The Tornado ended its long career with the RAF last year. It had been used in wars, virtually without respite, since its combat debut attacking Iraq in 1991. No RAF aircraft fought for so long, and the type is guaranteed to be remembered for a long time, but was it the right aircraft? 

The Findus Crispy Pancake munching British public of the 1980s knew their massive air force had a word-beating strike aircraft in the Tornado IDS and a top of the line interceptor in the Tornado ADV. Books and magazines celebrated the amazing potency of the aircraft with almost erotic excitement. Here was an advanced combat aircraft that could penetrate the Warsaw Pact nations’ air defences at treetop height (day or night) in appalling weather, and wreak havoc on their airfields and industrial areas. It was all very exciting, but was it true?

When I interviewed a former RAF Tornado pilot last week, I asked her how she felt the Tornado GR4 compared to the US F-15E Strike Eagle. â€œIt’s a tricky question as emotionally I loved flying the GR4, however it would have been fantastic to fly the F15. Would it have been a better investment for the UK, rather than buying the Tornado? Probably!” She also noted “Let’s be honest, it’s not as capable, apart from having a better range, I think that’s the only category on aircraft Top Trumps that the Tornado would win!”

When the Tornado was conceptualised in the late 1960s, the priority was high-speed low-level flight and long range. It was intended to fly low enough to avoid effective radar detection and perform deep interdiction missions, pre-emptively destroying strategic targets. It drew on the earlier AFVG and was heavily influenced by the similar, but larger, US F-111. The design was optimised for low-level high speed flight, but as Tornado Gulf Veteran Alistair Byford pointed out: “However, this all comes at the expense of altitude performance, and a war-loaded Tornado struggles to reach half the cruising height of a typical airliner. Clearly this has hindered its subsequent adaptability, and although the Tornado has provided absolutely sterling service and been repeatedly updated to keep it current as a weapons platform, this has been in spite of (rather than because of) its fundamental design and aerodynamic qualities.” The same was true of the sensors “At night the crew were blind to other aircraft resulting in tactics having a heavy reliance on timing that gave little flexibility to evade and safely avoid air and ground contract.”

The Tornado was a brilliantly engineered answer to the wrong question.

Variable geometry came at too large a cost

Variable geometry or ‘swing wings’ were included to meet the requirement for short field performance, long range and high speed flight. The small, heavily-loaded wing area gave the Tornado a very smooth ride at low-level, which both reduced crew exhaustion and made for a steady weapons platform. But it requires a heavy, voluminous and labour-intensive mechanism. The F/A-18 Hornet, a contemporary of the Tornado, is beefed up to allow carrier operations and has an empty weight of 10,433 kg; the Tornado had an empty weight of 13,890 kg. Though conceptually very different aircraft, in reality they ended up performing many similar missions (CAS and precision bombing in general). It is interesting to note that both types suffered from limitations that resulted from the opposite design compromises. The Tornado lacked power and performance; the Hornet lacked range and payload. Regardless, there is a reason that no VG aircraft projects have been initiated since the early 1970s: the advantages are not worth the increase in weight and complexity.

High attrition in Desert Storm

In Desert Storm, against a lesser enemy than the Tornado, which was created to defeat it, it suffered badly. Of the 55 Allied aircraft lost in Desert Storm, 8 were Tornados. Only 48 RAF Tornados were sent. This is pretty bad – consider this: the US alone deployed 1,656 armed aircraft to the campaign. The USAF alone flew 65,000 sorties, the RAF Tornado force 2,500.  

Soon after the war reports blamed the JP223* a cluster bomb/land-mine dispenser that ejects dozens of bomblets that required a predictable low-level attack profile, for the high rate of losses. This was only the case for one of the losses (the egress profile not the attack itself causing the loss). This misunderstanding was used to brush aside other observers who noted the alarming loss rate of Tornadoes in the war. Considering the aircraft was intended to be used against the far bigger and more potent Warsaw Pact, the likely losses would have been extreme.

The high number had much to do with the emphasis on low-level flight, the volume of missions and the type of weapons used. Stand-off weapons are now the preferred anti airfield weapon. When the safer US approach of attacks from medium levels was adopted, Tornados were at a disadvantage as they lacked the power to perform effectively at this altitude. Again, the Tornado design was over-specialised. In fairness, the F-15 and F-16 were both extremely specialised in their early life but superb engine/airframe performance allowed them to better adapt to new roles.

In Kosovo in 1999, the aircraft was much improved, but poor weapons integration meant the new precision bombs it was carrying were dangerously inaccurate.

*The use of the JP223 is now illegal under both cluster bomb and landmine conventions. The Convention on Cluster Munitions came into effect in 2010. Countries that have opposed the convention and not joined include China, Russia, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Brazil.

Self defence

“I would have preferred to see a better air-to-air capability, either through the radar and/or data-linking to the AWACs picture: that and possibly a radar missile would have given the Tornado a better self-defence capability”, Noted Tornado veteran Michael Napier in this interview. Today, mud movers such as the F-15E, Su-34 and the Eurocanards consider these de rigueur features for survival.

Tornado ADV 

Yes, the Tornado F.Mk 3 was effective at the end of its career. However, all the good systems integrated onto the F.Mk 3 would have been more effective on an aircraft of higher performance. Again, this is a case of Tornado succeeding in spite, not because, of its design. The ADV’s limitations are well-documented, but they centre around poor agility, poor medium and high-altitude performance, and a painfully slow radar development process.

In exercises towards the end of the 20th century, SkyFlash-armed Tornado F3s did very badly against German F-4Fs equipped with AMRAAMs. Could a F-4F or more radical British Phantom upgrade have proved a more cost- and combat-effective alternative to the F3 in the 1985-1998 timeframe? Almost definitely.

Though the F3 was well equipped at the time of its retirement, it was lacking a helmet cueing system, something which would have helped it where it was most vulnerable, in within visual range engagements with inevitably more agile opponents.

Anti Shipping

“A good maritime radar can pick up the nice big steel and aluminium radar reflector that is a ship at long range. The Buccaneer’s Blue Parrot radar had a maximum range of 240 nautical miles, although 180 was more normally used. The Tornado…had a maximum range of forty nautical miles*. So when operating without a Nimrod the Tornado was limited to firing Sea Eagle well inside the missile’s normal launch range” – Wing Commander Gordon Robertson (retd) in ‘Tornado Boys‘. The Sea Eagle was a big missile and fitting four meant the loss of the main fuel tank pylon, so to ensure an effective radius of action only two were carried, half the load of the aircraft it replaced, the Buccaneer. Considering a Royal Navy study estimated it would take 24 missiles to reliably knock out a large warship, this was a considerable disadvantage.

The engines were more ‘fragile’ than the Bucc’s, the light grey camo scheme made the aircraft stand out like a “sore thumb” over the sea, and worse still, a fleet-wide upgrade from 1998 had introduced a wiring problem to the GR.1B which meant the Sea Eagles didn’t work (in a Exercise Nepture Warrior one crew were allocated two missiles to fire: both failed). The Tornado also had navigation and weapon aiming system issues over the sea.

(*Sea Eagle’s maximum range was around 60NM)

Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Defences

The Tornado was used in the defence suppression role in the 1999 Kosovo campaign. As Wing Commander Gordon Niven (retd) noted in ‘Tornado Boys’, the ALARM missile and Tornado combination was not very effective for the role, “Neither the missiles nor the Tornado was configured in any way remotely close to the capability of the USAF F-16 SEAD units.” The ALARM was used by RAF Tornados from 1990 until 2013, a short service life for a guided anti-radar weapon; the US equivalent, the AGM-88 HARM series, has been in service since 1985 with no planned retirement date. Today an RAF ALARM from the Kosovo campaign is displayed in the Belgrade air museum, it failed to self destruct or destroy a target and instead gently delivered itself by parachute into curious (and Russian-friendly) Yugoslav hands.

Low-level culture

Low-level flying can still be an effective counter to radar, but it is also dangerous. Training for this mission has resulted in more aircraft and crew losses than anything else, including actual warfare, over the last fifty years. The culture is embedded in the RAF, a force that often prides itself on being among the best at this skill. There have been times when a cultural prejudice has favoured low-level tactics over the development of weapons that can be launched from higher altitudes.

The F-117 Nighthawk introduced another radar survival approach into operational service four years after the Tornado: stealth. Today all high-end warplanes in development are baking a high degree of reduced radar conspicuity into their design. The Tornado with its huge metal tail and boxy fuselage was extremely unstealthy. It is also worth noting that Tornado low-level training in Europe emphasised hiding behind hills, a terrain feature that is not available in much of Iraq.

Export success?

Nope. Saudi Arabia bought the IDS. But they will buy anything British, and the deal was shady as hell. In all 2006 all this dodgy-ness was all brushed under the carpet: “The Director of the Serious Fraud Office has decided to discontinue the investigation into the affairs of BAE Systems plc as far as they relate to the Al Yamamah defence contract. This decision has been taken following representations that have been made both to the Attorney General and the Director concerning the need to safeguard national and international security. It has been necessary to balance the need to maintain the rule of law against the wider public interest.”

Alright smart arse, so what should have happened?

IDS

A radical Buccaneer upgrade to cover the role until the arrival of the F-15E. At its peak, the RAF had six squadrons; a greater number (more airframes were available) of Super Buccaneers could have done this job.

ADV

F-4s to cover the role until either the earlier arrival of F-15Cs or a later arrival of dual-role F-15Es.

Political & Industrial

Did the Tornado protect the British aerospace producers from US industrial hegemony? No. The UK is currently procuring the F-35. A deal which has hindered Britain’s ability to create indigenous designs. Did it help to keep Europe together? No.

The roots of at least some of Tornado’s problems lie in a lack of compromise from the British side and the interference of political considerations. As the former West German Chief of Air Staff Heinz Birkenbeil noted in Dr Alfred Price’s ‘Panavia Tornado‘, “Before we went into the programme the German requirement was for a daylight attack plane. All the other European nations and Canada needed a replacement for the F-104, each nation put in its requirements and the requirements were a long way apart. In the second round the British required a deep interdiction aircraft with at least twice as much range as the Germans wanted, and all at low level for strike and conventional attack –– we had wanted an aeroplane for strike and close air support, with an air superiority capability over the battlefield. But we had not been after an aeroplane for deep interdiction… I told our Chief of Air Staff [General Steinhoff] that my department did not think the projected aircraft would fit the german requirement. And then a funny thing happened. The programme was of great political importance to Europe and the politicians stepped in…The result of this in Germany was the Chief of Air Staff simply changed our Air Force’s requirement until it eventually fitted the requirement of the MRCA!”

There have been many great British aviation manufacturers. Then there’s Supermarine, the poor man’s Blackburn, who produced a string of fair to average flying boats, one half decent piston fighter, and then a string of below par jets before being absorbed into BAC. The jets in particular started poorly with the Attacker, which for no obvious reason was a straight winged taildragger whose overall appearance screamed ‘we had one good design don’t make us change it’. This was followed by the Swift ordered as an insurance in case the Hunter didn’t perform as expected. For this Supermarine took their one ‘good’ jet design and added swept wings and a sensible undercarriage. Then we come to the Scimitar, a beast of an aircraft powered by two Avons producing around 22,000lbs of thrust while resolutely remaining subsonic. Admittedly this wasn’t completely Supermarine’s fault, although they didn’t have to listen to the Admiralty’s requirement for the aircraft to be able to conduct a free take-off from a carrier deck. As well as blown flaps this also required a much thicker wing section than was ideal for high speed flight, especially at high level where the critical Mach number made manoeuvring ‘difficult’.
Popular imagination has it that the Scimitar was also burdened with so many issues it needed 1000 maintenance man hours per flying hour. This almost sounds plausible when you consider the number of things that could go wrong with a late ‘50s aircraft. There were two Avons to leak fuel everywhere, blown flaps to malfunction, probably something resembling avionics. It does break down slightly when you introduce maths to the problem though.

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To take one example 804 NAS operated the Scimitar for 18 months from 1 Mar 1960 to 15 Sep 1961, or 563 days. During this they flew 1077 sorties for a total of 1,367 flying hours, with only one minor accident when Sub Lt J G Smith suffered a nose gear collapse when Landing on HMS Hermes. [8] 563 day is 13,512 hours, at which point the 1000 maintenance man hours per flying hour myth starts to break down. According to the myth 804 would have had to endure 1,367,000 hours of tinkering to have achieved that much flying. That’s 195,285 hours per aircraft. Or 14 people working on each aircraft every hour it isn’t flying. The compliment of 804 at this time isn’t readily available as apparently a global pandemic is the kind of easy excuse archives look for to prevent access. However, while equipped with 10 of Supermarine’s ultimate fighter, 803 NAS had around 123 personnel. [9] Ignoring any reduction in personnel due to operating fewer aircraft and subtracting the 14 officers who wouldn’t want to get in the chaps’ way while they’re working, that gives 15 maintainers per airframe on 804 NAS.
So, from the above workings the only way the Scimitar could be operated if it required 1000 maintenance hours per flying hour is if the squadrons were over manned and the workforce did nothing but fix aircraft. Even in their sleep. For those unfamiliar with the naval service they may be bastards, but they do let the workforce eat, sleep, and if they’re particularly good take leave. But what’s a more realistic figure? Well assuming weekends off, and their Lordship’s deigned to give the squadron 45 days leave over the 18 months that gives 357 days of work. Assume 8 hours a day are available for maintaining aircraft, which ignores the other duties that the navy insists are more important than fixing aircraft. In that case each maintainer would have done 2,857 hours of maintenance. Still allowing 15 maintainers per aircraft and you get a total of 42,857 hours of work on each jet for the period 804 NAS was in commission. With each aircraft averaging 195 flying hours you end up with 219 maintenance hours per flying hour as pretty much the upper limit of what’s achievable. This is still a lot, it’s around 20 times what an F-22 needs, but it’s a lot less than the figure bandied around. Which could lead you to suspect it was a glib answer given by someone who didn’t expect to be taken seriously, or the real answer was 100 hours and someone added a zero.

Bing Chandler is a former Lynx Observer and current Wildcat Air Safety Officer. If you want a Sea Vixen t-shirt he can fix you up.

[8] Eric Morgan, and John Stevens. The Scimitar File. Trowbridge: Air Britain, 2000. p137
[9] HMS Hermes Commissioning book photo. Count the people in the photo of 804 NAS.

This article is from the Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes. Preorder your copy today here. 

From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as:

“the thinking-man’s Top Gear… but for planes”.

The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.

FEATURING

• Interviews with pilots of the F-14 Tomcat, Mirage, Typhoon, MiG-25, MiG-27, English Electric Lighting, Harrier, F-15, B-52 and many more.
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• Expert analysis of weapons, tactics and technology.
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The book will be a stunning object: an essential addition to the library of anyone with even a passing interest in the high-flying world of warplanes, and featuring first-rate photography and a wealth of new world-class illustrations.

This book can only happen with your support. Preorder your copy today here. 

This book can only happen with your support. Preorder your copy today here. 

Whether it’s loyalty or emotional immaturity that led me to keep my boyhood obsession with aeroplanes I can’t tell you. I loved the aeroplane books I read as a child. Now, 35 odd years later I am making my own. I’ve had a lot of time to think about it. This is it.

Since I started my aviation site Hushkit.net in 2012 I have had the chance to do so many things that would impress my seven-year-old self. I’ve spoken to fighter pilots, many fighters pilots, and asked them the questions I want answered with no fear of the questions being too childish, or cheeky or technical. Collecting these stories has been a thrill. In particular speaking to perhaps the greatest living ace, an Iranian F-14 Tomcat pilot, and sharing his extreme tales of the excitement and brutality of jet combat in the 1980s.

Creating top 10s with experts was fascinating. I already loved the top 10 format but saw how frequently they were created by poorly informed generalist ‘content creators’ on a small budget…what would happen if articles like that were done properly? Who doesn’t want to know what would win in a fight, a F-16 or a MiG-29? I asked the people who knew the real answers.

I’ve also taken great pleasure in exploring the culture around the aeroplanes. Cinema, toys, art and the weird psychology of the aviation fan. I was also interested in what happens if you write about aeroplanes in a way that does not share the political outlook or style that all other books of this nature share. Many of the articles are funny as I see no reason why non-fiction should be serious all the time, and this has led Hush-Kit in a different direction.

The site exists because of a shared madness, and I am delighted that so many talented writers have contributed to making the site the success it is today. All of which is very good, but a big beautiful coffee table book is a hell of lot more pleasing than a website. I’m amazed and delighted by how many people read the site and I hope they’re willing to give up a little shelfspace for The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes.

I promise it will deliver things that no other aviation book has done so far.

Announcement: to celebrate the first flight of the Vulcan (30/08/52) we are aiming for 100% funding for the Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes by 30 August 2020. It’s ambitious but I have faith we can get there! Support us here.  

Yours waiting to publish,

Joe

SAC design and the CAC J-20

Jim Smith had significant technical roles in the development of the UK’s leading military aviation programmes from ASRAAM and Nimrod, to the JSF and Eurofighter Typhoon. He was also Britain’s technical liaison to the British Embassy in Washington, covering several projects including the Advanced Tactical Fighter contest. Here he considers what the J-20’s alleged failed rival reveals about the role and requirement of the Chengdu J-20.

The SAC design features a three-surface layout, with a canard, wing and tailplane. Like the J-20, the canard is relatively ‘long-coupled’, meaning there is a significant distance between the canard and the wing. The wing planforms of the two aircraft differ, with the J-20 having a straked near-delta planform, while that of the SAC design appears somewhat similar to the F-18, albeit with a straight strake leading edge, rather than the curved strake of the F-18.

The Chinese also operate the J-15, a three -surface aircraft derived from the Su-27 series and similar to the Sukhoi Su-33.

Compared to this aircraft, we can see that the tail is somewhat similar, but the wing and canard are more closely coupled. The wing on the SAC design has a larger strake than the J-15, and the planform appears less highly swept than the J-15.

Three-surface Configurations

Let’s discuss three-surface configurations first. There’s quite a good discussion about this on Wikipedia, but here’s my take. I remarked that the SAC design was in some way reminiscent of an F-18, so I’ll start there. 

I can already see the head-scratching – an F-18 isn’t a three-surface configuration. True, but what set the F-18 and the F-16 apart was the use of a fixed forward strake ahead of the wing. This does a number of good things. Firstly, it’s de-stabilising, meaning that (with an appropriate control system) manoeuvre performance can be improved, because pitch stability is reduced. Secondly, at moderate and high incidence, powerful vortices are generated which run over the upper surface of the wing. This generates considerable lift, improving instantaneous turn rate, and also helps maintain lift from the wings at high incidence, allowing flight at very high incidence and low speed (great for airshows, but of questionable utility in combat).

One way of looking at these strakes is to think of them as a highly-swept fixed canard, located in the plane of the wing. That’s how they behave aerodynamically. What about moveable canards, such as those on Typhoon, Rafale and the Su-33? Well, these moveable canards are contributing to the control of the aircraft, as well as providing de-stabilising and additional aerodynamic functions similar to the fixed strakes of the F-16 and F-18.

But having moveable canards and tailplanes provides some additional design freedoms (or opportunities and complexities if you prefer). Let’s assume that all these advanced fighter aircraft are unstable – this offers the rapid manoeuvre response expected of a fighter, but also requires continuous management of the control surfaces to ensure that the aircraft responds as directed by the pilot.

If the aircraft is in the cruise, the pilot will expect the aircraft to be trimmed, and in steady flight. The flight control computers will arrange this by, for example, continuously adjusting the controls in response to gusts and turbulence, and by managing the tendency of the unstable aircraft to diverge from straight and level flight as a result of these disturbances. Choices will be available on how to do this – because either the canards, the tailplanes or other controls, such as thrust-vectoring, can be used to trim the aircraft. 

These choices can allow the control law designer to do some other things as well. For example, thrust vectoring might be used to trim, allowing all control surfaces to remain aligned to minimise head-on signature. Or the canard surfaces might be continuously adjusted to minimise lift-dependent drag. Trimming the aircraft sounds like a minor exercise, but it is important to remember that the aircraft centre of lift will change substantially in supersonic flight, and this will have to be managed, ideally also delivering the minimum signature, maximum manoeuvre margin, and/or minimum lift dependent drag, depending on the decisions taking in designing the aircraft.

If the aircraft is manoeuvring violently, or perhaps flying an approach in turbulent conditions, the canard-tail combination provides a rapid and powerful way of generating pitch commands, and also of trimming out the effects of high-lift devices such as slats and flaps which allow approach speeds to be managed.

I also referred to the SAC design as being relatively ‘long-coupled’, meaning that the canards are further ahead of the wing than is seen in other canard designs such as the Typhoon, Rafale and Su-33. The Chengdu J-20 shares this characteristic.

Why might this be a desirable design feature? It is an interesting choice, because it will, to some extent limit the ability to optimise the flow for minimum drag, because the direct influence of the canard flow on the wing will be somewhat reduced. However, the increased moment arm available will mean greater control power will be available for trimming or for manoeuvre. 

Implications of the configuration

What does this suggest about the aircraft design, and the requirements against which this aircraft and the J-20 were in competition?

To address this, one needs to make some conjecture about the purpose of the aircraft. I suggest the J-20 and SAC-design are in the nature of strategic air defence aircraft. Perhaps, like the MiG-31, their primary purpose could be homeland defence, but it seems likely that this also extends to the defence of China’s immediate area of economic influence, in which I include the South China Sea.

To deter and defeat incursions into this space, the aircraft would require a range of flexible and long-range weapons, clearly including long-range air-to-air weapons, but also possibly including anti-shipping, and in the future, perhaps hypersonic weapon systems. These weapons are all likely to be larger than the AMRAAM-class systems employed by many Western Nations, and in the case of anti-shipping and hypersonic systems may also be heavier.

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This implies the need for the aircraft to have large weapons bays, and the ability to vary loads between different weapons and (probably) auxiliary fuel tanks. In any case, the geography of the air defence region is such that long-range, relatively large aircraft will be needed. High-speed, high-instantaneous-manoeuvrability, long-range and large internal weapons carriage appear to be the principal design drivers for the J-20 and the SAC design.

The Chengdu J-20 and the SAC design have adopted somewhat different solutions to these postulated design requirements. The J-20 is a long-coupled canard delta, appearing in some ways like a growth-version of the European canard fighters, but optimised for the internal carriage of relatively large weapons. The three-surface SAC design does look somewhat like an attempt at the same approach, but starting from a J-15-like three-surface solution, again seeking to provide a configuration with a large internal weapons bay. Both aircraft appear to be designed to accommodate a substantial c.g. range, allowing a wide range of fuel and weapon loads to be managed. The SAC design does also feature a straked wing, which appears to be, relative to the overall dimensions, a little smaller in area than that of the J-20.

Why might the J-20 have been favoured?  An almost impossible question to answer, as cost, industrial policies and other considerations are likely to have been involved. However, it is noticeable that the SAC design has a long forward fuselage, and that the intakes are set relatively far back on the airframe. 

It is possible that this complicates the packaging of the aircraft, as once intakes, engines and main undercarriage have been accommodated, there may be insufficient space for a broad weapons bay like that of the J-20. If the SAC bay has to extend forward into the forward fuselage, then the shape may have been constrained. Carrying two pairs of missiles in tandem (rather than 4-abreast as in the J-20) would be possible, but overall, the shape of such a bay might not offer the range of weapon options available from the J-20.

This article is from the Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes. Preorder your copy today here. 

From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as:

“the thinking-man’s Top Gear… but for planes”.

The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.

FEATURING

• Interviews with pilots of the F-14 Tomcat, Mirage, Typhoon, MiG-25, MiG-27, English Electric Lighting, Harrier, F-15, B-52 and many more.
• Engaging Top (and bottom) 10s including: Greatest fighter aircraft of World War II, Worst British aircraft, Worst Soviet aircraft and many more insanely specific ones.
• Expert analysis of weapons, tactics and technology.
• A look into art and culture’s love affair with the aeroplane.
• Bizarre moments in aviation history.
• Fascinating insights into exceptionally obscure warplanes.

The book will be a stunning object: an essential addition to the library of anyone with even a passing interest in the high-flying world of warplanes, and featuring first-rate photography and a wealth of new world-class illustrations.

This book can only happen with your support. Preorder your copy today here. 

A potent low-level specialist, the Tornado GR series served the Royal Air Force for 40 years, 28 years of which it was active in combat. We talked to Mandy Hickson about her experiences of flying the last British recce variant of the ‘Mighty Fin’, the GR4A, including her wartime missions over Iraq.

What were first impressions of the Tornado?

“My first impressions of the Tornado were that it seemed huge. Having come from flying the Hawk where some had described it as a large Tonka toy, the Tornado stood proud. It does what it says on the tin. It looks like a war-going machine with a fantastic capability and that’s exactly what it was.”

Describe the GR4 in three words…
“Formidable, capable, lethal.”

What was the best thing about the GR4?
“The best thing about the GR4 was the terrain following radar (TFR) capability. I remember an exercise that we were on in the USA, Red Flag, and we were night flying. One evening the weather proved to be out of limits for all the other aircraft, but the Tornados carried out a successful night mission. We dropped our weapons with a direct hit on target and we had not seen much of the surrounding area for the whole flight. You plug in the autopilot, nudge the aircraft down from 1000ft in increments until you get to the required height. Set the rad alt bug* 10% below and off you go. You monitor all the instruments, especially the E-Scope so that you can see what is coming up in front of you. The chat between the pilot and the navigator (or Weapons System Operator in todays terminology!) was clipped and professional. Not a time for banter.

*This ‘bugs’ you if your radar altimeter sees you dropping below a certain height

“An American aircraft carrier was on an exercise off the south coast, with an exclusion zone around the ship. A small civilian aircraft was flying directly toward the ship. The Americans believed that it was a terrorist as they were now on the highest state of alert. We heard that they were loading live weapons to shoot this aircraft down.”

..and the worst?
“The worst thing was the manoeuvrability.”

What was your most notable mission?
“I was flying across the Atlantic returning from Exercise Red Flag. We were in close formation with the tanker as we had been doing air-to-air refuelling. They told us that we needed to take some spacing so that they could use their HF radio. We separated away, but when we were called back in we heard that America has shut their airspace down. We had no idea what had happened. The date was September 11th. In the military you are always taught to control the controllables. We might not have had an understanding of what was happening but we did very quickly realise that if an entire continent has shut its airspace, then all the aircraft would be diverted or turned back. We were in thick cloud and had a huge risk of a midair collision. We started to scan the airspace in front of us to clear our pathway and as we approached the United Kingdom the clouds started to break. It was then that we heard another chilling radio call. An American aircraft carrier was on an exercise off the south coast, with an exclusion zone around the ship. A small civilian aircraft was flying directly toward the ship. The Americans believed that it was a terrorist as they were now on the highest state of alert. We heard that they were loading live weapons to shoot this aircraft down. The aircraft was oblivious and was not responding to attempted radio contact. We were tasked to intercept the aircraft, but enroute we finally managed to make contact and the aircraft diverted their flightpath. They had a matter of minutes before they would have been shot down. When we landed, we were signing the jets back in, when we turned and saw the twin towers collapsing on a small television in the engineers’ crew room. It was one of the most memorable moments of my life.”

How did you feel the GR4 compared to the F-15E?
“Let’s be honest, its not as capable, apart from having a better range, I think that’s the only category on aircraft Top Trumps that the Tornado would win!”

Would you have rather the RAF had had F-15Es?
“It’s a tricky question as emotionally I loved flying the GR4, however it would have been fantastic to fly the F15. Would it have been a better investment for the UK, rather than buying the Tornado? Probably!”

“Most memorable occasion was whilst trying to have a wee over Iraq with my navigator quietly calling out surface-to-air missile threats in the background.”

How effective was the GR4 as a recce platform?
“The GR4A was an excellent recce platform. That was originally our primary role on II(AC) Sqn. I was involved in the RAPTOR (Reconnaissance Airborne Pod TORnado) trials and at the time it was one of the most advanced reconnaissance sensors in the world. It hugely increased the effectiveness of the GR4 in the reconnaissance role, with the ability to download real-time, long-range, off-set images to ground stations during a mission. The stand-off range of the sensors allowed us to stay clear of threats (surface to air missiles or AAA sites) and therefore minimised our exposure time.”

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How good were you at the recce mission?
“I really enjoyed the challenge of recce missions although I did not enjoy learning all the categories of different pieces of equipment or structures… for example flying over an electrical pylon you would have to report that it was a self supporting steel lattice structure with eight satellite dishes orientated east to west direction. Bit of a mouthful!”

Are there any ergonomic issues for a female fighter pilot?
“There are the obvious size issues but these apply regardless of gender. The one challenge that we never managed to overcome was that of relieving yourself in the air on long sorties. The Tornado can stay airborne for about eight hours and yes you might well need to go to the toilet in that time. For a woman that presents huge difficulties. For men they have a small plastic bag with a dehydrated sponge in it that they can wee into. For a woman you have to completely strip down which involves taking off all of your kit. This leads to a ridiculous situation, akin to wrestling a bear in a cupboard! Most memorable occasion was whilst trying to have a wee over Iraq with my navigator quietly calling out surface-to-air missile threats in the background. I had decided that the only option I had was to wee into a drinking bottle that I had with me. Unfortunately it was full at the time, so I had to drink all the water first which then only made the situation 10 times worse after I never managed to successfully complete the task!

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What was your first combat mission like?
“My first combat mission was a complete eye-opener. I went into work and was a little surprised to find I had been selected to carry out a bombing mission. My eyes were wider than saucers apparently throughout the briefing. We did not actually end up dropping on that occasion as our target was not visible but it was a great wake-up call to operations in a theatre of war.”

What was your most memorable mission?
“I was on the last sortie for the detachment and was heading home the following day. Just as we were about to recover back to base we were engaged by a surface to air missile, in a heatseeking mode. We put out the flares as countermeasures and successfully evaded the missile. We were then tasked to deliver our weapons on a pre-designated target. We were running out of fuel though and first had to go and find an air-to-air tanker in Saudi Arabia. It was now the early hours of the morning, pitch black and the weather was poor. When we got to the Tanker our British tanker was un-serviceable and had been replaced by an American KC-135. I had no clearance to tank from this and had never done it before. I had two attempts before I had to divert back to base on my minimum fuel state. My number two and three were successful and went back into Iraq successfully delivering their weapons. It was an incredibly complex mission and as I was leading the formation I learnt more about decision-making and pressure under the most stressful of conditions that night.”

At the time of its retirement did you think the GR4 was survivable in a modern peer-peer war?
“If you think that the Tornado had its first flight in 1974 and was delivered into service in 1979 then it’s amazing that it had survived as long as it had. With all the upgrades it made it a very viable platform but I believe it’s time had come.”

Crewed recce platforms…do they offer any advantage over remotely piloted aircraft?
“Emotionally I would love to say that I believe they do but I can also see the huge benefits of unmanned aerial vehicles. The fact that you do not have to risk life by placing aircrew into a theatre of war and that one person can operate numerous remote aircraft at the same time from a different country is a huge advantage.”

How fast can a GR4 can at low level…what is the fastest you got?
“I think the textbook says it can exceed Mach 1.3. The fastest I ever went was Mac 1.1. At low-level over the UK you are limited because of the sound pollution, so you normally fly at 420 kts, accelerating to 500 kts occasionally.”

Is it true that the GR4 was slower than the GR1, if so why?
“Never heard that, I don’t believe so. I can’t imagine it getting to M2!”

Rate the Tornado in the following categories
Instantaneous turn: average
Sustained turn: average
Acceleration: good
Energy preservation: good
Climb rate: not as good as many of the more modern jets
Recce effectiveness: very good
Combat effectiveness: poor
Cockpit ergonomics: good

During DACT or training missions against fighter aircraft which type was the most challenging? We did’t do much DACT

What were the most and least reliable systems?
“Some of the nav systems were unreliable (INS). As the jet became older the groundcrew had to work increasingly harder to maintain serviceability levels, there did an incredible job.”

What are your thoughts about the Tornado retirement from the RAF?
“It was the end of an era and I am so proud to have played my part in its incredible history. It played a vital role in keeping Britain and its allies safe for four decades.”

Former Tornado GR4 fast jet pilot with RAF, now a Motivational Speaker. Author ‘An Officer, not a Gentleman’.

Bing Chandler is a former Lynx Observer and current Wildcat Air Safety Officer. If you want a Sea Vixen t-shirt he can fix you up.

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10 Fleet Air Arm Myths, Number 2: The Swordfish was rugged

Hero of Taranto the Swordfish pioneered attacking an enemy fleet in harbour over a year before the Japanese gave it a go on easy level, in broad daylight, before the opposition were ready. It was also a rare Fairey success story, especially when compared to its stable mates the Albacore and Barracuda. It even manages to cast Blackburn in a decent light as they took on responsibility for producing the vast majority of them while Fairey struggled with the rest of their workload and attempting to design aircraft that didn’t look like they’d already been in an accident. After the high point of Taranto popular imagination has the Stringbag’s ruggedness and robust landing gear allowing it to remain relevant taking part in the Battle of the Atlantic, in conditions that would defeat lesser aircraft.

This probably seems plausible based on the antiquated design which implies a certain sturdiness. The problem is that it doesn’t really match reality. At best it was easily repairable, certainly on at least one occasion a serviceable Swordfish was assembled onboard ship, from the remains of three that had been damaged serving on a Merchant Aircraft Carrier (MAC) allowing ASW patrols to continue. [4] Try doing that with an F-35. But being easily repairable isn’t the same as being rugged. Being rugged means you’re devastatingly attractive to the other aircraft, and don’t have to go to the engineers when you stub your undercarriage.

Some will argue that this is irrelevant as the Swordfish was better suited than anything else that could have been operated from Escort Carriers (CVE) during the Battle of the Atlantic. Unfortunately, this isn’t borne out by the evidence, as even the Royal Navy knew. In analysing operations by the US and Royal navies in 1943 they came to some disturbing conclusions about their premier ASW aircraft. While both forces were operating from near identical CVEs [5] the USN operating Avengers were suffering a far lower wastage rate. [6] In fact the USN suffered 14 aircraft lost or damaged in 1420 sorties to the RN’s 63 in 880! An accident every 14 sorties to the USN’s once every hundred. Worse, over half the Swordfish accidents were attributed to the undercarriage breaking or causing the aircraft to bounce on landing. Nor could this be blamed on the RN operating more often in bad weather as there was no correlation between the wastage rate experienced and the conditions the ship was operating in. On its own this would be bad enough, but that much lower sortie rate achieved by the RN? That was due to ship’s Captains being unwilling to launch their aircraft unless absolutely necessary in case they got damaged. Conserving their strength for times of emergency, you know, more than just being involved in a global conflict to the death. This had two effects, firstly Swordfish equipped CVE were less likely to spot U-boats as they just didn’t have aircraft airborne as much. Secondly U-boats were generally sunk as the result of a continued aggressive attack with all airborne aircraft converging on the target once it was spotted. For the RN this was only achieved twice in 1943 as the minimum number of aircraft would be airborne to reduce the number of landing accidents. So, despite both navies having almost identical carrier availability in 1943 USN aircraft sank 23 U-boats to the RN’s 3. [7]

Ultimately operating from the same decks in the same theatre, the larger, heavier Avenger had a wastage rate 1/7^th that of the experiment in parasitic drag that was the Swordfish. Perhaps more damaging to the Stringbag’s reputation the report’s writers only had two recommendations, one explicitly recommending replacing them with Avengers, the other pointing out doing so would make follow up attacks more effective.

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[4] Achtung! Swordfish! Stanley Brand. Chp 17.

[5] 39 RN CVEs were supplied by the USA to the USN’s design, 3 were built in the UK to a different design, and 3 converted from merchant ships. One of which had been captured from Germany at the start of the war.

[6] Directorate of Naval Operational Studies. ‘Achievements of British and US Escort Carriers’. Admiralty, 12 February 1944. ADM 219/95. The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.

[7] The USN had 24 carrier months to the RN’s 22. E.g. the USN could have had 4 carriers dedicated to ASW for six months each.

Bing Chandler is a former Lynx Observer and current Wildcat Air Safety Officer. If you want a Sea Vixen t-shirt he can fix you up.

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According to the former President of the United State of America, Donald Trump, air power has been important to rebels since the the 1770s. In his 4th of July speech in 2019 he stated that the Continental Army fighting the British ‘took over the airports’ as part of their struggle for independence. Despite his grip on historical fact being roughly equivalent to his understanding of morality, Trump accidentally got two things right: air power of any kind is seldom available to revolutionaries and therefore neutralising the aviation assets of their oppressors is a very sensible idea.

Combat aircraft are generally expensive and require large, vulnerable bases from which to operate not to mention a prohibitive amount of spares and maintenance just to get off the ground. When one then considers the hefty training requirements for their crew both in the air and on the ground, it is hardly surprising that freedom fighters, insurgents, rebels or revolutionaries rarely make use of aircraft.

Here are some of the most interesting exceptions to the rule: the best flying freedom fighters from 1776 to the present.

10. Martinsyde Type A Mk.II ‘The Big Fella’, Irish Republican Army, 1921

Not really a ‘warplane’ as such, the first aircraft of the Irish Air Corps was, at least, a modified fighter. In 1921, Michael Collins (the Irish Revolutionary leader, not the Apollo XI astronaut) was due to attend talks in London to discuss Irish independence. Fearing that Collins and other members of the Irish delegation might be detained if the talks were to break down the IRA decided to obtain a fast aircraft to whisk delegates back to Ireland at the first sign of any trouble. The aircraft they chose was a derivative of the Martinsyde Buzzard, arguably the finest fighter of the First World War, and the fastest readily available British-built aircraft. Secretly purchased in September 1921, the Martinsyde Type A was equipped with two seats instead of military equipment and for the rest of the year it was kept at readiness at Croydon aerodrome. Thankfully (and somewhat surprisingly) the talks were successful, the Martinsyde was not required and power was devolved to the Irish Free State. On the other hand, the terms of the treaty directly led to the Irish Civil War of 1922-23 and resulted in the Irish Air Corps investing in several more aircraft of a more warlike nature. Meanwhile the Martinsyde was shipped to Dublin in 1922 and painted with the Irish flag of green, white and gold with the name ‘The Big Fella’ (Collins’s nickname) emblazoned on the nose. This was later changed to ‘City of Dublin’ and later still to ‘Cathair Atha Cliath’ (City of Dublin). Despite the obvious historical importance of this aircraft it was scrapped in 1937.

9. Mitsubishi Ki-51 ‘Guntei’, Indonesian Air Force, 1946-49

Only one example of the Japanese Ki-51 exists and we have the Indonesian independence movement to thank for it. After the end of hostilities in 1945, the Dutch East Indies were still occupied by thousands of armed Japanese troops. Two days after the Japanese general surrender, Indonesian republicans declared the country’s independence from the Netherlands, however the largely powerless Dutch Government-in-Exile based in Australia wished to regain their colonial state. Meanwhile, Louis Mountbatten, Allied High Commander South East Asia somewhat reluctantly agreed to use Allied and Japanese troops as caretaker forces until the Dutch return in 1947. During this period nationalist republican sentiment took hold across this enormous country and fighting broke out, from September 1945 and would continue unabated for four years,

Compared to most revolutionary groups the Indonesians were in an unusual position, the country was littered with the still-functional military equipment of a defeated occupying power. Not only that but trained Japanese personnel were in many cases sympathetic to Indonesia’s desire for independence and actively assisted the revolutionaries’ efforts. About 1000 stayed behind after the general repatriation of Japanese forces to support the republicans.

The bulk of the fighting took place on the ground but in July 1947 the Dutch initiated a large air assault intended to destroy all potentially hostile aircraft on the ground. Rebel forces had managed to hide a handful of Japanese aircraft and on the 29th of July, the first operation of the Indonesian Air Force took place. Two Yokosuka K5Y1s trainer biplanes (known as ‘Cureng’* to the Indonesians) joined the rebel’s premium offensive air asset, a Mitsubishi Ki-51 light bomber known as ‘Guntei’*. They were supposed to have been escorted by a Nakajima Ki-43 fighter but unfortunately it developed engine trouble and could not be repaired in time. Resplendent in their new Indonesian markings (created by simply painting the lower half of the Japanese hinomaru white) the three aircraft dropped incendiaries on the Dutch Army barracks in Semarang, Salatiga and Ambarawa. Material damage was minimal but the psychological damage was enormous as the Dutch, with predictable hubris, had previously declared the total destruction of the Indonesian Air Force. This failure was compounded by the fact that Dutch P-40s, charged with finding and destroying the raiders were unable to locate them. In December 1949 the Dutch, under pressure from the international community, particularly the USA recognised Indonesian independence. Today, the unique Ki-51 and extremely rare K5Y1 and Ki-43 aircraft that helped to make Indonesian independence a reality may be seen at the Dirgantara Mandala Museum.

*Despite frequent references to these names in a variety of sources, I have been unable to find any kind of translation from Indonesian. If you know, please inform us in the comments.

 

8. Hawker Hurricane Mk IV, Balkan Air Force, 1944-45

In 1941 conventional Yugoslavian resistance to the Nazi juggernaut collapsed after a mere two weeks. There followed some four years of brutal partisan fighting in which Yugoslav forces twice came close to being wiped out but eventually emerged triumphant. What makes the Yugoslav experience unusual is its possession of an effective air force that achieved air superiority over the Luftwaffe and Croatian air force during 1944. Of course, the insurgent Yugoslavs could not have achieved this alone and for the first two years of the occupation Axis aircraft operated more or less unopposed on anti-partisan operations. However, after the Allies gained possession of Southern Italy the situation changed markedly. Previously limited to long range bombing missions, Allied tactical aircraft were now within striking distance of the Balkan nations. Initial operations were coordinated as part of the Italian campaign and as such sorties over the Balkans were essentially a diversion from the main thrust into Northern Italy but in June 1944 a different phase began with the creation of the Balkan Air Force, an organisation specifically intended to operate in support of the partisans.

The Balkan Air Force was a cosmopolitan organisation boasting some 15 aircraft types and eight different nationalities in its ranks. The units of the BAF with the most personal involvement in the campaign were 351 and 352 squadron, these were units of the RAF but were entirely Yugoslav manned and sported the Yugoslav star on their aircraft. Both initially operated the Hurricane, 352 converting to Spitfires in 1944 but 351 flew Hurricane IVs to the end of the war despite complaints from the Partisan Supreme Command that the Hurricane was inferior to the Spitfire. British manned No. 6 squadron also flew Hurricanes until VE day as part of the Balkan Air Force, these two units being the last to operate Hurricanes in combat over Europe. The Yugoslav units were kept extremely busy on ground attack, anti-shipping and reconnaissance missions until the end of the war. Released from RAF control on 16th May 1945, the two squadrons and their aircraft formed the 1st Fighter Regiment of the Yugoslav Air Force. The Hurricane remained in first line service until at least 1951.

7. Avia B.534, Slovenské povstalecké letectvo (Slovak Insurgent Air Force), Slovakia 1944

The story of the Slovak National Uprising is a tragic tale of massive bravery and initial success squandered due to political infighting, failures to follow an agreed plan, and a lack of international support. It did however result in one mission that made (slightly obscure) aviation history. The uprising was launched on 29 August 1944 from Banská Bystrica in an attempt to resist German troops that had occupied Slovak territory and to overthrow the collaborationist government of Jozef Tiso.

Things went badly from the start, the insurgents lost six airfields within days and operations were conducted from the two air bases remaining in Insurgent hands at Tri Duby (Three Oaks) and Zolná. The Insurgent Air Force was small, consisting of four Avia B-534 biplane fighters, three Letov Å -328 biplane light bombers, and two Bf 109E-4, charmingly known as the ‘Combined Squadron’. They were later reinforced by a two other Bf 109G-6s and a Focke-Wulf Fw 189. Rather more meaningful air support for the insurgency came in September from the 1st Czechoslovak Fighter Air Regiment of the Soviet Red Army Air Force under the command of Captain FrantiÅ¡ek Fajtl. Flying the potent Lavochkin La-5FN, many of the unit’s pilots were skilled fighter pilots who had previously flown for the RAF. These pilots ultimately flew some 923 sorties and destroyed 40 Axis planes before the collapse of organised resistance. Meanwhile the Combined Squadron did what it could with its motley collection of aircraft, always struggling with supplies – particularly ammunition for the German built fighters. The most remarkable sortie by a Slovak Insurgent aircraft came on the 2nd September 1944 when FrantiÅ¡ek Cyprich, who had attained ‘ace’ status with the Slovak air force against the Soviets, flew an Avia B.534 to successfully intercept a Hungarian Junkers Ju 52/3m that was crossing Slovak territory, forcing it to crash land. This was the last confirmed ‘kill’ by a biplane fighter in history.

6. Vought Kingfisher, Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Air Force), Cuba 1959

The Cuban Revolutionary Air Force garnered plenty of attention for its actions over the Bay of Pigs in 1961 but revolutionary aircraft had been in action well before that. Castro’s Cuban revolution was a remarkable turnaround from almost complete disaster in 1953 when only around 20 revolutionaries escaped President Fulgencia Batista’s forces to total victory five years later. Air power was almost totally the preserve of Batista’s government forces throughout the Cuban Revolution, the rebels fighting their way out of the Sierra Madre mountains in a guerilla campaign of greater and greater magnitude, garnering fresh troops and support as they went. But in the last few weeks of armed conflict the first ever combat operations of the Rebels’ Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria (FAR) were flown against Batista’s crumbling forces. The aircraft utilised was a Vought OS2U ‘Kingfisher’ of the Cuban Navy in landplane, rather than the more usual floatplane, guise. Without the time, or perhaps the means, to change the markings, the Kingfisher went into battle still displaying its pre-revolutionary Navy markings. On November 7th 1958, Silva Tablada with gunner Leonel Pajan flew the little Vought armed with two small fragmentation bombs over the encircled Army camp at La Maya, containing some 200 loyalist soldiers holding out against the rebels. Unaware that the rebels possessed any aircraft the soldiers cheered the approaching aircraft, believing it would attack their besiegers.

Their joy soon turned to panic when in the course of three passes over the camp, Tablada accurately dropped his two bombs into the centre of the camp whilst Pajan strafed indiscriminately. Material damage was negligible but such was the psychological effect of ‘Operacion A-001’ that the soldiers surrendered almost immediately, bringing to an end some two weeks of fighting at La Maya. Tablada would go on to fly three more bombing missions, all escorted by the second combat aircraft of the FAR, a T-28 Trojan, before the cessation of hostilities on the 1st January 1959, these four missions representing the complete combat operations of the rebels during the Revolution. Tablada’s OS2U is preserved today in the Museo de la Revolución in Havana.

5. Curtiss Falcon, Constitutionalist Brazil, 1932

Unless you’re Brazilian, I suspect that you’ve never heard of the Constitutionalist Revolution but more fool you because it was a pretty big deal. Basically, in 1932, the state of São Paulo decided to declare war on the rest of Brazil. Ten out of ten for chutzpah but maybe not the brightest move, you would be forgiven for thinking. The ‘Paulistas’ were aggrieved by President Getúlio Vargas having seized the Brazilian presidency in a coup d’etat and ruling by decree, in place of the democratically elected Júlio Prestes. They planned to oust the Government and adopt a Brazilian Constitution, hence the name of the revolt. When hostilities broke out, Government forces could muster around 60 aircraft against the rebel’s four, none of them on either side particularly modern. Immediately, both sides frantically attempted to procure more aircraft. After being fobbed off by France the federalist forces of President Vargas managed to acquire some 200 modern warplanes in the US including the state-of-the-art Boeing 256, which was obtained by Brazil before they entered service with the U.S. Navy as the F4B-4. Meanwhile the Paulistas were prevented by naval blockade from contacting any aircraft-producing nation. Luckily for them in 1930 Curtiss-Wright had set up a production line in Chile and the revolutionaries were able to purchase nine new Chilean-built Curtiss Falcons, though one was confiscated by Paraguay during the delivery flight. The Falcons proved to be the most formidable aircraft involved in the conflict.

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Despite the disparity in numbers the revolutionaries used their meagre air assets to considerable effect, unfortunately far too late to make any difference to the outcome of the war. Nonetheless they made several dramatic attacks on Federal forces, the most successful when two Curtiss Falcons, one Waco 225 and a single Nieuport-Delage raided the Federal forces’ airstrip in the town of Mogi-Mirim, São Paulo, destroying two brand new Waco CSOs on the ground and seriously damaging two others.

4. Zlin Z-143, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 2007-08

Sri Lanka is a lovely island riven with ethnic division and years of horrific violence. Historical ethnic tensions between the majority Sinhalese and Tamil population prompted the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), generally known as the ‘Tamil Tigers’. Their aim was to secure an independent Tamil state in response to policies of successive Sri Lankan governments considered discriminatory towards the minority Tamil population. Formed in 1976, the Tamil Tigers pursued this aim militarily through a full scale national insurgency from 1983 to 2009. Most of the LTTE’s operations were ground based though unusually for an insurgent group they were able to boast both a naval arm and an aviation component, the ‘Air Tigers’.

The origins of the Air Tigers remain somewhat murky, LTTE radio began to refer to Tamil Tiger aircraft during 1998 but their existence could not be confirmed, and indeed was written off as LTTE propaganda by Sri Lankan Deputy Minister for Defence Anuruddha Ratwatte, until 2007 when they made their presence known in dramatic fashion. In March two LTTE Zlin Z-143 aircraft attacked Katunayake Air force base north of Colombo, killing three air force officials and wounding nearly 20 others. IAI Kfris and recently acquired MiG-27s of the Sri Lankan Air Force were believed to be the target as they had recently bombed LTTE territory but all escaped damage. There followed a succession of small but maddening raids on civil and military targets by the Zlins, of which the Tamils never had more than five, including an audacious attack on the naval base at Trincomalee and a particularly cunning raid on a Shell refinery timed to coincide with the 2007 Cricket World Cup final between Sri Lanka and Australia which a vast swathe of the population was watching live. To add insult to injury Australia won by 53 runs. The culmination of the air attacks was a suicide attack in February 2009 by two Zlins on SriLankan Air force targets around Colombo though both attacking aircraft were destroyed before they could hit their targets. The victory of Sri Lankan forces over the LTTE later that year brought an end to the Air Tigers’ operations.

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3. Dewoitine D.520, Forces Francaises de l’Interieur (Free French Forces of the Interior), 1944

Is it cheating to have your insurgency backed up by the largest invasion force ever assembled? Of course not. The final fling of France’s most successful wartime fighter saw it once again heroically fighting the Nazi forces it had been designed to oppose. Dewoitine D.520s spent most of the conflict in a variety of fascist-y guises from Vichy France to Bulgaria but ended up After D-day being flown against the German occupiers by the Forces Francaises de l’Interieur (FFI), better known to English speakers as the French Resistance. Initially seizing serviceable aircraft from abandoned German and Vichy stocks a few D.520s went into action in a distinctly ad-hoc manner against their former owners.

The Dewoitines were incorporated into a unit named Groupe Doret during July 1944 under their leader, the charismatic pre-war test pilot and aerobatic champion Marcel Doret (who coincidentally had made the D.520’s maiden flight back in 1938). Although distinctly long in the tooth, negligible German air activity meant that the D.520s could be used with relative impunity attacking anti-aircraft positions and isolated pockets of German troops. Doret’s Dewoitines were also used to escort Dauntless dive bombers operating over Royan and la Pointe de Grave. Sufficient aircraft were made airworthy to allow a second squadron to begin operations in August. In the same month, following the Allied landings in Provence, both the SNCASE (Dewoitine) and the Morane-Saulnier factory, which had been manufacturing D.520s for the Germans since 1943, diverted construction to the FFI. The French Resistance therefore became the first, and so far only, insurgent group to possess not only an air force but a functioning aircraft factory! The first brand new D.520 for the Resistance, appropriately coded ‘1’ and sporting both D-day invasion stripes and the cross of Lorraine on its roundels was photographed at Tarbes-Ossun in South Western France on 24th August 1944. The D.520’s insurgent days were relatively brief however as the French Air Force was officially reformed on 1st December 1944 and Doret’s unit became G.C.II/18. The Dewoitines were replaced with Spitfires on the 1st March 1945.

2. Gloster Gladiator, Royal Iraqi Air Force, 1941

Credit: © Clavework Graphics

Quite reasonably believing that in 1941 Britain had rather too much on its plate to deal with an uprising against its rule, Iraq, under Prime Minister Rashid Ali, decided to throw off the imperialist yoke. Correctly surmising that this course of action would be of interest to the Axis powers he requested material assistance from Germany and Italy. As a result several Bf 110s and He 111s under the command of Colonel Werner Junck operated for a time in Iraqi markings as ‘Fliegerführer Irak’. However, the insurgent Iraqi forces were not devoid of air power of their own, being equipped with the impressive total of 116 aircraft of various types at the start of hostilities. Admittedly only about 60 of those were serviceable but these included some relatively effective modern types such as Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 bombers and Gloster Gladiators, not exactly cutting edge by 1941 but notably the same fighter equipped British units in the area. The Gladiator would turn out to be the stand-out aircraft of the conflict on both sides.

Most of the fighting centred on RAF Habbaniya airfield, a large force of Iraqi troops laid siege to the airfield on the 1st of May. Despite possessing a massive numerical advantage (there were about 9000 Iraqi troops facing some 300 defenders) and expecting negotiations to come to discuss terms for a peaceful surrender, Iraqi forces were not prepared for the remarkable intensity of the British response. On the 2nd aircraft from Habbaniya began constantly attacking Iraqi positions and it was near total superiority in the air that allowed for swift British victory. It did not quite all go in favour of the British however, one of the Royal Iraqi Air Force Gladiators succeeded in shooting down a Vickers Wellington on the 4th of May. A day later the only known Gladiator versus Gladiator ‘kill’ occurred when Pilot Officer Watson shot down an Iraqi Gladiator over Baqubah. RAF Gladiators also successfully intercepted Iraqi SM-79s and even destroyed two of the Bf 110s without loss despite the terrific speed advantage enjoyed by the German fighter.

1. Mikoyan MiG-23BN, Free Libyan Air Force, 2011

The aftermath of the events of the Arab Spring still resonate around the world and perhaps nowhere greater than Libya. For a brief period it looked like a historic and justified revolution had occurred but Libya has been stricken with permanent civil war since the initial revolt against the autocratic government of Muammar Gaddafi in early 2011. Nonetheless in the early days the Libyan revolt appeared to be deposing a tyrant and the actions of the Libyan Air Force, though relatively modest, were decisive.

Collectively, probably the most significant act by the airmen of the Libyan Air Force was their defiance of orders to attack their fellow countrymen. On multiple occasions aircraft despatched to bomb protesters deliberately dropped their weapons in deserted areas. Meanwhile two pilots defected with their Mirage F.1s to Malta after their pilots refused to attack opposition forces. Events took a more dramatic turn when in March when the Free Libya Air Force announced its existence in spectacular style by utilising a MiG-23 and a Mil Mi-24 helicopter to sink two pro-Gaddafi warships. Strike missions against Gaddafi’s forces seeking to take Benghazi proved instrumental in the defence of that city and a total of 38 combat sorties was ultimately flown by Free Libyan aircraft between March the 1st and 19th when the NATO imposed no-Fly zone was imposed, effectively grounding the air force. However 32 covert supply runs by BAe 146 transport aircraft operating from roads were undertaken, these flights being escorted by MiG-21 fighters, despite imposition of the no-fly zone. Despite their heroic actions during the first Civil War, the Free Libyan Air Force was reabsorbed into the Libyan Air Force and as of 2020 is split between the forces of the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and those nominally led by Khalifa Haftar of the Libyan National Army (LNA) on behalf of the part of the National Parliament in Tobruk. The two groups have been at war since 2014.

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VIFFing won the Falklands There is a line of thinking among some aviation enthusiasts that goes like this: The Sea Harrier was crucial to winning the Falklands Conflict. Harriers can vector in forward flight (VIFF). Therefore, VIFFing won the Falklands. This is sometimes extended into the conclusion that as the F-35B can’t VIFF it’s not as good as the Harrier, presumably because that means it wouldn’t have been able to win the Falklands Conflict. The problem with this line of thinking is that just because the Sea Harrier could do something, it doesn’t mean it did. After all it was also nuclear capable, but no one ever brings that up as a reason it helped win the war.

For those wondering what VIFFing was supposed to achieve, imagine Maverick’s move in Top Gun where he ‘hits the brakes and they fly right by’ but in a much smaller aircraft. The massive reduction in speed forcing the pursuer into an overtake at which point the Harrier takes its shot. Meanwhile any other enemy aircraft has a nice slow-moving target to try and hit, which could be considered a drawback. Air combat over the Falklands was characterised by short engagements as Argentinian fighters were operating at the limits of their endurance and were generally concerned with anti-shipping or ground attack missions in the vicinity of the islands themselves. In fact, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina’s most sophisticated interceptor the Mirage IIIEAs of Grupo 8 de Caza could only reach the islands with fuel for 12 minutes at altitude or 5 if they descended to low level where the majority of combat took place. Consequently, they would only engage Sea Harriers on the 1st of May, during which two were lost, one to Argentine AA fire as it attempted to divert to Port Stanley. [1] Future sorties would instead concentrate on high-level sweeps, attempted intercepts of clandestine helicopter operations, and Canberra bomber escort. The remaining Argentine aircraft encountered, were predominantly IAI Daggers, essentially bootleg Mirage’s optimised for ground attack, and A-4 Skyhawks. The only weapons these carried for air-to-air combat were 20 and 30-mm cannon, the Dagger’s main advantage being looking like they might be Mirages. However, these too were at the limits of their range and even with the most direct routing only had around 10 minutes over the islands to find their targets. The Skyhawks had slightly better endurance, especially if a KC-130 was available to refuel them, even so after transiting to the islands they’d have little time to loiter. With these limitations there was little appetite, or time for the Argentinian forces to engage in protracted air combat. At the same time, the FAA’s Sea Harriers would have limited time on CAP for much of the period as the carriers remained well to the east to stay out of range of the Exocet armed Super Étendards of the Argentine Navy. Only when heavy raids were expected did they close to around 80NM from the islands, such as on 25th of May, Argentina’s Independence Day. [2] This reduced their opportunities to engage aircraft and close cooperation with Fighter Controllers onboard frigates and destroyers was often crucial to ensure they were in the right place at the right time. As a result of both sides limited opportunities, most of the engagements during the conflict consisted of a single pass or a tail chase by the Sea Harriers after having spotted the enemy. There appear to have been no prolonged turning fights where VIFFing might have been used as a last-ditch manoeuvre. Because nothing says last ditch like coming to a stop in the middle of a dogfight, ask the Chinese pilot who was shot down by Lt ‘Shmoo’ Ellis over Korea. In total Sea Harriers shot down 20 aircraft during the conflict, plus one shared with HMS Ardent. Several decades after the events the circumstances of each engagement are now relatively clear and are summarised below. Suffice to say none of these combats saw VIFFing employed, where Fighter Controllers were involved the defending aircraft were as far as possible vectored behind the attackers allowing them the best shot for their Sidewinders. On other occasions the enemy were spotted visually with the Sea Harriers chasing after them as they were routing to or from their attacks on the amphibious landings and ground forces. Nor does there appear to have been any use of VIFFing in order to shake off an opponent. In fact there are relatively few accounts of Argentine aircraft being behind Sea Harriers, in one instance Capt Gustavo Justo fired his guns at Lt Cdr Ward at a range of around 2000’ and missed, a lack of tracer not helping. [1] Distracted by a wingman’s parachute Justo then managed to beat Ward around a hill, the winner receiving a Sidewinder for his troubles. Another occasion took place during the final combat on 8 Jun 82 when Flt Lt Morgan engaged a flight of four A-4B but mistook the third aircraft for the fourth. [3] This might have been an opportunity to employ VIFFing, if Flt Lt Morgan had been aware of his mistake, but as it was the Skyhawk’s cannon had been damaged earlier in the sortie by ground fire and the pilot could do nothing as Morgan engaged two of his wingmen. [2] In conclusion the VIFFing myth seems to have arisen from people associating one of the Harrier’s unique capabilities with one of the highlights of its career. To quote the now retired Lt Cdr Morgan ‘No one used VIFFing during the conflict. It was purely a defensive manoeuvre and no SHAR was ever in a position where a defensive manoeuvre was required – we were always offensive!!’. Despite reports of it happening being conspicuously absent in any of the first-hand accounts of the air campaign no doubt there will forever be those who claim it’s the kind of British engineering genius that won the war. Which is ironic as it reduces the actual achievement of taking a task group with integrated air defence to the other end of the world to ‘one neat trick you won’t believe they used’. So, expect a National Interest article on it any day now. Our interview with Sea Harrier pilot ‘Sharkey’ Ward here We sell fantastic high quality aviation-themed gifts here

[1] Dildy, Doug, and Pablo Calcaterra. Sea Harrier FRS1 vs Mirage III/Dagger: South Atlantic 1982, 2017 [2] Rivas, Santiago. SKYHAWKS OVER THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: The Argentine Skyhawks in the Malvinas/Falklands War 1982. S.l.: HELION & CO LTD, 2020. [3] Morgan, David H. S. Hostile Skies: The Falklands Conflict Through the Eyes of a Sea Harrier Pilot. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006.  Bing Chandler is a former Lynx Observer and current Wildcat Air Safety Officer. If you want a Sea Vixen t-shirt he can fix you up.

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Modern fighters are ‘multi-role’, meaning they can attack aerial or surface targets. They can carry the same weight of anti-surface munition as a World War II bomber, yet are also capable of performing the air superiority mission which demands extremely high performance. The ‘swing’ or ‘omni’ mission is one in which both air and ground targets are attacked in the same sortie. 

In 2020, fighter-bombers dominate, with only the US and Russia rich enough to produce and field single-role fighters and attack aircraft. Here we assess and rank the ten most capable multi-role combat aircraft in service in 2020. 

Before we reveal our top 10 for 2020, Jim Smith, who took an active role in in the development of many British warplanes, shares an analysis of what ‘multi-role’ means.

Note: The introduction section is by Jim Smith, the top 10 section is by Hush-Kit (with a section from Justin Bronk) with recommendations from Jim, but does not reflect his opinions. 

Why do air arms select multi-role aircraft?
“When considering the qualities of particular systems, or classes of capability, it is always good practice to start with an examination of what objectives might drive their selection.
In the case of multi-role aircraft, having been peripherally involved with Tornado, and fairly deeply involved with both the Typhoon and JSF projects, I can well remember the much rehearsed argument ‘Another Jack of All Trades, and Master of None’ directed against the Multi-Role solution as opposed to separate Air Combat and Strike platforms.

I can also remember the German Government attitude to Typhoon (when it was still EFA) ‘Not a Deutsche Mark for air-to-surface’*. And the Treasury coming in with “As it’s multi-role, I assume you’ll be taking at least two types out of Service when it comes in” – bye-bye Jaguar and Harrier …

So those are the rather glib messages suggesting multi-role aircraft might not be the way to go. But what are the counter arguments? And where might a multi-role solution be just the thing. Well, there are two obvious drivers – force structure constraints, and the economy. For the first, consider maritime air power, specifically carrier-based operations.

You need to be able to provide fighter aircraft – as a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) screen to deter attacking forces, defeat threat anti-shipping and air combat capabilities, and protect other assets, such as airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, tankers and electronic warfare (EW) platforms. But you also need a strike aircraft, capable of projecting power from the ship – otherwise what’s the point of being there? And you only have limited space on the ship to store and maintain your aircraft.

Hence even the US select multi-role aircraft for naval air, most notably the F-4 Phantom II and more recently the F/A-18F Super Hornet. Not to say they don’t also have some single role aircraft, but these two excellent aircraft give the lie to the “… Master of None” gibe.

In addition, in smaller air arms, and in smaller economies, it may be neither necessary or affordable to maintain separate strike and fighter capabilities. The development of air combat aircraft has been increasing in both cost and time as more and more capability is both sought and delivered. This trend has placed relentless pressure on forces to reduce the number of different types in the inventory, partly because of the continuing increase in development cost and time of such systems, but also because of the operational costs in maintaining, and in training air and ground crew for multiple different systems. As an example, in the UK, we can see a fairly near-term future in which a mix of Typhoon and Lightning II will provide the core air power for the nation, excepting long-range precision strike by cruise missile.

The pressure to reduce the number of types in the inventory has also driven some innovative and successful solutions, where different variants of aircraft have been produced optimised for the Fighter and Strike roles, the most notable Western examples being the F-15C and F-15E, and the Tornado GR and F3 aircraft. These aircraft have differing avionics, and some significant airframe differences, yet still manage to retain significant commonality in propulsion and other, not directly role-specific, systems. However, these aircraft are not truly multi-role, as they are specialised variants of a near-common platform, rather than truly able to be used in many roles.

The third reason to adopt a multi-role approach is simply the flexibility in defence planning which it enables. Many recent conflicts have not involved a contest for air dominance. In general, although fighter aircraft have been used to escort high value targets, the air threat in (say) Afghanistan, Mali or Yemen, has been minimal, and the ability of air combat aircraft like Typhoon or Rafale to ‘Swing Role’ and deliver strike missions has been invaluable. The F-16 also provides a good example of a fighter that has spent most, though definitely not all, of its life operating as a strike asset.

What makes a good multi-role combat aircraft?

Let’s start with a brief indication of the capabilities we might expect such an aircraft to have. A multi-role combat aircraft is one that is used to perform many different types of mission.
Examples might include the delivery of precision guided bombs; the delivery of long-range stand-off weapons; the suppression of enemy defences, perhaps through the use of anti-radar missiles in support of other aircraft; carriage of tactical reconnaissance systems; and the ability to both defend itself against air threats, and, when necessary, escort other aircraft.

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In some cases, possibly many cases, a swing-role capability may be desirable. This means the ability to switch from one mission to another if required, for example, the carriage of mixed weapons so that alternative targets can be addressed. Carriage of both laser-guided bombs to allow direct attack, and anti-radiation missiles to allow defence suppression, for example. Fighter aircraft may carry a full air-to-air load out as well as air-to-surface weapons, allowing them to retain an air combat capability once the air-to-surface stores have been released. As a capability, ‘swing role’ may be particularly important in delivering Close Air Support (CAS), where precision is required due to the proximity of friendly troops, but the nature and location of the target will be unknown until an airborne taking is received.

Delivering this flexible capability is going to drive a number of aspects of our aircraft. To be effective in air combat, it is going to need a radar, an infra-red seeker tracker (IRST), if it has aspirations to either be somewhat stealthy or tackle stealthy targets, and ideally both Long-range or Medium-range and Short-range air-to-air missiles (L/MRAAM and SRAAM). To survive, it’s also going to need the defensive aids that support air combat – a towed decoy; defensive aids system, chaff, flares, missile launch and approach warner, for example.
Beyond this, our aircraft is going to need to be effective, at a minimum, as a tactical strike aircraft. This means having the payload-range to deliver its weapons to their targets. Precise requirements will depend on the targets to be engaged, as this will drive the nature of the weapons to be carried, and the sensors needed to support them. A basic precision-guided bomb delivery capability will require either a podded or internal laser designation system, and the necessary weapons stations and pylons to carry and release the weapons. A JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) or other equivalent datalink capability will also be essential to enable situational awareness, and to receive in-mission target tasking and authorisation.
If the targets are heavily defended by anti-air systems, or are hardened, then it is likely that the ability to deliver weapons with significant stand-off capability will be needed. Because of the need for these weapons to make a powered fly out to their targets, they will be larger and heavier than unpowered bombs or glide-bombs. Similarly, the use of larger and more complex warheads against hardened targets will also drive up weapon size and weight.

Unless a stealthy multi-role system is available, the stores are likely to be mainly carried externally, which compromises radar signature, and increases drag very significantly. To achieve a useful mission radius on a strike mission, it is likely that increased fuel will be required, either through the use of external fuel tanks (e.g. Rafale, Typhoon), fuselage saddle tanks (e.g. F-15E, Late-model F-16) or increased platform size (e.g. Su-32, J-20).

It is important to note that having plenty of pylons available to carry weapons is necessary, but not sufficient. For a multi-role aircraft to be an effective strike platform, the weapons it carries must be integrated with the aircraft system. Aircraft sensors have to be able to cue weapons; the weapon capability envelopes have to be displayed to the pilot; the appropriate carriage and release envelopes must be known and respected; and pilots and maintainers have to be trained in the use and the maintenance of the various systems.

Low Observable Systems
What of stealth? By this I mean systems that are hard to detect by surface and air-based sensors of all types, but generally at least radar and infra-red sensors. One impact of seeking to avoid detection is that when this is necessary, no external stores can be carried. The effect of this is to require stores to be carried in internal bays, which limits the size and number of weapons that can be carried, impacting on both fighter and particularly strike capability.

This has driven the development of specialised stores such as the Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB), but use of internal weapons bays for air-to-surface stores will generally be at the expense of carriage of MRAAM. The inability to carry external tanks or stores without compromising the aircraft stealth capability will reduce both strike range and mission flexibility. That said, the low signature of these aircraft does allow greater utility in high threat environments (sometimes described as the ‘first day of the war’ capability).
A related issue is that while internal stores carriage also means that (generally) there is plenty of space for internal fuel, the resulting configuration can also have higher wave drag. This tends to result in less combat radius or combat persistence than might be expected, and can also result in less energy manoeuvrability.

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Are the F-22 and F-35 multi-role? Well, they do have both fighter and strike capabilities, but will be constrained by weapons bay size if they are relying on stealth to survive. Certainly, the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Air Force will be seeking to use their Lightning IIs for both air defence and strike. Some other air arms will rely on a force mix approach, using their Lightnings mainly as a strike asset, supported when required by air superiority fighters.

The F-22 is effectively optimised for the fighter role, and JSF for strike. In service, F-22 is likely to be used primarily an air superiority fighter, even though it is capable of carrying a mix of JDAM and SRAAM to deliver a strike capability, largely because it is available in limited numbers. Arguably, the F-22 is better employed to achieve air superiority, enabling other aircraft and systems to deliver the strike missions.
Conversely, at least in high-threat environments, the F-35 might best be considered as a strike aircraft with a self defence capability, or perhaps as an air defence aircraft without an effective strike capability. Of course, both air combat and strike effects can still be achieved, using aircraft with a mix of strike and air combat load outs – effectively functioning as ‘bombers and escorts’.

Is a stealthy multi-role aircraft possible? Certainly, but such an aircraft may need to have a larger weapons bay than the F-22 or F-35 to accommodate the variety and size of weapons required for strike missions. Inevitably such a design would be large and expensive, and an exemplar perhaps already exists in the Chinese J-20.

Mission Support

Much depends on the target set, and particularly whether moving targets as well as fixed targets are to be addressed. If targets are fixed, pre-planned strikes are possible and may be conducted with ‘fire and forget’ systems such as cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons. If targets are moving, or are re-locatable, and are thus uncertain in position, a more flexible approach will be necessary.

A variety of approaches are possible, the simplest being laser designation from the aircraft, with the laser being enabled to track the target. This approach, however, relies on a line of sight being available to the target, and hence results in relatively short-range engagements, which may not be feasible against some targets. Alternatively, an active seeker on the weapon may be used, for example using a millimetric wave radar or an infra-red sensor to track and guide to the target.

Importantly, appropriate operational doctrine and command and control systems need to be in place to enable swing role, close air support and dynamic in-mission planning to allow targets of opportunity, or urgent tasking requests, to be addressed. Avoiding casualties to friendly forces or civilians, ensuring the validity of targets and the suitability of the weapons carried, coordinating actions with coalition ground forces, and ensuring the safety of air operations in a complex environment, will all require secure, high confidence datalink communications, and a system for receiving, processing and approving taskings.
While what is described has a Western and Coalition perspective, it is clear that any multi-role, dynamically planned short-notice operation is unlikely to be possible unless some process is in place for issuing and accepting valid taskings in a dynamic environment.

Features enabling a multi-role capability – a reprise
A summary list of good attributes for a multi-role combat aircraft might be (in no particular order):

1. A suitable integrated suite of air-to-air weapons for self defence and escort capability. Likely to be a minimum of 4 MRAAM and 2 SRAAM
2. A suitable integrated suite of air-to surface weapons.
3. Precise capabilities will depend on the target set, but likely to include precision guided bombs, anti-armour and/or anti-shipping weapons, stand-off weapons and cruise missiles, anti-radiation weapons.
4. Appropriate sensors to detect targets and provide necessary weapons guidance. Likely to include Air-to-air and air-to-surface radar, IR Tracker, laser designator and capability to carry other systems such as a tactical reconnaissance package.
5. Sufficient internal fuel to deliver required mission radius, enhanced when necessary by additional external fuel, and ability to receive air-to-air refuelling.
6. Defensive aids including chaff, flares, active radar and IR jamming capability. Ideally a towed radar decoy, or other means of electronic attack
7. Datalink communication to off-board assets such as AEW&C aircraft; ability to receive and pass on target information and authorisation; necessary datalink support to weapons, and desirably ability to provide third-party targeting and weapons support.
8. Air vehicle performance sufficient to deliver Beyond visual range (BVR) air combat, and desirably to survive WVR air combat.
9. An affordable and supportable airframe and weapons systems.
10. If stealthy, a sufficiently large internal weapons bay, or bays, to be able to carry both MRAAM and air to surface weapons simultaneously.
11. An appropriate command, control and doctrinal environment to allow dynamic in-flight mission targeting.

–– Jim Smith

Aircraft discounted from the list 

Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor 

An unmatched air superiority aircraft –but a waste of capability to use as a strike aircraft.

Chengdu J-20

I see this as air superiority, but with an anti-access edge. If armed with a hypersonic air-to-air weapon it would have to be a concern for US AWACS and AAR assets. If capable of fielding a similar anti-ship weapon it might also be a concern for the USN.

Sukhoi Su-57 Felon 

Impressive looking beast, which could well be a good future multi-role platform.

Mikoyan MiG-35

Should become a decent all-rounder but is currently immature.

Top 10 multi-role fighters 2020

10. McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C Hornet (APG-79v4)

The number ten slot is the most contested, with each potential candidate bringing something to the table: the JF-17 has a state-of-the-art cockpit, a stand-off ground attack capability and a potent EW suite; the Mirage 2000 is a proven and well equipped platform; the Tejas is tiny, with a good sensor package and the best carefree handling system of any fighter. But it can only go to one aircraft, so by a slim margin we are handing the number 10 slot to the upgraded FA-18Cs of the USMC. Though they may lack endurance, they may be ancient, they are currently been given a new lease of life with the retrofitting of the APG-79v4, a baby version of the Super Hornet’s AESA radar. This results in excellent situational awareness in an engine/airframe combination already loved for its reliability and legendary manoeuvrability, and one cleared to deploy a wide-range of modern munitions. The Hornet has been combat proven for over 30 years and earned its spurs itself in the heartbreaking wars of the Middle East, Afghanistan and Libya. Back in the early 1980s the legacy Hornet led the way, demonstrating how an electronic cockpit and a decent multi-mission radar was the way forward. In 2020 it can still hold its own and it will continue to serve for some time.

9. Chengdu J-10C

Observers tend to be cautious of heaping praise on Chinese hardware, which (other than engine technology) may be a position more rooted in historical prejudice than fact. Judging an aircraft that has not been exported is tricky, but it is noteworthy that Pakistan cancelled their 2009 order for the type in 2011 to concentrate on improved JF-17 variants in the short term, followed by a likely commitment to the J-31. This may point to the aircraft’s capability edge over the JF-17 being too marginal to merit the cost, but this is pure speculation. What is more certain is that this is modern design that is being rapidly updated.

The Chinese J-10 is in service in large, and growing, numbers. The latest version, the J-10C, is a formidable machine. We spoke to Justin Bronk, Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at the RUSI think-tank to find out more. 

No nation has more new aircraft programmes than China, and the progress it has made in the twenty years has been spectacular. In the field of fighter aircraft much media attention has been paid to the rather spectacular J-20, a monstrous stealthy combat aircraft comparable in some respects to the US’ F-22, while less has been paid to the J-10.

The J-10 entered service in 2006 and since than around 350 have been built, more than the number of French Rafale, or Swedish Gripen and very close to the number of F-35s. With an estimated empty weight of 8850 kg and maximum weight of 19277 kg it is comparable to the F-16, as is its reheated thrust of around 130kN. The latest version, the J-10C, is the most potent – with a modern AESA radar and the ability to carry the PL-15 long range air-to-air missile, a formidable weapon in the same class as Europe’s much lauded Meteor. We asked Justin Bronk how the aircraft would fare against the F-16, the most widely used modern fighter aircraft.

“On J-10C in Beyond Visual Range combat; kinematically, it is likely to be somewhere close to a later Block F-16; the original J-10A’s thrust-weight ratio most likely having degraded due to weight growth as more advanced sensors, stores and kit such as HMS have been added.” — the J-10C’s thrust-to-weight, an important measure for how ‘energetic’ the aircraft is, remains decent- above 1.1 -1 in a typical combat configuration. “With a light airframe, relaxed stability, decent (although not stellar) thrust to weight ratio and large canards, the J-10C is very agile in airshow configuration and the option for thrust vectoring only increases this capability at low speeds. However, the light airframe and small size relative to fighters like the J-20, Typhoon or F-15 mean that external stores and fuel tanks will have a more serious impact on both performance and agility than on larger fighters.”

China has long struggled with aero-engine technology, so how good are the J-10C’s WS10s? “The WS-10 series has suffered from persistent problems with engine life, mean time between failures and throttle-spool response time. Whilst it has improved sufficiently to enter quantity production for later J-10Bs and J-11s, the Russian AL-31FN Series 3 developed for the J-10B is still a superior engine on almost all metrics aside from cost. Chinese military turbofan engines are improving rapidly but are at best only at par with Russian equivalents and are not yet in a position to compete directly with European or American designs.”

The PL-15 missile is something of a bogeyman to US planners, as if fully operational and as good as the Chinese say it condemns AMRAAM-armed legacy platforms to a position of vulnerability.

Bronk believes the Pl-15 is not yet fully operational, “The PL-15 is certainly being shown off on carriage flights with a number of different PLAAF types, so being somewhere around what we in the West would term Initial Operating Capability but not near Full Operational Clearance is probably a decent bet. There is a fair bit of concern in the US fighter community about the PL-15; its size and design should allow it to technically outrange the AIM-120 series and a proper active radar seeker head gives a lot more tactical options than older semi-active Russian and Chinese ‘sticks’.”

Though mechanically scanned radars are considered a technologically of the past, they remain the most common fighter sensor in the West. The J-10C has an Active Electronically Scanning Array radar, “Finally, its AESA radar should give the J-10C a significant advantage over older Mech-Scan equipped F-16s in the BVR arena; although having a great deal more experience in the technology, American fighter AESA sets are likely to remain superior where fitted especially in terms of advanced low-probability of intercept/detection (LPI/LPD) scanning modes.” In summary, Bronk firmly places the J-10C in Generation 4.5* “All in all, the J-10C is a significant leap into true ‘4.5th Generation’ capability for the PLAAF compared to the earlier variants of this distinctive bird. 

*something he defines as including “low-observability to radar; the ability to supercruise (fly at supersonic speed without using afterburners); and extreme manoeuvrability at all speeds.”.

8. Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II

In the scenario of war against Russia or China, the F-35 should be able to operate on Day One. If the US doesn’t want go to war with Russia or China, and just fancies bombing poor people, then the F-35 offers a great deal of over-capability (as do all the aircraft on this list). As a Rafale pilot recently noted in an interview, a weaponised C-130 or 737 would be able to do everything currently expected of a frontline fast jet in real-world operations.

The F-35C lacks maturity, and the F-35B has a short range. In time, the C variant would perhaps be the best multi-role one, with its bigger wing, then the A. The F-35B has significantly less range. As discussed above, I wouldn’t see this delivering a swing role very well. It has the advantage of stealth, and good data-links within F-35 to F-35, but would be unlikely to fare well in WVR combat.

7. Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70

It would be easy to dismiss the F-16 as it is so old, but the latest versions have very little in common with the aircraft that flew 46 years ago.

The F-16’s traditional dominance in the WVR regime is dependent on a relatively clean configuration. Whereas the eurocanards carry their vital EW kit internally, the F-16 will in any real-life situation go into battle with a very draggy 600-pound pod. Above 25,000 feet and at higher speeds it is dominated by the eurocanards in air-to-air combat.

The latest F-16s carry AESA radar, an impressive weapon load of modern weapons and some avionics and systems superior to even those of the F-35. The cockpit of the block 70 is excellent and future variants are likely to benefit from Lockheed Martin’s experience of wide-screen displays.

The F-16 has seen as much combat as any US aircraft type, and has demonstrated itself for 40 years. It remains an aircraft to be respected.

(Note: Mitsubishi F-2 is included as an F-16 variant for our listing)

6. Saab JAS 39C Gripen

The Gripen has a good mix of external stores, fuel capability and good connectivity, but is a single-engine and smaller design and hence has less range with a useful load. Its air combat capability, with the superlative Meteor long range missile, is likely to be better than the F-16. The Gripen pilot is imbued with excellent situation awareness and protected by an exceptional electronic warfare system. 

The Gripen is also the cheapest aircraft to operate on this list, the least fuel thirsty and the smallest. Its small size, combined with high off-boresight missiles and a helmet cueing system make it a particularly nasty opponent in within visual range combat.

5. Boeing F-15SA/QA Eagle 

Though the USAF’s F-15E force is old, it is unmatched in the strike role. But it is is also rarely used in a dedicated air combat role, which raises questions about it being counted in this category. Self defence certainly, but given the F-22 and F-15Cs, in service it’s not really a multi-role aircraft. It is however a multi-role aircraft for some of the export operators of the type. The latest members of the Strike Eagle family, (the SA and QA) are lavishly equipped with all the latest sensors and systems.  The SA is ferociously capable as will the QAs when they reach a greater stage of maturity.

HK notes

Personally I would have placed the F-15SA or QA higher in this list. In payload performance, sensor suite and modernity of systems it ranks very highly. Depends whether we give more importance to the ground attack or air role. At the risk of committing to the Turkey at Christmas argument I would argue that the former has dominated the last two decades of air operations.

4. Sukhoi Su-35/Su-30M series

Deciding which ‘Flanker’ to include is challenging. It would be tempting to include the Chinese J-15 on the grounds that carrier fighters must be multi-role but the J-15 currently shares many of the limitations of the Su-33 (which are described here) — is not optimised for air-to-ground and lacks a meaningful load-out when carrier deployed.

The Sukhoi Su-35 is generally better equipped than the Su-30M series though lacks the situational awareness and workload benefits of the M’s backseat WSO, but does benefit from the very capable Russian defensive electronic warfare system. The vast sums that the Indian Air Force is willing to pump into Rafale procurement does not boost confidence in the similar vintage Su-30M (the Russian type having entered Indian service only five years before Rafale entered French service). The Su-34 is more of a medium bomber than a multirole fighter. The Su-35 has a very powerful radar, excellent kinematic performance and an exceptional un-refuelled radius of action. It should be able to give a decent account of itself in air combat with any type short of the F-22 or Su-57. Another contender is the Chinese J-16, a twin-seat multi-role Flanker.

The Russian Su-35 and related aircraft have high payload range, a very good range of weapons carriage options, including large numbers of pylons and high internal fuel. They also have large radars and are fitted with IRST. They might not do too well against stealthy fighters, but in a permissive environment, or against non-stealthy opponents, would be a capable multi-role aircraft in at least the F-15E class.

3. Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet

The Super Hornet is very well equipped, and needs to be. Whereas the air force can rely on a mixed force of F-15C/Es, F-16s, F-35As, A-10s etc, the Super Hornet has to do pretty much everything (at least until the F-35C is more mature). The range of weapons it can carry is impressive, ranging from the stealthy AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) to the AGM-88 for anti-radar attacks, the JDAM series and the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-shipping missile. Air-to-air weaponry is decent but typical of the current US lag behind Europe. Though the AIM-120D is highly regarded, it is an enhanced range AIM-120 rather than the new breed of long-range air-to-air missiles.

It is much slower than the European canards, and the extremely draggy manner in which the fuel and weapons are carried further compounds this disadvantage. The aerodynamic configuration is optimised for low-speed handling. The most notable omission equipment-wise, an IRST, will be solved with a combination sensor/fuel pod carried on the centreline. This inelegant solution will have a deleterious effect on the Rhino’s already lacklustre performance. Boeing had earlier proposed an internal IRST at the expense of the aircraft’s gun, but this was rejected by the Navy.

I have placed this ahead of the F-15E because I think it achieves a better balance between both roles. The F-15E is a very capable strike aircraft, but I’m suggesting less emphasis is likely to be given to air combat missions (at least in US hands) because of the availability of other assets. At present the F/A-18E is the primary strike and air combat asset for the US Navy.
2. Eurofighter Typhoon

Cynics might note that the Eurofighter nations have spent a great deal of time and money on turning the Typhoon into a Rafale, i.e. converting it from a fighter to a fighter-bomber (this idea would have been taken further if the rather silly idea of a carrier Sea Typhoon had actually happened). Today’s Typhoon, especially the British examples, are a very different beast from the fighter-intercepter that entered service in 200

The long road to AESA seemed to be finally reaching a happy conclusion but has recently split into a complicated mess of different nations and different radar. Still when Kuwait receives their Typhoon’s this year they should have a functional AESA in the Captor-E Radar 0.

Like Rafale, it has demonstrated capability in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground role, and likely exceeds Rafale in the former domain due to greater energy manoeuvrability.

1. Dassault Rafale 

Other than low observability the Rafale has almost everything. The most notable absence, a helmet mounted display/cueing system has, with the introduction of the type into Qatari service, been addressed (though no photos have yet been released to support this). It also lacks a towed radar decoy though it is believed this will enter service with the Indian Air Force in the near future. There is some question regarding whether all Rafale’s have an IRST, though it was a certainly a part of the original internal sensor set.

It edges out Typhoon due to better strike optimisation and greater number of ‘wet’ pylons, giving a broader range of weapons fit options and potentially greater range.

Future Capabilities – By Jim Smith 
“What of the future? Well, who would dare to predict anything in the world of 2020? However, if the material out there in US and European future air power projections is to be believed, a system of systems approach is likely to be the key to future air power.
It seems likely that, at least from a US and European perspective, autonomous, cooperating systems of systems will form the basis of future air power. To implement this, it is likely that we would see a return to a variety of specialised platforms, rather than the current move towards fewer multi-role systems.
The driver for this is likely to be survivability. Wherever possible, systems will be unmanned and either autonomous or operated remotely. If this approach is to be believed, future manned platforms will largely be limited to a manned multi-role system such as Tempest or Future Combat Aircraft System (or their US equivalents), accompanied by a series of unmanned co-operating systems, which could include a ‘wingman’, a Neuron or Taranis platform to augment air combat capability or provide a strike platform. Other functions, such as refuelling, Electronic Attack, Electronic Intelligence, Target Detection and Geolocation, and Communications Relay, would all be delivered by specialist autonomous or remotely operated vehicles.

Manned platforms would be limited to, perhaps, Airborne Early Warning & Control platforms, and the manned fighter aircraft, operating principally as a fighter and weapons director, controlling cooperating unmanned weapons carriers. All elements of the system would be stealthy, and linked by secure data-links, with the intent of separating command and control, sensor and weapons delivery elements.
Is this plausible? Well, technically this might be an endpoint of a road-map, and individual elements of such a system are likely to be achievable in the relatively near term.
A better question might be ‘Is such a system affordable?’ Separating the functions across 7 or 8 specialised platforms would certainly increase costs, as each would need to be designed, developed and integrated. It would also be unlikely to reduce manpower costs all that much, as experience seems to show that unmanned and autonomous systems still need to be maintained and ‘crewed’, even if the crew is not actually in the aircraft.
Among the most powerful drivers against the implementation of such a system would be its vulnerability to cyber attack through interference with communication links. Its most effective opponents are, however, likely to be the accountants in Treasury departments, who may not be swayed by survivability arguments when asked to disaggregate the functions of one multi-role platform to two, three or four specialist, stealthy and autonomous platforms.

In any case, it is perhaps a safe bet that this route will not be affordable outside the Super-Powers – China, Russia and the USA. The EU, and the UK, would, in my view, not be able to take on this approach without cooperation, and in the current climate, that seems a big ask. Maybe the first integration should be between the Tempest and Neuron or FCAS and Taranis if a European approach is to be sought.

It is also not clear how a carrier task group could accommodate such a proliferation of platforms, and it is also clear that this type of solution will not be available without very significant expenditure. So – for the UK and EU, it would be best to design FCAS and Tempest with capability growth in mind. Build growth avionics capacity and some extra volume into the initial aircraft, because more sensors, more functionality, and more roles are likely to be required. And I would not expect the USN to adopt the same solutions as the USAF – the (big) carriers might not be big enough to accommodate the system of systems approach.

Multi-role systems are likely to be of continuing value to Air Arms and countries that are not seeking world domination, but need to address local defence issues, and to deter external aggressors.”

––– Jim Smith

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