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“I think the fastest anyone ever claimed to have gotten was Mach 2.91.”

Hans Christian Andersen’s story of ‘The Ugly Duckling’ tells of a swan’s egg unknowingly pushed into a duck’s nest. Once hatched, the bird endures a miserable life, awkward and unloved by its duck peers before learning he was really a swan. Once he joins a bevy of swans he finds acceptance and lives happily ever after. The F-111 had a similar life-story, pushed onto the Navy as a fighter interceptor as part a multi-service do-everything concept, it disappointed and was cancelled. After a dangerous and painful early life it emerged as an Air Force interdictor par excellence. Extremely long-ranged, carrying a fearsome bomb-load that could be delivered with remarkable ac curacy, the F-111 was a formidable Cold War warrior, proving its horrifically destructive power in the deserts of Iraq in 1991. We spoke to former USAF F-111 WSO Jim Rotramel to find out more about the mighty Aardvark.

Special thanks to David Riddel

What was the cockpit like? What are the pros and cons of side-by-side seating?
“First, you need to realise that the Navy insisted on side-by-side seating and an escape capsule as part of their plan to make the jet so heavy that they could justify getting out of the program. Also, their Korean War vintage F3D Skyknight and the F6D Missileer (pictured) that was replaced by the TFX also had side-by-side seating.”

“The advantages were that it made communication between the crew members easier—I could point to an instrument I wanted the pilot to look at or show him a chart. The main disadvantage was that visibility out the other side of the jet was very limited.”

What were the best and worst things about the F-111?
“When everything was working, it was awesome. When everything didn’t work right, it could be awesome in a completely different way!”

We had a challenge within the squadron once to ‘attack’ a train station in Scotland from behind a hill so we wouldn’t be able to see the target until after the simulated ‘bomb’ had been released. I picked the route and offset aimpoints I wanted to use and off we went. Getting a good positional ‘fix’ required updating not only latitude and longitude, but also elevation. We approached the hill (small mountain) from over the water where I got an altitude calibration to take care of the elevation part of the equation. As we went up the back side of the mountain, there was a small rock outcropping where I took care of the latitude and longitude. We went into “the pull” and “released” our simulated bomb. As we cleared the hill, I switched to PAVE Tack video and saw a stone bridge just to the north of the train station. I was able to drag the cursors over to the train station by the time the ‘bomb’ impacted. When we got back home, the guy who set up the challenge admitted that the coordinates he’d given us were for the bridge, not the train station, figuring that no one would be that close and the bridge coordinates would be good enough. That was the last time I trusted anyone to give me target coordinates!

“After the Cold War ended, USAFE apparently invited some Soviet military to a friendship visit. As part of the visit they had a static display including the F-4, F-15, F-16, etc., and the F-111. By far, the Soviets were most interested in the F-111, shocking their American hosts. It turns out that, aside from the SR-71, the F-111 was the plane they considered the greatest threat.”

We had a mass launch exercise with airplanes from all over the UK in the air simultaneously. Our particular flight air refueled from a KC-135 and then was tasked to ‘attack’ a RAF Bloodhound SAM site in East Anglia not too far south of ’The Wash’ body of water that lays just north of East Anglia. There was a light ship moored in the middle of The Wash that we often used to take fixes off of. As we headed south, I put my cursors on the light ship, then as we were crossing the coast, I’d picked the end of a line of trees as a second offset. We flew right over the Bloodhound site at less than 500 feet. My pilot was pretty excited and the guys at the missile site really enjoyed the show, too!

We deployed to Spain one spring instead of our normal trip to Turkey. While the night life was certainly better, the flying was much more restricted; with the exception of one day, we weren’t allowed to fly low level—just go to the bombing range and drop bombs. The F-111 carried 30,000 lbs. of fuel internally (more than a combat loaded F-16, including bombs). That was enough to stay aloft for nearly three hours including (in England) flying high level to and from Scotland, flying low level for a half hour or so and spending 15-30 minutes dropping practice bombs. So, with our flights in Spain pretty much limited to going to the range, we had a LOT of fuel to burn. Rather than spending a LOT of time in the landing pattern, we started picking out ‘targets’ to find on the base or in downtown Zaragoza using PAVE Tack. It was easy! Ridiculously easy! I remarked at the time that if we were ever unleashed in combat where we could attack from medium to high altitude instead of low level like we trained for, it would almost be unfair to those we were attacking. That is precisely what happened during Desert Storm.”

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With which unit did you serve and on which models of the F-111?
“Trained on the F-111D in late 1981. F-111F WSO from 1982-87. F-111D WSO 1987-91.”

The top speed is quoted as M2.5 – did it ever reach such speeds? Could it?
“99% of the time was spent subsonic—going fast uses lots of gas and most of our missions required us to penetrate deep behind enemy lines so gas was always at a premium. But, if you needed to go fast, you could. Most of the really high speed stuff was done during Functional Check Flights. In the UK, when we flew up the east coast to Scotland, it took about 45 minutes. The FCFs did the high & fast part of the flight returning from Scotland—in about 15 minutes. I wasn’t an FCF guy, but there were stories of planes landing with their antennas melted off. One time we flew 70-2376, which had been Mountain Home’s bicentennial jet soon after an FCF and the paint at the leading edge of the inlets had partially burned off. revealing the b-c paint underneath.

“There were stories about guys seeing how fast the Vark would go. There was NO specified maximum speed. What we had was a heat sensor on the windscreen. When the sensor got hot enough, it cause a caution light to illuminate and an egg timer located behind the WSOs head to start. The warning was that if the timer reached five minutes, the windscreen would melt. I think the fastest anyone ever claimed to have gotten was M2.91. In any event no one ever saw the jet stop accelerating—everyone decided to back off before testing the egg timer…

In its early development it had many problems – do you think this is why only Australia was the only export user?
The UK dropped the TSR.2 in favour of the F-111K, but backed out when the wing structural issues arose and ended up with F-4K/M until getting Tornados. Aside from that issue, the F-111 was expensive to operate and that was probably a factor in the decision.”

What equipment would you have liked added to the aircraft?
“For its time, it had top-of-the-line equipment. Toward the end, some jets even got GPS and multi-function displays, but that was after I left. Some of the stuff that came along later, like night vision goggles, synthetic aperture radar and digital map displays would have been useful. Also, a more reliable INS would have been VERY welcome.”

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Was the EW/EW equipment good enough?
“Apparently, as none were lost during Desert Storm. We had internal ECM that was useful against older SAMs and ECM pods to deal with the newer systems.”

Why did Australia purchase the aircraft?
“The F-111 could carry a lot of bombs a long way—we could get deeper into Eastern Europe from Lakenheath than Tornados could from German bases. It handled about the same no matter what it was loaded up with. The RAAF needed a jet with long legs for it to have a creditable offensive capability. I suspect that was their main rationale for getting it, but you need to ask them to be sure.”

Do you miss the aircraft, have fond memories of it?
“It’s been 30 years, and you tend to remember the good bits and forget the bad ones. We lost six jets and two crews in the first 18 months I was at Lakenheath. Nobody who flew fast jets in those days didn’t know guys who were happy and healthy in the morning and didn’t go home that night. That said, it was the most fun job I ever had.”

What was the hardest system to master?

“A Test WSO from Edwards AFB, who’d flown lots of different aircraft, visited us at Lakenheath. He told us that the F-111F was the most challenging aircraft for WSOs in the USAF inventory—including the SR-71. Basically, if we could conquer the ‘F’ we could handle anything else the USAF could throw at us.”

The bombing range could be very challenging as it took about 13 steps to get a bomb to come off the airplane, so while you were trying to copy down the score from your previous bomb, you were also setting up the switches for the next bomb and getting back in the radar for its delivery.

The most problematic system was the inertial navigation system, which failed more often than anything else. There were backup procedures, but they were very workload intensive and not terribly effective.’

What are your feelings/thoughts on the Tornado and Su-24?

“The Tornado had better (newer) systems, but a much smaller range and payload capability than the Vark. As I understand it, the Russians referred to the Su-24 as the ‘Suitcase’. I’’ve heard that it only had a Doppler navigation system—no INS, so that would have limited its effectiveness. I wouldn’t trade the Vark for either, especially the Su-24.”

How combat effective was it?

“Ask the Iraqis. After Desert Storm, we learned that during daytime airfield personnel would hide in harden aircraft shelters (HAS) because they felt safe from attacks by fighters dropping unguided bombs. At night, they only felt safe outside the HASs because the F-111Fs would conduct attacks using a tactic called “consecutive miracles” where the first LGB would punch a hole in the HAS roof followed milliseconds later by a second bomb going through that hole to explode within the confines of the HAS totally devastating everything inside.
Likewise, Iraqi tank crews learned quickly that sleeping in their nice warm tanks at night wasn’t a good idea. They didn’t worry too much about the dumb bombs being dropped during the day, but when the F-111Fs showed up at night, it was one-LGB per tank. It was soon decreed that F-16s weren’t allowed to attack the tanks after 4PM so that the heat from their misses wouldn’t distract the F-111Fs crews at night that were actually destroying tanks. F-111Fs destroyed nearly as many tanks as A-10s.”

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“As I sat out the war in New Mexico, I watched Gen. Schwarzkopf’s 5 o’clock follies (er briefings) every day. He never mentioned F-111s, not even crediting them for their ‘tank-plinking’ that allowed the ground war to start, but talked a lot about the USAF’s favourites, the F-15Es and F-117As. But nearly all the video shown was from F-111Fs! The most interesting thing to me was that the video was sometimes reversed or tilted to one side or the other. It turned out that a WSO from my squadron had been in charge of putting together the video clips used every day. He explained that the general couldn’t figure out from which directions the bombs were entering the video, so decreed that he always wanted them to come from the upper right corner!

After that war demonstrated the clear advantage of using smart bombs like those employed by the F-111F & F-117A the US pretty much abandoned “dumb bombs” and procured much better targeting pods than the LANTIRN pods used during Desert Storm by F-15Es. And the smart bombs themselves have been greatly improved.”

Tell me something I don’t know about the F-111…

“People who flew the MiG-23 described adjusting the wing sweep as a terrifying experience (actually, several things about the Flogger qualified for that description!). The F-111 (and other western variable geometry aircraft) had two trim systems, called parallel and series. Series trim is what the pilot controlled and acted like trim in any aircraft. Parallel trim was where the magic happened. It worked in background to automatically compensate for aerodynamic changes caused by the wings movement. I’ve watched the wings move and there was absolutely no physical sensation in the cockpit that anything was happening.”

What should I have asked you?
“After the Soviet Union collapsed, the military had to absorb the ‘peace dividend’. Big Air Force had never liked the F-111 (except when something actually needed to get done) and they rationalised that they would never need the F-111’s range and payload capability again, so they retired the last of the fighters in 1996. In 2001, that assumption was proved foolish when we found ourselves fighting in Afghanistan.”

What was considered the main threat nation and how would the F-111 have fared against its defences?
“The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were the obvious threat US F-111s were directed against, China for the RAAF. After the Cold War ended, USAFE apparently invited some Soviet military to a friendship visit. As part of the visit they had a static display including the F-4, F-15, F-16, etc., and the F-111. By far, the Soviets were most interested in the F-111, shocking their American hosts. It turns out that, aside from the SR-71, the F-111 was the plane they considered the greatest threat.”

Anything a F-111 could do that a F/A-18F can’t? How did you feel about the transition?

“Torch (aka dump and burn)?! After retiring from the USAF, I worked for the USN as a contractor, primarily on the F/A-18 programme. The Super Hornet systems are fantastic compared to what we had in the F-111. The main advantage the F-111 had was range and payload. The F-111C with the Avionics (Australian?) Update Program (AUP) certainly featured many improvements over the Varks I flew, but the F/A-18F systems are infinitely more capable.”

A sleek silver dream, the Marut fighter was a bold statement by a newly independent nation. India’s first indigenous fighter-bomber and the first Asian jet aircraft to enter service, the ‘Spirit of the Tempest’ never lived up to its full potential.  One pilot noted “She’s a beauty, no doubt on that. It is also the only aircraft, I know, where nothing moves faster than the fuel gauge.” We spoke to former Indian Air Force pilot Dara Cooper to find out more. 

“I flew the Marut in two short spells. My background was flying ground attack and photo recce roles on Vampires and on the Mystère (leaving aside my experience on the T 66 Hunter -  the standard trainer for Maruts till late 70s) when the type trainer came from HAL. I converted from Mystère 31 Sqn to Maruts at Hindon (1974)and then sqn moved to Jodhpur to join 220 and 10 Sqns.

I remember you saying you wanted to make comparisons with latter day aircraft including the MiG-23 and MiG-27. Don’t know if I got that right or not. However, I think that would be comparing chalk and cheese. I would stand the Marut up against the Hunter, Mystère and the MiG T-77 (the Type 77 better known as MiG-21FL). The first two were near peers in class though the Marut never lived down its underpowered rating. (Air Mshl Johnny Greene, an ace in days gone by, was Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) of South Western Air Command (SWAC) and I remember receiving him after his first solo. He said, “I say Coops, Amazing aircraft! Only thing that moved on the take-off roll was the fuel gauge!” Great guys and their great sense of humour). The only MiG variant that we flew in contention with it was the T – 77 CAP and can say honestly, I cannot remember a single occasion when the Marut didn’t slip away unscathed.

To get back to the beginning I first saw the first Marut in physical form in Hindon, though I had heard stories about it. She was a feast for the eyes, that was my first impression. First sit in the cockpit was a relief after the cramped Mystère. I also noticed that the workmanship was shoddy compared to the Hunter and Mystère. It was my first experience of nose-wheel steering, and I found it exceedingly comfy to turn her (after my past experience of using brakes). The first air experience was surprisingly pleasurable, despite it being summer. I remember the take-off was slightly longer than that of the Mystère and considerably longer than the more powerful Hunter. It took her some time to build up initial speed but once she crossed 400 knots she was a different beast altogether all the way up to 580 kts, the most I remember clocking level with D/Ts. There are peeps who took her up to 600 knots and a wee bit more. High G turns at low level were smooth and steady though at times it bled off fast, especially while taking avoiding measures (evasive manoeuvres). At low level performance (good at height) gradually petered off.

The avionics, by today’s standards were as expected, a good Integrated Strike and Interception System (ISIS) gunsight but not much by way of any navigational aids. Easy to fly, easy to handle and as stable as a rock. The airframe was rock solid. But as for its role, ground attack and close air support, it was tailor made for the role.

I had two short spells in 1974. I converted and did a bit of the ops syllabus before being brought down by cerebral malaria following a trip to Jamnagar for sustained range firing. Followed a long spell of low med cat, I managed to fill the gap with the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC )in 1979. Then back to 220 Sqn this time (1980 – 81) when the fleet was disbanded and only the target tow flight moved out to Bakshi ka Talab. Total flying on type was a little over 200 hrs. Enjoyed every bit of it.

What I didn’t like was what I consider the biggest goof up of all time. We were predominantly a MiG-21 and Su-7 air force then and their prize qualification was an FCL from the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment. So during my second tour, two of the Sqn Cdrs were MiG FCL (Fighter Combat Leader, fighter weapons course trained) types & Chief Operations Officer another of the same, popularly known as ‘Alley of the Valley’. The third squadron Cdr was Joe Bakshi, a dyed-in-the wool Marut guy and also a VRC (Vir Chakra gallantry medal) from 71, commanding 10 Sqn which was the training squadron. He too despaired. Somehow the first three took it upon themselves to make Marut pilots ace air defence pilots. So when I got back to Maruts after DSSC was shocked to see the ops syllabus. Almost 40% devoted to high level air combat and a quaint exercise called pair manoeuvres! Being a senior in the squadron spent hours pleading, begging, being down right insubordinate with my boss about this air-to-air fetish. We were a ground attack squadron flying an aircraft specific to that role. Couldn’t get him to write a paper on why waste a/c hrs on doing something we were not capable of? We flew sorties amongst ourselves and spent hrs on briefing and de-briefings on “I was here and you were there, and I percehed blah blah blah”. What we needed was more low level strikes with bouncers from other types, that was our role and not converting speed into height! But alas….

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Some rare experiences. We had got on to doing slow speed aerobatics to gain confidence. If I remember right the entry speed for a loop was 500 kts (cant remember) and we gradually kept reducing. One such sortie in a trainer was on top of the loop and looked in to check speed (40 – 50 Kts) looked out to see a huge buzzard practically scraping the canopy. Both of us ducked, check altimeter reading 12,000′! Remember telling the other pilot, F@@ck if it had hit us, no one would have believed us. Been up chit creek facing a Court of Inquiry at the very least for unauthorised low flying outside low flying hours. Another speciality of the Marut was hydraulic failure. Lives there a Marut pilot who only had one hydraulic failure? Take me to him! That was some hydraulic system. But its outstanding feature was the airframe. I am desperately trying to locate a photograph of a Marut that belly-landed in a field, except for the belly touching the ground there is no other visible damage. I will send it later when I see it. I have seen a jock bring back a HT cable stuck in the rudder, lashing along on landing. The espirit de corps saved him, Shashi Ramdas cleaned up the rudder and Rajasthan went into a two day black-out. Keru came out smiling and smelling of roses!

The diciest mission was at Jaisalmer. It was a four-aircraft lead check, I was No 4 in LL nav ending in a live F/G strike at the range. I was flying a known underpowered aircraft. As we finished firing, ATC told us a guy had got lost and just landed downwind with engine flaming out on R/W. As Jodhpur was under repairs we catered only for diversionary fuel to Uttarlai, also under repair but usable parallel taxi track. As a tractor was already towing the a/c away decided to orbit at Jmer and land. LL fuel blinker, 120 gals, started on in orbit No 1. I eventually switched off 34 gals. Did heave a bit of a sigh and managed to get out of the chit thanks to my friends. I had seen the blinker on a few times, but never for this long!

Sustained turn at low level was good but below 420 speed washed off fast. At high level, it was below average. Acceleration after 420 was a piece of cake. Building up to 360 took some time. The Marut crowd, all three squadrons was something else. No petty envy, no back-biting, plenty of healthy competition, still around 75 of us friends who meet occasionally, have get-togethers, know families and keep in touch. My blog MarutFans is ample proof of that.

Oh yes, it had a lot of tech problems almost to the end of its life thanks to shoddy HAL workmanship. Last one I heard was someone pushed left rudder, nose wheel turned right. The Hydraulic lines were inter-changed!”

The greatest feeling I got from flying this aircraft? “It was the pride to be flying India’s first full-blown fighter. Secondly, guys who were already legends Kapil Bhargava, Babbi Dey, Prithi Singh, Shashi Ramdas, Chuchu Tilak had nursed it through its trials and tribulations.”
Saddest bit? “Politics & poor foresight eventually struck off over 100 serviceable aircraft, some with less than 200 hrs on the airframe, written off at the stroke of a pen.”

These are the 58 fastest manned aircraft that ever flown. As you’ll see, the age of speed peaked in the 1960s: today the US Navy hasn’t a frontline aircraft that comes close to making it into the top 58!

58. Avro CF-105 Arrow (1958)

M1.98

57. Northrop YF-17

Mach 2. Oh, and I should also add the Convair B-58 Hustler here, also at Mach 2. And the Gripen.

56. BAe Experimental Aircraft Programme (1986)

Mach 2.

55. Saab 35 Draken (1955)

Mach 2

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54. Northrop F-20 Tigershark (1980)

Mach 2

53. Sukhoi Su-57 (2010)

Mach 2 (est)

52. North American A-5 Vigilante (1958)

Mach 2

51. Douglas D-558-II Skyrocket (1953)

Mach 2.005

50. Dassault Mirage IIIV (1965)

Mach 2.04 (Fastest ever VTOL aircraft). Should also include the Grumman F11F-1F Super Tiger here at Mach 2.04.

49. Tupolev Tu-160 (1981)

Mach 2.05. (I should have also added the Eurofighter Typhoon here which has also gone M2.05)

48. General Dynamics F-16 (1974)

Mach 2.05

47. English Electric Lightning (1957)

Mach 2.1 (fastest British aeroplane)

46. Saab 37 Viggen (1967)

Mach 2.1 (fastest Swedish aeroplane)

45. Helwan HA-300 (1964)

Mach 2.1 (Fastest African aircraft)

(I should have added Chengdu J-10A here at Mach 2.1, awaiting verification)

44. Republic F-105 Thunderchief (1955)

Mach 2.1

43. Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 (1955)

Mach 2.1

42. Tupolev Tu-144 (1968)

Mach 2.15

41. Mikoyan-Gurevich Ye-8 (1962)

Mach 2.15

40. Sukhoi Su-15 (1962)

Mach 2.16

39. Nord 1500-2 Griffon II (1957)

Mach 2.19

38. Mirage F1 (1966)

Mach 2.2

37. Mirage 2000 (1978)

Mach 2.2

36. Mirage IV (1959)

Mach 2.2

35. Dassault Mirage III (1956)

Mach 2.2

34. Dassault Mirage 5 (1967)

Mach 2.2

33. Dassault Mirage F2 (1966)

Mach 2.2

32. McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (1958)

Mach 2.2. It is rumoured that the prototype XF4H-1 reached Mach 2.6 and that a special recon variant reached even greater speeds.

31.. Rockwell B-1A ‘Excalibur’ (1974)

Mach 2.22

30. Sukhoi Su-11 (1958)

Mach 2.2

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29. Northrop YF-23 (1990)

Mach 2.2 1990

28. Lockheed F-104 Starfighter (1954)

Mach 2.2

27. Sukhoi Su-47 (1997)

Mach 2.21

26. Aérospatiale/BAC Concorde

Max recorded 2.23 (Normal Mach 2)

25. Mikoyan Project 1.44 (2000)

Mach 2.24

24. Mikoyan MiG-29 (1977)

Mach 2.25

23. Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor (1997)

Mach 2.25

22. Panavia Tornado ADV (1979)

Mach 2.27

21. Dassault Mirage 4000 (1979)

Mach 2.3

(The IAI Kfir is also quoted as Mach 2.3 though verification is sought)

20. Dassault Mirage G (1967)

Mach 2.34 FASTEST EUROPEAN AIRCRAFT

19. Grumman F-14 Tomcat (1968)

Mach 2.34

18. Sukhoi Su-27 (1977)

Mach 2.35

17. Mikoyan MiG-23 (1967)

Mach 2.35

16. Chengdu J-20

Estimated Mach 2.35 (Expected to get to 2.5 with future engines)

UPDATE: With divert-less bumps M1.6-2 seems more likely

15. Convair F-106 Delta Dart

Mach 2.39

14. Vought XF8U-3 Crusader III (1958)

Mach 2.39

13. Shenyang J-8II (1984)

Mach 2.4 (limited to 2.2 in peacetime)

12. Bell X-1A (1953)

Mach 2.44

11. General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark (1964)

Mach 2.5 (though some pilots have said it was actually lower, maybe 2.2-2.3). One pilot has claimed M2.91.

10. McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle

Mach 2.54 (Really prob 2.2 for in-service aircraft) 1972

9. Mikoyan MiG-31

Mach 2.83 (LIMITED TO M1.5 in peacetime)

8. Mikoyan-Gurevich Ye-152-1 (1961)

Mach 2.85

7. North American XB-70 Valkyrie (1964)

Mach 3.1

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6. Bell X-2 (1955)

Mach 3.196 (air-launched)

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5. Mikoyan MiG-25 (1964)

Mach 3.2 (normal limits 2.83) (FASTEST NON US AIRCRAFT)

4. Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird (1964)

Mach 3.3

3. Lockheed YF-12 3.35 (1963)

2. Lockheed A-12 3.35 1962

1. North American X-15 (1959)

Mach 6.72

The People’s Mosquito is a charity with the sole aim of restoring and returning a UK-based DH.98 Mosquito to British and European skies. We spoke to their Operations Director Bill Ramsey to find out what makes the ‘Wooden Wonder’ so special.

Describe the Mosquito in three words
“Fast, innovative and multi-role.”

What was unusual about the Mosquito’s construction? Were any aircraft made in similar ways?
“Wooden composite for the entire airframe, giving strength, light weight and streamlining (no rivets) – as others designed for combat operations then you are looking at the gliders such as the Horsa used for paratroops.”

How did its performance compare to other aircraft of the time?
“During its trials on 16 January 1941, W4050 outpaced a Spitfire at 6,000 ft (1,800 m). The original estimates were that as the Mosquito prototype had twice the surface area and over twice the weight of the Spitfire Mk II, but also with twice its power, the Mosquito would end up being 20 mph (30 km/h) faster.”

What was best and worst about how the RAF operated the type in World War Two? What were the greatest triumphs and mistakes?
“The most famous action of the Mosquito was the Amiens Prison raid in February 1944, a precision strike which released captured resistance leaders who had knowledge on some plans for D-Day. The saddest raid by Mossies would be the successful strike on Gestapo HQ in Copenhagen, Denmark in March 1945, called Operation Carthage. The raid was successful in destroying records and preventing the collapse of the Danish resistance fighters, but tragically a Mosquito was lost and crashed near a school; other Mosquitos mistakenly then though the school was the target. Civilians, including many children, were killed.”

What were the type’s biggest strengths and weaknesses?
“Speed, versatility, and the ability to outsource manufacturing to alternative industries e.g. cabinet makers, reliability, good range, and good survivability on raids compared to other types. Weaknesses, well very few, but one all pilots respected was that both engines props turn the same way and as you take off there was a vicious tendency for the aircraft to swing violently. Another would be that if a fully fuelled and loaded Mossie had an engine failure on take-off below 160 knots then the aircraft would not climb and your only course of action would be to belly-land the aircraft. This actually affected all aircraft fuelled and bombed up, but the Mossie needed a high rate of speed to then take-off on one engine fully armed.”

What are the advantages of twin-engines versus single or four engines? Depends on the mission type, for the Mossie she operated well in many roles whether bombing, intruding or photo-reconn at good speed, range and versatility versus some single engined types (range / mission) and four engined (size / weight and speed).  

In terms of survivability and carry a certain size bombload a certain distance hope how does a Mosquito compare to a B-17? “The Mossie had a higher survivability over all the four-engined bombers used by the allies. Its size, speed and manoeuvrability gave the allies the ability to do precision strikes and great close air support. But Mosquitos were used as an effective light bomber force, used very effectively to mark targets and aircraft were often detailed to do two Ops in an evening. The early Mosquito bomber versions could carry 2,000 lb of bombs, but the later B.XVI could carry 4,000 lbs in an enlarged bomb bay. It is a myth it carried the same as the B-17, this carried 6,000 lbs of bombs and was used in strategic bombing.”

Could a Mosquito do well in a dogfight against a single-engine fighter? “Yes and no. If the single-seater engaged the Mosquito low level, with height and speed it (the single-seater) had tremendous advantage in a dogfight. The Mosquito’s strength was its ability to hit and run. Not to engage in twisting dog-fights, the Mossie crews would engage once with an advantage and speed off to fight another day.”

How many export operators did it have? Did Mosquitos perform in any wars in ways that we are unlikely to have heard of? “Circa 12, including Canada and Australia. It operated in the Chinese Civil War 1945-47 and was used by the Israelis in the early Arabic wars in the Middle East.”

What is the biggest myth about the Mosquito?
“It carried the same bomb weight as a B-17.”

What was the strangest role or mission that the Mosquito had? “Flying with a passenger in the bomb bay?”

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Could it take a lot of gunfire and fly on compared with its contemporaries?
“Yes, and depending on damage, repairs could be done in service at the field.”

Complete this line, the Mosquito was the great because….
“It could do any mission you asked of it!”

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How dangerous was it being a pilot assigned to a Mosquito unit?
“Less dangerous operating the four-engined aircraft – as survivability was higher.”

Which enemy aircraft was most comparable to it and how does it compare?
“None, in my opinion it was unique for its type and era.”

Which modern aircraft could you compare it to and why?
The F-35, as this is also a composite multi-role combat aircraft.”

How many are airworthy?
“Currently three and all in the USA. There is one in Canada requiring work to regain airworthiness”

Over the course of the 20th century there are very few aircraft that can claim to have been truly decisive, whether by accident or design. The list might Include such worthies as the P-51 Mustang or the Hurricane. It is doubtful that Heinkel’s much derided He 177 would be included in such a list but nonetheless the case can be made that it was one of the most influential aircraft on the course of the Second World War. Unfortunately for Germany it was influential in exactly the opposite direction they intended. Named the ‘Greif’ (Griffon) the mighty aircraft promised much and delivered considerably less. Unlike dragons, griffons do not breath fire but fire was to prove particularly pertinent to the He 177 programme.

The Nazis were a government of fantasists, they fantasised about a huge German Empire, arranged on strict psuedoscientific racial lines that rated hair colour over talent. They fantasised about enormous ugly buildings, so large they would experience internal weather conditions. They fantasised about murdering a large swathe of their population on the basis of who their grandparents were, and unfortunately for everyone else, many of their fantasies spilled over into reality. One thing that you can’t accuse them of is a failure to ‘think big’ and so it was, just as with big tanks and big trains, they fantasised about big aircraft. The origin of what would become the He 177 lay in a somewhat murky programme for a big aeroplane, developed by the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) under the leadership of Generalleutnant Walther Wever, impressively named the ‘Ural Bomber’. Wever envisioned a strategic bombing arm for the Luftwaffe and was closely aligned with the prevailing theories then governing the development of air power in the UK and USA. To that end he approached aircraft manufacturers Junkers and Dornier, in secret, that would be able to attack Soviet industry in the event they moved their factories eastwards during a future war. The Do 19 and Ju 89 produced for the Ural Bomber programme flew in 1936 and 37 respectively and were decidedly humdrum. Meanwhile Wever died in an air crash in 1936 leaving the Luftwaffe bereft of a strategic bombing proponent. Wever’s replacement was Albert Kesselring, a talented General who oversaw development of the Messerschmitt 109, but he was far more interested in medium bombers. Ernst Udet headed up the Luftwaffe’s technical division and was totally fixated on dive bombers (which was to prove significant to the He 177 down the line) inasmuch as he was fixated on anything other than partying with plenty of alcohol and attractive women. Erhard Milch, their superior, was fully aware that Germany lacked the industrial capacity at this point to produce strategic bombers in any meaningful quantities. Between them they persuaded Herman Goering to drop the Ural bomber programme and concentrate on tactical bombers, a strategy that was, initially at least, very successful but was to cost them dear later on. Goering is alleged to have stated, “The Führer will never ask me how big our bombers are, but how many we have.” Nonetheless, with the unfocussed strategy typical of the Nazi period, the idea of a strategic bomber was not completely quashed, indeed work on very large strategic aircraft was resuscitated with the requirement, issued in 1937, for an aircraft capable of carrying a five tonne bomb load to New York which really was in the realm of fantasy in the late 30s.

Out of all this muddled thinking and vacillation came the He 177: once the tepid performance of the Ural bomber contenders became known, a more modest requirement, named ‘Bomber A’ was issued by Wever on the very day of his death. The specification called for an aircraft to carry a tonne of bombs over a range of 5000 km at a speed not less than 500 km/h (311mph). This was an exceptionally challenging specification and the speed element alone put the bomber into territory beyond that of contemporary fighters, being known as the Schnellbomber concept, the same basic idea would result in the incredibly successful De Havilland Mosquito, but was to be the source of much heartache for the Luftwaffe.

Heinkel, well respected for the successful (and fast) He 111 that was then gainfully being employed laying waste to large areas of metropolitan Spain, responded to the tender with Projekt 1041, building a full scale mock-up by November 1937. Coincidentally Heinkel had been working on ways to wring the maximum speed out of aircraft design and had lighted on an almost pathological obsession with reducing drag – a process that resulted in the undeniably graceful He 119 which featured a smoothly tapering fuselage from nose to tail with no unsightly windscreens or other excrescences to spoil the streamlining. Significantly they had powered the He 119 with two Daimler Benz DB 601 engines mounted side by side in the fuselage and geared together to drive a single airscrew. Designated the DB 606 and known, rather grandiosely as a ‘power system’, the siamised engines had performed sufficiently well in the He 119 for Heinkel to propose two such ‘power systems’ for Projekt 1041, a decision that would see a significant reduction in drag over a similar aircraft with four separate engine nacelles but was to prove disastrous to the programme as a whole. But this would be only the most serious of the manifold problems of the He 177, virtually every major design decision Heinkel made was ill advised at best, as follows:

The DB 606 had caused no problems onto He 119 but in the He 177 the ‘power system’s were an incredibly tight fit in their cowlings. Both engines shared a common central exhaust manifold serving a total of 12 cylinders, the two inner cylinder banks of the component engines. This central exhaust system would often became extremely hot, causing oil and grease which routinely accumulated in the bottom of each engine cowling to catch fire. this problem was compounded by the fact that there was a tendency for the fuel injection pump on each engine to lag in their response to the pilot throttling back in such situations, deliver more fuel than was required and thus fuel the fire, in addition the fuel injection pump connections often leaked. Furthermore, to reduce the aircraft’s weight no firewall was provided, and the back of each engine was fitted so close to the main spar, with two-thirds of each engine being placed behind the wing’s leading edge, that fuel and oil fluid lines and electrical harnesses were crammed in with insufficient space and the engines were often covered with fuel and oil from leaking fuel lines and connections. At high altitude the poorly designed lubrication pump led to the oil foaming, reducing its lubricating qualities. Insufficient lubrication ultimately resulted in connecting rod bearings failing (which also befell the Avro Manchester but that aircraft was quickly altered into the superlative Lancaster), resulting in the conrods sometimes bursting through the crankcases and puncturing the oil tanks, the contents of which would then empty onto the white hot central exhaust manifold. The tightly packed nacelles in which the engines were installed on the He 177A, with many of the engine’s components buried within the wing led to very poor ventilation as well as poor maintenance access. In the words of one aviation historian, the engine accessories and cowling of the He 177 were ‘almost wilfully badly designed’. Essentially the He 177 was a fire waiting to happen.

But there was more. In an effort to fulfil their obsessive desire to reduce drag, Heinkel decided to use cutting edge technology to provide the aircraft’s defensive weaponry in three remotely controlled turrets. These offered other advantages such as reducing the vulnerability of the gunners and providing them with the best possible view. Unfortunately development of the remote turrets lagged behind the airframe and the aircraft had to be redesigned to allow manned gun position to be fitted, this required strengthening the aircraft in the affected areas and increased weight again. Eventually, later production He 177s got one remote turret at least. The manned tail gun position was always problematic, initially requiring the gunner to lay prone at his position, production aircraft at least gave him a seat but the field of fire was always very limited. 

Weight growth meant that the original single wheel undercarriage would be insufficient to handle the ever-enlarging He 177. The undercarriage legs needed to be long to allow ground clearance for the unusually large propellers (required for the mighty power of the DB 606). With limited room in the nacelle and wing for a larger undercarriage unit, Heinkel adopted the unique expedient of having two separate legs, each with its own wheel, that retracted in opposite directions up into the inner and outer wing simultaneously. Ironically, given that this system was adopted due to weight growth, the undercarriage design was very heavy and contributed to weight growth. Furthermore it added complexity for servicing, just changing a tyre required two hours of work and involved the use of a massive 12 tonne capacity jack.

As if this weren’t enough tests on the first A-1 production aircraft revealed that the wing had been improperly designed and would begin to fail after only 20 flights (provided the engines hadn’t caught fire by then) and extensive redesign and strengthening was undertaken requiring further time and increasing weight.

Meanwhile, the specification changed. After the death of Wever, the impetus for strategic bombing was lost. At the same time Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers were proving impressively successful in Spain. Contemporary German bombsights were pretty inaccurate (as were most bombsights at the time to be fair) and experience in Spain demonstrated that dive bombing was more effectively destructive than level bombing by conventional medium bombers. And thus, if a small aircraft could cause so much devastation by dive bombing, imagine how much potent that would be if the dive bomber were a large aircraft. On 5 November 1937 the RLM issued the stipulation that the He 177 should be capable of shallow angle dive bombing. Ernst Udet mentioned this to Ernst Heinkel when inspecting the He 177 mock-up on the same day. Heinkel stated that the 177 would ‘never’ be capable of dive bombing. 

Despite Heinkel’s response, the design was modified to possess the structural strength to safely pull out of shallow dives, thus beginning the aircraft’s inexorable increase in weight before it even existed, just in time for the requirement to be altered again to demand the He 177 be capable of 60 degree dive bombing. This is very steep, especially for such a large aircraft, the design was altered and strengthened again, this time causing a large jump in weight. If you are sniggering over the idea that such an obviously unsuitable aircraft as the 32 tonne, 100 foot wingspan, He 177 could be even considered for dive bombing, it is worth remembering that this wasn’t solely just some madcap Nazi scheme – the specification that called for the eminently sensible (ie dull) Handley-Page Halifax four engined heavy bomber of roughly the same dimensions and weight also stipulated that it be capable of dive bombing. Air forces across the world were painfully aware that the accuracy of level bombing was pretty woeful and were attempting to change that state of affairs. However, the British Air Ministry actually listened to Frederick Handley-Page when he told them the Halifax would never be capable of dive bombing. The RLM chose to ignore Ernst Heinkel to pursue their dive bombing dreams, which would never be realised, and paid for them with wasted time and weight growth 

The first He 177 flew on 9 November 1939 and all seemed broadly well despite its litany of questionable design choices and ongoing wrangling over its application. But then the engine temperatures soared and the aircraft had to return hurriedly to the ground, a fairly accurate premonition of what was to come. Similarly, the hopelessness of the dive bombing concept was made very apparent very quickly when the second prototype undertook the He 177’s first diving trials and promptly broke up in mid air, killing all on board. Just to make sure the point was adequately made though, during further diving trials the fourth prototype then dove straight into the Baltic Sea, killing all on board. The fifth prototype was the first to catch fire and was lost, followed by a further three.

The biggest myth about WW2 aviation is…

“…that the Battle of Britain was a close run thing, won by a narrow margin.  It really wasn’t.  The Luftwaffe were whipped and whipped badly.  I can produce all number of stats to prove my point but perhaps this isn’t the place.“

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Nonetheless, when working properly the He 177 possessed a performance that could not be ignored and the aircraft entered production, beginning with 35 A-0 pre production models followed by 130 A-1s, the latter all built under subcontract by Arado. virtually all of these aircraft were kept in second line service due to ongoing teething troubles. KG 40 were the first unit to attempt to use the bomber operationally in the maritime role during the summer of 1942, but this proved premature and they reverted to their Fw 200 Condors. The A-3 was an improved version, though still problematic, 170 of which were built. Further effort yielded the A-5 with more powerful DB 610 ‘power systems’ and many of the problems ameliorated if not solved and some 350 of these left the factory. Further developments led to the A-6 and A-7 of which a handful were built by which time development had switched to the He 177B with four conventional separate engines (and which would never progress beyond the prototype stage).

In service the He 177 never served in the numbers required to really make a difference and only became a mature enough design to commit to mass usage at around the same time that Germany effectively ran out of fuel. It is not known what proportion of the 1169 produced saw service but estimates range as low as 200. What is known is that hundreds of He 177s appeared parked at bases on Allied reconnaissance photographs and contemporary photographic interpreters stated “absence of track activity suggests that these aircraft are not being worked on.” 

To be totally fair to the He 177 it should be pointed out that it could prove to be effective on operations, it had, for example, the lowest loss rate of any German bomber during the ‘Baby Blitz’ of 1944 though the overall loss rate of all types was an eye-watering 60%. It was also formidable as an anti-shipping platform equipped with the Fritz-X radio controlled glide bomb, though on its debut in this role, the captain of the ship being attacked noted that one of the aircraft appeared to burst spontaneously into flame, which may not come as a great surprise to those familiar with the aircraft. “For five or six seconds we saw a large flame coming from the port engine and then the aircraft was enveloped in a dense black cloud of smoke. When I last saw the aircraft it was at an angle, which may have been done deliberately to blow the flame away, or it may have been losing height. It went into cloud and I did not see it again.”

The facts were that the He 177 was too accident prone, too late and too resource heavy. It is difficult to quantify exactly how many manhours were expended on its development and production but as this was at exactly the same time Heinkel were developing the world’s first jet fighter (that would ultimately never see production due to inexplicable official indifference) it was obvious that there were more worthwhile things they could have been doing. As to how much material went its production, each He 177 consumed four DB 601 or DB 605 engines for its ‘power system’s. With 1169 built that’s enough for 4676 single engine fighters, all of which never existed to attack Allied aircraft or strafe Allied troops. The empty weight of each aircraft was 16.8 tonnes, that is a lot of aluminium and steel to not be made into other more useful, aircraft (for comparison, a BF 109G weighed about 2.2 tonnes).

But perhaps the timing was the worst of all. The He 177 could deliver the goods in terms of speed, range and payload, at least when everything was working. But the desultory expenditure of time on tinkering with the design to try and make it work properly, which it didn’t really do for about five years, meant that the bomber essentially joined a war already lost. To put this into perspective, the He 177 flew for the first time in November 1939, a month after the Handley page Halifax, yet the Halifax began operational service in late 1940 and contributed much to Bomber Command’s horrific campaign against German urban centres. If one were to imagine an He 177 force, and the 177 was arguably a more potentially formidable aircraft than the Halifax, available at the end of 1940 then the destruction meted out to British cities would have been an order of magnitude higher than it transpired to be. The He 177 could carry more than any other German bomber and was extremely difficult to intercept by 1940/41 standards, even more so by night when it would have been effectively immune to night fighters, at least until the advent of the Mosquito.

Thus the badly designed large aircraft that, unavailable at the right time, built to a requirement its operators found uninteresting, consumed much industrial effort and material and required many trained aircrew who could have been flying something else. 

Did the He 177 cause the Allies to win the war? In reality, almost definitely not, Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union basically sealed the fate of Germany in June 1941. But it is not hard to imagine that a combat capable He 177, available in numbers in 1940, would have had a tremendous effect on the UK which could have adversely affected US commitments to its ally. Meanwhile a force of He 177s in the maritime role could have caused havoc with British naval operations. All of which does rather presuppose a massive production effort on the big Heinkel, which may have been beyond Germany’s ability to supply at that time. Nonetheless Goering summed up the effect of Germany’s fixation on the tactical medium bomber fleet in 1943, ”Well, those inferior heavy bombers of the other side are doing a wonderful job of wrecking Germany from end to end”, had the Greif been the priority earlier perhaps it would have been Luftwaffe heavy bombers wrecking Britain from end to end. It’s absence, whilst probably not decisive, was colossally influential.

A Helicopter the World Needs

Dr Ron Smith joined the British helicopter company Westland in 1975, working in Research Aerodynamics, remotely piloted helicopters, before becoming Head of Future Projects. He had a strong influence on the design of the NH90, and was involved in the assessment of the Apache for Britain. We asked him what to consider what helicopter the world most needs.

The Problem

Having been asked the question “what helicopter does the world need?”, I am thrown back to a query raised with me a couple of years ago. “Could you develop a fire-fighting or crane helicopter with a water / fire suppression load of 20 tonnes or more?”

With climate change, there is an increasing wildfire risk worldwide. There is a very good discussion of this at www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-how-climate-change-is-affecting-wildfires-around-the-world

In recent years there have been significant fires affecting Australia, the Amazon region, the US West coast from Washington State down to California, Indonesia, southern Europe and Central and Southern Africa. With climate change in the far north, significant fires have also broken out in both Alaska and Siberia.

Given this wide geographic spread, fire seasons are now occurring pretty much throughout the year, and indeed seasons are beginning to overlap in geographically dispersed locations such as those listed above.

Notable on the above figure is the markedly increased risk of severe fire risk weather conditions in Southern Europe and Southern Africa in addition to significant percentage increases in many of the current high-risk locations.

Solutions?

So, what do we need and how do we get it?

I see this as having some parallel with the difficulties currently being experienced in dealing with the present COVID-19 pandemic.

One’s first reaction is – well, fix the emissions and it will go away. However, the world’s scientists and governments have known about climate change for decades and (despite some encouraging changes in direction in the US Administration) there is a lack of effective global coordinated action. Nowhere is this more evident than in Australia, where the Government seems more focussed on maintaining its coal exports to China than on reducing emissions.

In the case of the pandemic, the World Health Organisation has said that effective vaccination is needed world-wide, but many wealthy nations are taking the ‘after we’ve looked after ourselves’ approach. This despite the acknowledged rationale that any pool of unvaccinated populations will provide a source of mutated variants that could stretch the crisis out for years.

So past and current behaviours tell us that there isn’t going to be a magic reduction in world-wide emissions (and even if there was, the path is already set for significant climate change).

There does not seem to be a military need for large crane helicopters and the largest helicopter available today originates from Russia, which is currently something of a problem child in terms of global diplomacy, and this type is not available in a fire-fighting variant.

The largest lifting capability currently in servie is the Erickson CH-54B / S-64K Skycrane fleet operating at up to 47,000 lb max weight and the Billings and Columbia CH-47 adaptations at around 50,000 lb max weight. Some 31 Erickson Skycrane have been built.

A high-capacity fire-fighting crane could potentially be generated using a Mil Mi-26 dynamic system (rather like the Mil Mi-10K derived from the Mil Mi6) but this note examines what a new-build aircraft for the role might look like.

How would it be Funded?

With no military need, could funding be raised from concerned nations? Europe, the United States and Australia might head that list, but past and present behaviours suggest that those, with existing helicopter design and manufacturing capability, would lobby to have any such work placed with their own domestic industries.

The future wildfire risk forecast suggests European nations, particularly Italy and France, which have significant land areas near the Mediterranean, and strong helicopter industries; and the US, which has been having significant fire problems, particularly in the West, might be best to develop this capability.

While noting these countries as having the greatest need and the requisite capabilities, in the absence of any current project activity, I am forced to leave the question of funding and acquisition management on one side for the moment.

What is the operational vision? There probably needs to be around 60 – 80 aircraft allocated to this task, with greater numbers concentrated where there is the greatest risk to human life and economic impact. The fleet would be dispersed with perhaps 10 in southern Europe, 20 on the west coast of the United States, 15 in Australia, 10 in South America and a reserve fleet to respond to emergencies elsewhere and to provide a surge capability when required.

The climate data indicates that additional capability might be required in Southern Africa and in Russia, should funding become available. In view of the global nature of the problem, consideration should be given as to whether there might be support available from the UN, as well as an assessment of the level of interest in countries such as Russia and China, both of which are likely to have future need for such a helicopter.

The Air Vehicle and Equipment

Drawing on my thirty-year old experience of helicopter preliminary design, I will outline some very basic rule-of-thumb thoughts on what a new fire-fighting crane might look like.

The discussion will necessarily be highly simplified at this stage but will give some idea of how to get into the ‘right ballpark’. From there, we can evaluate what other areas would need to be investigated to harden up the design.

The Mil Mi26 will give some idea of the size of helicopter required. The quoted figures for this type include an empty weight of around 62,000 lb, a ‘gross weight’ of 109,000 lb and a maximum take-off weight of 123,000 lb. The aircraft has an eight-bladed rotor of 105 ft diameter and is powered by two ZMKB Progress D-136 engines, each rated at 11,400 shp.

Where to Start?

We start with some ground rules for the new design:

• The helicopter must use engines that are already certified and in production in the west. The parallel development of a new powerplant would result in excessive risk to the project.
• The target payload is 20 tonnes (roughly 45,000 lb)
• Design ambient conditions should reflect those in typical fire risk regions – perhaps 2,000 ft and ISA +30C (although this aspect can be subject to confirmation).
• The aircraft needs to be capable of regional self-ferry operations. Possibly three hours endurance at 125 kt+. In actual use, most drop operations are likely to be between hover and minimum power speed. Modular arrangements to allow long range tanks to be fitted should be investigated.
• The rotor should be optimised for hover and low speed operation, thereby maximising payload and endurance. This implies composite blades with modern aerofoils and a non-linear blade twist of perhaps -14 degrees, probably with an anhedral tip. Between six and eight blades would be used and, for hover efficiency, the rotor tip speed would probably be around 660 ft/sec (similar to that of the Sea King and AW101).

Where do these assumptions lead us?

The above constraints allow us to make the following decisions:

(i) The aircraft is likely to be in the same weight class as the Mil 26 and therefore we are looking for an in-service powerplant in the 11,000 shp class if two engines are to be used. The only candidate currently available is the Europrop TP400-D6 used on the Airbus A400M aircraft. Basic information has been drawn from the EASA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) for this engine. The 5 minute take off rating of this engine is 8,251 kw (11,000 hp).

(ii) The likely payload fraction of the helicopter is estimated at 45%, although 50% may be achievable for a crane configuration. This implies a maximum weight of around 100,000 lb. Taking a hint from the Mil Mi-26, we will assume a rotor diameter of 100 ft.

(iii) Will the power be sufficient? Our data suggests that two of the TP400-D6 engines used on the A400M, coupled with an appropriate main rotor gearbox, would be likely to be sufficient.

Clearly, a proper design with detailed weight estimation and specific attention to both engine and gearbox rating structures would be required to firm up the figures suggested in the text box. A key question in respect of the Europrop engine would concern the implications of providing a short duration contingency rating to be used to fly-away following an engine failure.

Gearbox Requirements

The existing TP400 engine comes with a propeller reduction gearbox that reduces the take-off prop rpm to 864, from an output shaft speed of 8580 rpm. For the helicopter, the proposed tip speed of 660 ft/sec on a 100 ft diameter rotor implies a nominal rotor rotational speed of 126 rpm.

The helicopter gearbox is likely to be lighter if the A400M propeller reduction gearboxes are not used and the overall reduction is accomplished within the main gearbox. This implies an overall ratio of around 68:1 between the engine output shaft and the main rotor drive.

The TP400 engine would need to be certificated for helicopter applications, whether or not the existing reduction gearbox was retained. One specific consideration would be the vibration environment to which the engine would be exposed in any helicopter application.

Notionally each engine would be spaced outboard of the helicopter main gearbox. A bevel gear would redirect the drives toward the gearbox. A further bevel gear would turn the drives vertically into two planetary (or epicyclic) stages to drive the main rotor shaft. A tail rotor drive would be provided to the rear, with an accessory gearbox mounted forward.

This arrangement provides four reduction stages (two bevel stages and two planetary stages). The overall 68:1 ratio would be provided using an average reduction of around 2.8:1 per stage.

Other aspects of the airframe design would broadly be similar to an enlarged version of the Sikorsky S-64.

Fire-fighting equipment

Delivery of water, fire suppressant chemicals, or a mix of the two is anticipated to be through the use of a fire-fighting turret, as this provides an opportunity for greater precision in application than a simple water drop system, The directional fire-fighting turret could be mounted on a suspended water tank arrangement. Arrangements to stabilise the position of the turret with respect to the helicopter are likely to be required. (This would be needed to control the cg position of the heavy load and should also lower operator workload and ease the design of the helicopter Flight Control System.)

The operator could use sensors to define the jet aim point(s) and an active control system could then adjust the fire suppression jet onto the target, or along a defined line. An increased payload (longer delivery time) and targeted delivery should significantly increase efficiency and reduce operator workload.

Provision will also be required to allow the helicopter to take on water through a suction pump arrangement similar to that used by many other fire-fighting helicopters. This will allow flexible operation, particularly where lake, dam or oceanic water is available close to the location of fires.

Unanswered Questions and Risks

Identification of funding and commercial principles.

Market analysis and solicitation of government, national park agencies, fire services and end-user opinions.

Selection of helicopter manufacturer based on facilities, experience, capacity, etc. Almost certainly an existing helicopter manufacturer.

Allocation of sub-contract and supplier elements. This to include selection criteria and sub-contractor qualification and management.

Powerplant development and certification for helicopter applications.

Understanding of powerplant constraints, including physical, electrical, electronic / digital interfaces, engine vibration and other environmental clearances.

General engine performance characteristics – power / fuel flows vs altitude & temperature; intake and exhaust constraints; particle separation.

Definition of engine and gearbox rating structures (including contingency rating(s) and one engine inoperative operation). Possibly linked to dynamic simulation of post-engine failure fly-away manoeuvres.

Mass estimation and loads modelling including crashworthiness

Flight performance modelling

Manufacturing tooling of 50 ft composite blades (tape laying, autoclaves, etc). There are likely to be significant non-recurring costs for such items, to be amortised over a relatively short production run.

Main gearbox test facility compatible with engine power available, another significant non-recurring cost to be amortised.

Structural static and fatigue test rigs

Rotor head and blade design. Control power when operating high inertia system in turbulence?

Fatigue life of critical components (and their validation / verification)

Digital architecture and flight control system design (hardware & software)

FADEC responsiveness (taking into account the fluctuating power requirements likely to be found in the turbulent conditions encountered in the vicinity of large fires).

Failure modes and effects analysis, Health & Usage Monitoring Systems

Cockpit design / human factors – for both pilot and fire suppression system operation

Design and development (hardware and software) of fire suppression stabilised turret

Vibration control and structural dynamics

Flight test and certification

In service support

The overall task would be managed with a defined work breakdown structure (WBS) such as Mil Std 881D:

This would typically include

a. Integration, Assembly, Test, and Checkout

b. Systems Engineering

c. Program Management

d. System Test and Evaluation

e. Training

f. Data

g. Peculiar Support Equipment

h. Common Support Equipment

i. Operational/Site Activation

j. Industrial Facilities

k. Initial Spares and Repair Parts

Included within item (a) above is the design, integration, assembly, test and certification of all Air Vehicle elements and systems / sub-systems.

Planning (including taking account of long lead items) for all the above activities will be required to generate an overall development programme. This plan, with suitably realistic contingency allowances, will be required to establish programme costs and the associated spend (and investment) profile.

Overall Conclusion

A new large crane helicopter could feasibly be developed based on the use of a pair of Europrop TP400-D6 engines adapted for helicopter use.

There is a clear need for a helicopter of this type based on current experience and projected increases in wildfire events worldwide.

Bringing such a project to fruition requires a significant effort on a number of fronts. Not the least of the challenges is the raising of investment funds (possibly on an international or global basis) to see the project through to completion.

Without the availability of a significantly increased fire-fighting capability, there is likely to be a severe penalty in terms of the loss of property, livelihoods and lives, in a number of the widespread regions that are at risk. The potential economic damage of future wildfires is such that investment in the development of a modern, capable, helicopter system to fight these fires appears not merely prudent, but essential.

RV Smith

May 2021

The Spitfire was…

“…my first love.  I had been interested in the Second World War as a boy, then it all rather went out the window in my teens.  Then, in my late twenties, I was playing cricket and while I was batting a roaring, pirouetting vision appeared far over mid-wicket.  Turning to the umpire, I said, ‘What is that??’ And he replied solemnly, ‘That’s a Spitfire.’  It was a massive Damascene moment.  The following weekend was Flying Legends at Duxford, so I took myself off, drooled over the warbirds and especially Spitfires and bought a first edition of David Crook’s ‘Spitfire Pilot’ about his time in 609 Squadron in the Battle of Britain.  It was the kickstart of my enduring fascination with the war and, as it turned out, my career.  I absolutely love the Spitfire – who doesn’t? – and have loved watching them, flying in one, writing about them and getting a little thrill every time I see one.  As I’ve got older and learned more, I’ve learned a bit about some shortcomings but there’s no denying what a fabulous aircraft it was and remains.  I love the Mk I because it was there in 1940 and it’s what David Crook flew, I love the Mk V because it was flying in Malta in 1942 and I wrote my first history book on the subject, I love the Mk VIII because they were sent to Bengal and Burma in 1943 and turned things around there, I love the Mk IX because it was the fighter pilot’s favourite, and I love the Mk XIV because it was Griffon-powered and simply amazing.  But I love them all, really.“

The P-51 Mustang was…

“…the most decisive aircraft ever built – or, at least, I think it can be quite convincingly argued.  The Merlin-powered P-51B onwards transformed the air war, allowing daylight bombing deep into Nazi Germany, which in turn meant hammering their aircraft industry.  This materially helped the Allies win air superiority over all of North-West Europe, a non-negotiable pre-requisite for any Allied invasion on D-Day.  This was because to destroy the enemy’s lines of communications – bridges, railway marshalling yards, locomotives, roads and so  on – they had to attack low-level and the only way that could be done was by having skies clear of marauding Luftwaffe fighters.  It was achieved just a few months after the Merlin-powered Mustang’s arrival into the fray.  And what an aircraft!  The look of it, the speed of it, the ridiculous range, the rate of roll, of dive and frankly, its modernity.  I absolutely LOVE the Mustang.”

The RAF was ____________ compared to the Luftwaffe?

“The RAF was vastly superior compared to the Luftwaffe for much of the war.  OK, so Bomber Command was a bit rubbish early on, and the RAF didn’t have enough aircraft in 1939-40, but the RAF gave the Luftwaffe a bloody nose over Dunkirk, then comprehensively won the Battle of Britain, which was one of the main turning points in the entire war.  By not defeating Britain in 1940, Hitler was forced, through lack of resources, to turn to the Soviet Union far earlier than he had planned – and with catastrophic consequences.  In the summer of 1940, the RAF – and I include Bomber and Coastal Commands as well as Fighter Command in this – were the first line of defence, not the last as is so often portrayed, but they were none the less the ones who destroyed Hitler’s hopes for a swift end to the war – and without a swift end it was very unlikely Nazi Germany could ever win.  The RAF made mistakes – the disastrous rhubarbs over France in 1941, the abject failure to send Spitfires to Malta and the Middle East in 1941, for eg – but by 1942, the RAF was pioneering new methods of tactical air power – doctrine still used to this day, incidentally – and growing air power in all its many facets into a war-winning a decisive weapon.  As the RAF grew in size, stature, performance and capability, so the Luftwaffe diminished.  One can argue the toss about the morality of such overwhelming air power – and of strategic bombing – but no-one can deny its impact or that it saved lives of Allied servicemen.“

A cliche or oft-repeated quote that drives me mad…

“…that Hurricanes shot down more aircraft in the Battle of Britain than Spitfires.  Yes, of course, because there loads more of them and for the most part they were going for bombers, which were a bigger target, slower and easier to shoot down.  It doesn’t mean the Hurricane was better, though.”

World War II would have been very different without…

“…the Battle of Britain.”

What was the most important aerial contribution to the war? 

“I’m going to top and tail this.  Probably the Battle of Britain to begin with because of reasons listed above, but I’ve always thought the single most important theatre of the war was the Atlantic – without it, Britain, Canada and the USA would not have been able to prosecute the war against Nazi Germany and the Axis powers, and without the closing of the air gap, it would have taken longer to defeat the U-boats.  One can’t underestimate the importance of the Very Long Range Liberators flying anti-shipping patrols across the Atlantic.  Then finally, the war would have very probably gone on into 1946, had the B-29s not dropped the two atomic bombs on Japan.  Not sure which is the most important – probably, because of what followed, the Battle of Britain, but all three really very, very significant.”

The biggest myth about WW2 aviation is…

“…that the Battle of Britain was a close run thing, won by a narrow margin.  It really wasn’t.  The Luftwaffe were whipped and whipped badly.  I can produce all number of stats to prove my point but perhaps this isn’t the place.“

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The most overrated warplane of the conflict was the…

“…the Mitsubishi A6M Zero.  I’ve never really understood why it prompts such hushed gasps of awe when people talk about it.  Sure, it had range, but it wasn’t brilliant in a dive and although manoeuvrable, wasn’t particularly so at high speed.  Sleek and refined, it did have a phenomenal rate of turn, and shocked the Allies when it first appeared against them in 1941-42 but then flat-lined.  The Spitfire, the Mustang and other US Navy fighters were dramatically developed and improved or replaced, but the Zero rather stuck where it was and that’s no good.  In the Second World War, the ability for combatant nations to rapidly progress technologically was vital.  I’ve also started to think the Zero flattered to deceive in the early years, despite obvious plus points.  The reason was largely down to the quality of the Japanese naval pilots.  If anyone has read Samurai! By Saburo Sakai, they’ll get what I’m driving at here.  His training was immense – physically, technically, mentally.  Those pilots were the best of the best, to quote from Top Gun.  I was talking to some of the Red Arrows the other day and was struck by the similarity of the intensity of their training compared with that of the IJN fighter pilots at the early part of the war.  And, of course, that gave them a massive edge and sheer pilot skill overcame many of the Zero’s shortcomings and so helped put it on a pedestal I’m not sure it quite deserves.   Inevitably, though, as the war progressed, training standards fell off for the Japanese while the Zero stood still.“

And the most underrated? 

“What about the Heinkel 112?  This was developed in the early 1930s in tandem with the legendary Messerschmitt 109, but was shelved in favour of the twin-engine Me 110, partly because Willi Messerschmitt was an appalling arse-licking Nazi and partly because Göring simply liked the look of it and named it the ‘Zerstörer’ (the Destroyer).  But the He 112 V9 was properly classy and in 1937 could fly faster than the Bf109.  It had elliptical wings very like those of the Spitfire, a wide undercarriage with inward retraction, which gave it a firm platform and would have saved the lives of countless trainee fighter pilots who died horribly on landing and take-off in their 109s, it had decent rate of climb, was highly manoeuvrable, a bubble canopy and low-back fuselage and looked absolutely stunning.  Perhaps more importantly, it had phenomenal range – nearly 700 miles, which was extraordinary for a single-engine fighter at that time.  It’s fascinating to ponder what might have been in 1940, for example, had the Luftwaffe had a stack of these instead of the Messerschmitts.  I would also tentatively suggest that its innate design was so good it had plenty of room for development, which is more than can be said for the Me109.  I remember talking to Eric ‘Winkle’ Brown about it and he much preferred it to the 109.  Thank goodness Göring was such a rubbish commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe!“

Do you think there is any national bias in how we talk about aircraft from different countries?

“I like to think I’m impeccably impartial and one can’t argue that the Axis forces lost, but anyone reading the above answers might think I was a teeny bit biased towards the RAF…”

Which aircraft is most like you and why?

“Maybe the Hawker Typhoon.  It operates quickly, is like a bull in a china shop, and leaves carnage in its wake.”

Tell me something I don’t know about WW2 aviation? 

“By the summer of 1942, Air Vice Marshal Arthur ‘Mary’ Coningham, an Aussie-born New Zealander, and his British sidekick, Air Commodore Tommy Elmhirst, had developed the RAF Middle East’s Desert Air Force into a very slick fighting machine.  Coningham had the vision and ideas, supported by his RAF Middle East C-in-C, (then) Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, while Elmhirst had the operational skill, reworking the structural organisation brilliantly.  The RAF had begun the war with little concept of a tactical air support – that is, operating to provide close air support to ground troops – so Coningham and Co really were pioneers and the Desert Air Force developed purely for that role.  When increased US Army Air Forces joined the British war effort in North Africa, mainly from November 1942 onwards, they soon decided to pool resources and create the first specific Allied NorthWest African Tactical Air Force.  Coningham was appointed its first commander, and Brigadier-General Larry Kuter, an American, its deputy.  Elmhirst remained in an administrative role.  These were exciting times as Allied air forces in theatre swelled and they gradually and increasingly successfully turned the screws on both the Italian and German air forces over Tunisia, and senior commanders both got on and worked well together, conscious they were paving the way for new techniques in air power.  Coningham and Kuter were especially tight.  Later, Kuter returned to Washington and post-war was responsible for writing the tactical doctrine of the new US Air Force.  Much of this doctrine remains in place today – but its origins can be directly traced back to the heat and sand of the Western Desert of 1942.”

James Holland FRHistS is an author and broadcaster who specialises in the history of World War II. He is the co-host of the We Have Ways of Making You Talk podcast

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My friend Joe Coles, who publishes the excellent Hush-Kit aviation blog, asked for my thoughts on the USAF’s new version of its legacy fighter, the F-15EX Eagle II. This is my short response:

Joe, I can’t speak much to the aircraft itself, but I started pushing the idea of buying some of the advanced versions being built for allied nations years ago, prompted by the aging of F-15s still in USAF service and the far smaller buy of F-22s than originally planned. At the time no one in any official position would even broach the subject, because to do so would threaten the F-35 buy. Now, USAF leaders are openly talking about a “future without the F-22” and even more cutbacks in the total F-35 buy … the good old F-15 has range the F-22 and F-35 don’t, a robust airframe you can hang the most powerful radar on, and the ability to carry up to 22 air-to-air missiles. All you give up is stealth. And as I also said years ago, “fuck stealth.” I’ll see what I can work up.

By way of backup, I first wrote about buying new F-15s in July 2015. In that post I cited three ‘legacy’ fighters the U.S. military was no longer buying, but which were still being built for foreign sales: the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and F/A-18 Hornet. At the time, no one in the military or defence contractor community would openly discuss the idea. Surely the thought had occurred to many, but to speak of it might threaten the military’s most sacred cow: the F-35 Lightning II. Here’s some of what I said then:

All of these current and proven fighters share the advantages attributed to the F-35: they are true multirole aircraft, they are highly manoeuvrable, they use advanced digital array radars, they can employ everything in the modern air-to-air and air-to-ground armament inventory, they have helmet-mounted displays with off-boresight missile cueing, they have datalink for information sharing. The only thing they don’t have is stealth.

Fuck stealth. There isn’t an air force in the world that won’t turn tail and run from a wall of Eagles coming its way.

[…]

To be fair, there is also this: the success of the F-35 programme depends on American and allied countries standing firm on buying it in the numbers projected. If one or two allies back away from their commitments to buy the F-35, costs will go up dramatically and other allies may get wobbly knees. And if American military services start buying new versions of legacy fighters, they’re going to want fewer F-35s.

A lot has happened since 2015. Buying new versions of legacy fighters is no longer a taboo topic but an established reality. The USAF is buying 144 F-15EX Eagle II aircraft, an advanced version of the F-15QA being built for Qatar. The first two USAF F-15EXs are now undergoing testing at Eglin AFB, Florida. The added capability they’ll give the USAF, in both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles, is already affecting the F-35 programme, with reduced numbers of aircraft being budgeted for and purchased each year.

A more direct threat to the F-35 programme is the USAF purchase of new F-16s (also still in production for foreign customers), since unlike the F-15, the F-16 is the fighter the F-35 was meant to replace. In fact there is now high-level talk of buying new F-16s and capping USAF F-35 purchases at 1,050 versus the 1,763 originally planned. This isn’t a done deal, but it’s looking likely. As for the Navy, it too is buying new versions of a legacy fighter, the F/A-18 Hornet. I don’t have numbers, but the decision is bound to affect the number of F-35s that service will eventually buy.

Under the Obama administration, production of the F-22 Raptor, the stealth air superiority fighter meant to replace the F-15 Eagle, was capped at 187 aircraft, far short of the 750 the USAF said it needed. It made sense then to keep a number of existing F-15Cs flying to supplement the few F-22s in service. Now that those remaining F-15Cs are facing retirement, it makes sense to replace them with new F-15EXs. The same logic applies to the idea of supplementing USAF F-35s with existing F-16s, then purchasing new versions of the F-16 as the existing fleet is retired. In both cases, new versions of legacy fighters are cheaper to buy and operate than the aircraft that were meant to replace them, and in some specific areas (range and weapons-carrying capabilities, for example) better as well. Yes, we sacrifice stealth. You already know what I think of that.

I recently wrote about the Eagle Eye, the rifle scope F-15 pilots once used to see and identify target aircraft at longer ranges. You can see one mounted to the head-up display bracket behind the windscreen of this F-15:

I remembered that my operations officer at Soesterberg Air Base, one of the original cadre of pilots selected to fly the F-15, had been one of the movers behind the Eagle Eye. I contacted him to see if what I’d written was anywhere close to the truth. Here’s his response:

“Skid, Great to hear from you and that you are both hale and hearty. Re Eagle Eye … as I recall the impetus was a 2-year mid-70s test called AIMVAL/ACEVAL, during which VID was required. The little airplane mafia wanted to cancel the F-15 buy and purchase a bunch of F-5s. VID meant the all aspect AIM-7 was almost ineffective. We chatted with our AF and McAir engineers and had them design and produce the gun scope mounting brackets, bought 7 scopes for our test aircraft, and tried them out. They got our VID range outside of min range. The things we did for our country! Cheers, Jeff“

To flesh that out:

VID is visual identification, the ability to see an adversary aircraft and determine what it is: friend or foe, aircraft type, national markings, etc.

AIMVAL/ACEVAL: Air Intercept Missile Evaluation/Air Combat Evaluation, a mid-1970s test conducted primarily at Nellis AFB, Nevada with a fleet of F-15s, F-14s, and F-5s.

The “little airplane mafia” were reformers in DoD and the defense industry opposed to the Air Force and Navy’s large, expensive, and complex F-15 Eagle and F-14 Tomcat, who argued instead for purchasing large numbers of smaller, less capable fighters like the F-5E Tiger II. Their influence led to the AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests at Nellis, and later to the Air Force and Navy’s decision to buy “high/low” mixes of fighters (F-15s and F-16s, F-14s and F/A-18s).

The AIMVAL/ACEVAL test was “rigged” to skew results in the little airplane mafia’s favor with the imposition of VID requirements imposed on F-15 and F-14 crews, preventing them from employing their long-range weapon, the all-aspect AIM-7 Sparrow missile, against the F-5s (which were not equipped with long-range radars or missiles).

The Eagle Eye, developed by AIMVAL/ACEVAL F-15 pilots, allowed them to VID F-5s coming at them in time to take head-on AIM-7 shots before minimum range.

In the end, despite rules designed to even things out for the little planes, it was clear to military leadership that the F-15 and F-14, with their long-range radars and missiles, gave more bang for the buck. The F-15 in particular turned out to be its own best proponent, with a combat record of 104 air-to-air kills and not a single loss. The small airplane mafia did get something out of the deal, though: USAF F-5 aggressor squadrons were established in the U.S., Europe, and the Pacific (today the USAF’s aggressor role is performed by civilian contractors, but the Navy and Marines still have a few F-5s at China Lake and Yuma).

In my personal experience (I came into the F-15 in 1978, not long after the AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests concluded), artificial training limitations on the F-15’s long range and all aspect missiles persisted well into the 1980s. It was routine, when setting up dissimilar air combat training with units operating older and lesser-capable fighters, for them to demand we not score (or even take) long range head-on radar missile shots, or even close-range head-on shots with our all-aspect heatseeking missiles, the idea being to force us into turning visual dogfights where many of the Eagle’s advantages were eliminated. It was done for fairness, of course, and even though we weren’t allowed to call kills with them, we took those long- and close-range head-on shots anyway, and knew we’d taken our adversaries out prior to the merge … just the way the designers of the Eagle intended.

Today, everyone has all-aspect radar and heatseeking missiles, and is equipped with sophisticated electronic equipment for identifying enemy aircraft at distances outside of visual range. The Eagle Eye, as far as I know, is an obsolete piece of gear. But damn, when you saw F-15 pilots stepping to their jets with a helmet bag in one hand and a mean-looking rifle scope in the other, you knew they meant business!

• By Paul ‘Skid’ Woodford, We strongly recommend you check out his excellent blog.

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Let’s get fucked up and fly a plane! Everyone likes to unwind now and again, and pilots are no exception. Join us on a brief high history of flying as we explore the uppers and downers of aviation.

Amphetamines

Everyone’s favourite late-night chatting, penis-shrinking, madness-inducing drug, speed, was until recently a fav with the USAF. Amphetamines were given to Allied bomber pilots during World War II to stave off fatigue and enhance focus during long missions. During the Persian Gulf War, amphetamines were super popular with American bomber pilots, and were taken (on a voluntary basis) by roughly 50% of USAF pilots. Until 2017, the US Air Force had been happily handing out amphetamines—dubbed ‘go pills’— to keep pilots perky during long flights. In 2002, two Air National Guard F-16 pilots, under the influence of Dexedrine (the air force’s ‘speed’ of choice) pilots bombed and killed four friendly soldiers in Afghanistan. In the inquiry it was revealed that the pilots (Schmidt and Umbach) were advised by their superiors to take “go pills“, and the airmen cited this as part of their defence.

The German, British, American, and Japanese armed forces hoofed down hefty amounts of amphetamines during World War II. An extremely popular methamphetamine in Germany marketed as Pervitin, were known informally as Stuka pills due to their popularity with the Luftwaffe. The Japanese imperial government distributed pills to pilots for long missions under the trade name Philopon (also known as Hiropin). The Japanese pilots used the term “senryoku zokyo zai” or “drug to inspire the fighting spirits.” Though it is sometimes said that Kamikaze pilots took large doses of methamphetamine (via injection) before their suicide missions, this is much debated and it may have been merely ritual sake and a crushing sense of duty that sent them to their cockpits.

We asked a Cold War fighter pilot if he was encouraged to take speed for long flights, he replied, “Oh, yes. Go pills. We’d save ’em for when we got there so we could stay up all night running the local girls. There wasn’t any kind of a rush. They must have worked, though … either that or the stamina I had after 8- to 10-hour ocean crossings was due to my youth!”

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Modafinil

Dexedrine is gone and the new upper of choice for long USAF missions is Modafinil. Shame that “Between 5% to 10% of users may be affected with anxiety, insomnia, dizziness, diarrhoea, and rhinitis”.

Cocaine

Though more popular with infantrymen than pilots in World War I, cocaine was taken by some early aviators (both military and civil). Use of the then widespread confidence-boosting drug is understandable considering the huge risks involved in early aviation (French records reveal cocaine was beloved by many early aviators). To be a fighter pilot in this time was to have one of the most dangerous jobs in all of history. Cocaine was issued by superiors and self-prescribed by airmen themselves. It was taken during long-distance flights by Imperial German military pilots.

According to a 1931 book:

“Cocaine infused into the few duelists of the air who made use of that cold and thoroughly lucid exaltation which – alone among drugs – it can produce … at the same time it left intact their control over their actions. It fortified them, one might say, by abolishing the idea of risk.”

Alcohol

Sadaaki Akamatsu (赤松 貞明, Akamatsu Sadaaki, 30 July 1910 – 22 February 1980) was an ace fighter pilot in the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II famed for his mischievous behaviour. He was officially credited with destroying 27 enemy aircraft. This is pretty impressive considering much of his flying was done drunk.

Alcohol and flying have long gone dangerous hand-in-hand. A report from 1963 stated over 35% of fatal general aviation accidents that year involved pilots with measurable amounts of alcohol in their blood.

Tobacco

We asked former F-15 pilot Paul Woodford if in-cockpit smoking happened during his time, “When I flew for the 32nd TFS in the Netherlands, one squadronmate, smoked in the cockpit. He carried a screwtop 35-mm film canister in his sleeve pocket and used it as an ashtray. This was in the late 70s/early 80s. I suppose there were others throughout my career, but he is the only one I can say for sure did it. I flew on his wing often and could see him light up in the cockpit. Even though few smoke these days, I bet it’s still done, and actually electric vape cigarettes would make it even easier to smoke in the cockpit, leaving no evidence behind.” Former Lightning pilot Ian Black when asked if recalled smoking replied, “I do – especially in Vietnam era – not sure RAF did it in fighters but pretty sure the VC10 had an ashtray – I know the F-4 did.”

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The McDonnell RF-4C ruled the tactical reconnaissance skies for the U.S. Air Force from 1964 through the early 1990s. The aircraft’s main job was the…

The RF-4C: Last Manned USAF Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft by Col. Eileen Bjorkman