) than a B-17, but it should be remembered that even the latest fighters were not going much faster than 300 mph, so it was quite a design challenge. Over 40 US companies were sent the design brief by the USAAC and 5 eventually submitted proposals.

The Martin Company put forward the Model 179 on which it had already started work on. It also recruited, at this time, the delightfully named, Peyton Marshall Magruder, aged 28, to co-ordinate all the work as Chief Designer on the project. He was a pilot and graduate of the USN Academy at Annapolis, as well as having an aeronautical degree. He had already designed the B-10 bomber. He was clearly an exceptional individual, as he went to become an industrialist, playwright and novelist.

The first thing the team did, was go to the USAAC for clarification on what was exactly required. The answer was quite unambiguous. They wanted bomb load and high speed above all else. This was being driven, to a large degree, by Charles Lindbergh’s recommendations following his review of the Luftwaffe.

Magruder noticed that proposal did not specify a maximum landing speed, and, as you don’t get anything for nothing in aeronautics, this was clearly an area where the design team had considerable leeway in terms of trade-off with other aspects of the design. There would have been tactic acceptance of this fact within the USAAC but probably without understanding the implications. This apparent minor oversight, in what we now call the human factor element, was to have a profound and far-reaching impact on the whole project. 

More surprisingly, neither was a stalling speed specified and Magruder ended up using this to his advantage with a 97 mph with full flaps stall speed being quoted, because it sounded less intimidating and frightening than 100mph – a neat psychological trick.

However, if USAAC wanted speed and bomb load, they would get speed and bomb load. Accordingly, the Model 179 design was developed very much along those lines. The proposal submitted had 15 variants and initially was a twin tail design, something that was very much the fashion at the time, and a bomb load capability of 4000lbs.

The singer from Cobalt Chapel, Cecilia Fage, wishes to share her feelings for the C-130 Hercules.

“The ships hung in the sky in much the same way that bricks don’t.” I think of this Douglas Adams quote every time I see a Hercules. Their huge mass seems so at odds with their grace, these great hulking ballerinas, dancing on air.

Cecilia Fage (right)

The first time I came close to a Hercules I had gotten lost on a walk with my young twins. We were making our way uphill through a beech wood of gently twisting trees, silent except for the sound of twigs snapping and the small voices of mildly protesting children. Clambering over a moss covered dry-stone wall, we finally emerged into sunlight and found ourselves in a farmyard. We stopped to rest against an old, rotting wooden gate, but before I could catch my breath I noticed a strange rumbling sensation.

It grew bigger; I could feel it in my body, as though I was being enveloped in an almighty purr. Suddenly two C-130 Hercules barrelled over our heads at no more than 500 feet, almost clipping the moors beneath them, and our involuntary shouts and gasps of awe were plucked from our mouths and carried away by their propellers. They drifted up the valley together, an almighty pair – they often travel in pairs, these beautiful beasts.

Living under a military low-fly training route, I sometimes hear them at night, driving my husband mad by saying “It’s a Herc! Ooh, I reckon 30,000 – no, 28,000 feet,” before being embarrassingly pleased with myself for confirming the altitude on an app and getting it right (well, within a couple of thousand feet anyway; I’m working on it). The sound of a Hercules going over your roof at less than a thousand feet, making you yelp as you brush your teeth before bed, is one you never get used to.
The skies have been quieter lately, perhaps due to cuts in defence spending and the pandemic. Gone are the days of screaming with excitement in my car seeing two Tornado GR4s (R.I.P.) tearing up the valley towards me, while trying not to veer off the road as I drove under their bellies. Or the wokka wokka of a Chinook cruising at the same level as my kitchen window as it headed towards the golden glow of the moorland. Or shrieking with delight in the kids’ playground as a pair of Typhoons ripped the sky above us, a group of bemused children looking at me quizzically (“Why is your mummy shouting?”)

I have to go further afield now to scratch my plane-spotting itch, and what better excuse for an annual trip to Those Famous Valleys in Wales. I’ve sat on my preferred hillside for eight hours at a time without seeing a thing, but it soon dawned on me that part of the enjoyment is in the waiting. Listening for the faintest clue. Watching the landscape, squinting at every dot in the distance. Is it growing? Is it moving nearer? No, it’s just a shadow.

Seeing the clouds play tricks on you, the sun dancing tantalisingly behind them, teasing you with the possibility of a perfect low-fly blue horizon. Accepting when those clouds descend in a blanket of disappointment and you realise you won’t get lucky that day.
But on the day you do get lucky, the excitement crackles in the air. The thrill is palpable as each little figure, determinedly dotted around the various ledges and peaks, leaps up in anticipation. You might even be blessed with the inside knowledge of one of the dedicated regulars, a wise Obi Wan Kenobi of an aviation enthusiast, appearing just in the nick of time at the summit to generously share the news, “Strix incoming! Two-ship.” Your eyes focus on that tiny speck, this time it’s definitely not a sheep in the distance, yes it’s getting larger, and larger, and then there she is – wait, there’s another one – and within seconds, they appear. That unmistakable ruler-straight wing, four massive propellers, the most elegant soaring whale of a plane, her sister a blink behind her, and that giant rumbling purr which you feel from your toes to your hair. Standing high on a hillside above a Hercules as she sweeps beneath you through the valley feels impossible, like a childhood dream of blissful flying and that feeling of freedom, so elusive in adulthood.

I get asked the question often, but I haven’t worked out why I love planes so much. (Many of us seem to also have a fondness for birds?) Perhaps it started with all those trips to Biggin Hill as a child, at a time in the 1980s before the advent of kids’ fashion, when trendless, practical clothes for girls bestowed a tomboyish sense of freedom. I wore a bowl cut so precise, you could have used a compass to measure its arc, and a terry-towelling tracksuit for all occasions. I feel the same way now, when I put on a Fostex flight suit (or as I call it, cosplay for those of us who will never be pilots). Practical and ready for anything. Ideally for sitting strapped in the back of a Hercules, looking out of her wide-open cargo door at the vista below as we fly through the gap between the high Welsh peaks, and waving to those familiar figures on the hillside taking photographs.
Well, a girl can dream, can’t she?

The new Cobalt Chapel album Orange Synthetic is available here