For over fifty years the EP-3 has been sticking its beak in were it is not wanted, gathering signals intelligence for the US Navy. Hoovering up the signals, active sensor transmissions and communications of non-consenting parties is the stock-in-trade of the Navy’s oldest flying spy, the Lockheed EP-3. We spoke to Captain ‘Dirty Duck’ Niemyer to find out more about this shadowy aircraft. 

Tell us a little about what kinds of reconnaissance missions the US Navy was flying in the Cold War and the risks involved?

“The very short answer? While the US Navy’s photoreconnaissance effort, from various carrier-based aircraft, including AJs, F9Fs, F2Hs, RF-8s, RA-5Cs and even the RA-3B was well known, the Navy’s other reconnaissance effort, that of signals intelligence collection, in both tactical and strategic applications, is intentionally far less known or written about. Throughout most of the Cold War, and beyond, the US Navy mounted nearly daily flights in international airspace to provide information of a technical nature, often with very real-time analytics, to tactical and strategic decision makers and to help build the database on emitters and other information. The programme remained very intentionally obscured until the early 2000s.

Caveat: This is my version of things. It’s true, because I’m telling the story. Your version may be different.) Short of the outstanding, multi-part series of the history of the US Navy’s two SIGINT collections squadrons written by the late Captain Don East and published in the Hook magazine (The journal of the Tailhook Association), this downloadable monograph, ‘A Dangerous Business’, published by the historical branch of the National Security Agency on the occasion of the dedication of an actual Douglas EA-3B airframe at NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, will really give readers an in-depth history of the Navy’s role in the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program, PARPRO.

 

These flights were both land and carrier-based and involved several types of aircraft over the decades. The two aircraft I flew in as a Naval Flight Officer serving as a Senior Tactical Electronic Warfare Evaluator, SEVAL, were the Douglas EA-3B Skywarrior, more popularly known as the ‘Whale’, and the Lockheed EP-3E ARIES.”

 What was the role of the aircraft
“The EP-3E was the natural follow on to the early PB4Y-2’s, P4M-2Q’s and the Lockheed EC-121s that it directly replaced. (The very first were EP-3B’s, but they were very narrowly modified and proved the concept admirably). It had a large crew in the back end to fulfil the SIGINT collection mission, with a commensurate larger crew of operators and coordinators. At the time I flew in them, mainly to hone my skills as a Senior Evaluator-in-Training, they were far, far more dedicated to flying on nationally-tasked reconnaissance missions, including the Caribbean, Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean, even the North Cape and environs on occasion.”

[NOTE: The EP-3E has gone through constant improvements in airframes, engines and above all the collective systems in the back-end over the years. The EP-3Es that went to war in 1991 were way different from the EP-3E’s of the 70s and early 80s, just as the EP-3Es currently flying bear only a superficial resemblance to those EP-3E’s that were flying in 2003]

What was the best and worst features of the aircraft?
“The absolute best feature, from a purely technological aspect, is one that, honestly, isn’t still talked about much, and won’t be here. From an operator’s POV, the collective ARIES (Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System) remains, through its many manifestations, a very impressive system, especially its ability to fully integrate data from across the RF spectrum and give both real-time situational awareness as well as to preserve signals for further technical analysis, post-mission. The fact that instead of being a simple ‘vacuum-cleaner’, sucking up data, you have real people in the loop, makes a huge difference for lots of reasons.

Additionally, besides flying reconnaissance missions assigned by Higher Authority, the EP-3E was certainly seen and appreciated as a “Fleet Asset.” So much so that if they were flying one flavour of reconnaissance tasking and they came across things that Commander Sixth Fleet and the various Med naval forces would need to know about, they were authorised to leave that mission and prosecute those emitters, platforms, etc. And anytime we had various NATO or US Fleet exercises, the EP-3E’s were big players.

The other thing the EP-3E brought to the reconnaissance table was the fact that its physical architecture was such that its reconnaissance capabilities could be reconfigured in the field, by the Squadron itself. That lent itself to a lot of flexibility and the ability to try things based on real-world experiences, and to do so very quickly. That paid off a number of times out in the real world.

The platform, the Lockheed P-3, was designed for lower altitude use as an anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The EP-3E’s mission required flight up much higher and I think that required a lot more handling finesse by the pilots. The fact that our USAF peers were flying much higher and much faster in their RC-135’s made the comparison tough to consider. Of course, for a lot of reasons, we justifiably thought we did a whole lot of things better than they did. One thing for certain was that since we were a Mediterranean-based squadron, we knew our theatre of operations intimately, day in and day out, whereas they’d fly out from Omaha, do their thing, then go back to “The World.”

I would be remiss if I did not add that, from a crew point of view, the EP-3E did have a significant advantage: Whale crews went, mainly, to the Boat. EP-3 crews went to big, nice bases all over, often with contract hotel rooms, great chow and were paid per diem for every day they were away. That led to some pretty hard feelings between the two aircraft types that existed in the squadrons at the time.”

What was the hardest system to operate?
“I think it really took a lot of time and real-world experience to master all the intricacies of the many bits and pieces that made up the ARIES systems. Then, to add the added coordination and mission leadership skills needed to be a good SEVAL, to it, meant that it generally took at least a year for a SEVAL to be initially qualified, leaving him with only about 24 months to get really good at his job before transferring.”

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What was the most effective system and why?
“I think it’s exceedingly difficult to point to one particular receiver system and say it was better or worse than another. The individual Electronic Warfare Operators (“EWOP’s”) had their likes and dislikes when it came to individual operator positions, most of them became specialised in a particular position and part of the RF spectrum. I think it was easier to get the hang of coordinating folks during the course of a mission, but very, very hard to do it well and to do real-time analysis on what all this data that was coming at you was really telling you.”

Interview with RC-135 pilot here. 

How effective was it and why?
“EP-3E’s started flying missions in the 1970’s, and while the actual airframes are much, much newer, here they are, at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st Century and they are still out there, doing missions they were never originally envisioned to be doing, and doing them incredibly well. The EP-3E has been involved in most of the Cold War and every hot war the US has been involved in, as well as a lot of other things we may finally hear about at some unknown date in the future. I really think the US Navy and the nation has more than received their monies-worth on their investment. We really screwed up by thinking the MQ-4 is ever going to really replace it. (Don’t get me started, for heaven’s sake).”

How well would it have survived in a full-scale war with the USSR?
“What mission are you envisioning? Let’s face it, the P-3 is not a fighter, so as the NSA commemorates, blood has been spilled by the ELINT community for decades. That’s the price of vigilance, and it always will be. It’s considered a “National Asset” so I would hope that the people who planned that stuff may have thought that putting too close to something like a Very Longe Range SAM envelope or subject to fighter intercept in a shooting war wouldn’t be doing a lot for asset protection.”

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What was your most memorable missions and why?
“I got most of my EP-3E flight time as part of my training as an EA-3B SEVAL, but one mission does stand out. For reasons, we felt, of sheer perversity, the Soviets would always sortie various ship types out from the Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets to the Med, with estimated arrivals in the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar either on December 24/25 and/or December 31st. This, of course, led our being tasked, along with the local Navy P-3 VP Detachment, to go out on those nights waiting to see if we could pick up any presence of the passage of their submarines. As a ‘Geographic bachelor’ I was picked to spend a Christmas Eve, along with a bunch of other hand-picked folks who were ‘voluntold‘ that we’d spend the night flying to the west of the Straits. I manned a plotting position for most of the evening, as we drilled holes in air, wishing only the worst for Ivan for having screwed up the holiday. And yes, they did it every year.”

Was it better than the Nimrod R.1?

“I had a shipmate who was able to do an exchange tour on 51 Squadron and the R.1s. He admired the fact that the RAF’s operational mindset was much more attuned to how the US Navy did things (anything not specifically prohibited was implicitly permitted) than the USAF. He liked the available range and altitude advantage it had over the EP-3E, but also mentioned that while the two systems were complimentary, each had features he’d have liked to have seen on the other. He just wished the RAF had many more of them.

I also flew missions with the USAF in the RC-135 Rivet Joint in an advisory capacity. Great birds, but their way of doing things, back then, differed significantly to ours. Not in a bad way, per sé, just ‘different’. I’m sure they looked on us the same way.”

Tell me something I don’t know about the EP-3?
“Right after take-off in the generation of EP-3E I flew in, there was a requirement for certain portions of the fuselage under the floorboards to be inspected, I presume for leaks, things being where they’re supposed to be, smoke, fires (!) and nothing askew. Or something, I never quite knew. It’s quite a sight on initial climb out to see certain designated aircrew running up and down the cabin, to and fro, opening and slamming hatches in no apparent coherent order.”

Describe the aircraft in three words
“Ubiquitous, under-appreciated, well-used”

What should I have asked you?
“Do I have a favourite among the three? Yes. No. Each airplane taught me a whole lot, about flying, airmanship, crew resource management, carrier operations, air warfare, the ‘Big picture’, intelligence collection and analysis, strike warfare, life, the universe and everything.

And yes, there was another aircraft type you didn’t ask about, the one I have the most flight time in of the four: The Douglas KA-3B Skywarrior, the long-range pathfinder/refueller in which I gained ~1900 of my nearly 3200 Navy flight hours.”

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Catapult take-off in an aircraft that weighs the same as fifteen wartime Corsairs is a daunting prospect, yet the US Navy’s Skywarrior served with aplomb from US aircraft carriers for 35 years. Ed Heinemann’s ‘Whale’ was huge, fast and challenging — and could do almost anything asked of it. We spoke to Captain ‘Dirty Duck’ Niemyer to find out more. 

What was the role of the aircraft?
“Shortly after debuting as a purpose-designed carrier-based strategic nuclear bomber, the Navy and Douglas’s legendary Ed Heinemann recognised its immense and roomy fuselage design would lend itself to a variety of other tasks. This included a design change that would beef up pressurisation and make the cockpit, companion-way and bomb-bay area one large, sealed and pressurised vessel, allowing room for massive amounts of equipment, including four extra systems operators and equipment to fulfill a CVA-based electronic/signals intelligence collection capability. After a few A3D-1Q’s, the Navy went on to build around 20 or so A3D-2Q/EA-3B’s over the years, including the conversion of several VA-3B’s and TA-3B’s to replace losses. The ‘Whales’ provided a fused SIGINT product that could be passed to Battle Group Commanders, strike leaders and strike packages in real and near-real time, as well as collecting important and new data for later, fine-grain analysis by other entities.”

What was the best and worst features of the aircraft?
Its size and its size. The A-3 was huge, for it was designed to fulfil a late-1940’s NAVAIR requirement for a nuclear bomber with a roughly 2000-NM range at high altitude and very high sub-Mach 1 cruise speed. Ed Heinemann was incredibly proud that his design came in well, well under the 100,000-pound projected maximum gross weight, with performance numbers well ahead of its competition. Nonetheless, with a demonstrated max catapult weight of 83,000 pounds (Routinely kept to 73,000 pounds in actual use) and a very long unrefuelled, still-air range in excess of 2000NM, the Skywarrior was over 74 feet long and its long, high aspect ratio swept wings were over 72 feet wide. (Which meant line-up at the boat was everything. Don’t be drifting or lining up to the right!) See why it almost immediately got the fleet nickname of the ‘Whale’?

That size meant that she rapidly became a jack-of-all trades. Nuke and conventional bomber and minelayer, the last two of which they did during Vietnam; reconnaissance; trainer; VIP transport, tanker-jammer, tanker, EW aggressor; developmental testbed. All these and more made the Whale a unique and valued platform. The range we offered meant that an Admiral, who wanted information, that morning, on what the various elements of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet might be up to, could dispatch us over the course of a day to acquire what information we could from all of the three major SOVMEDFLT anchorages. Something we called “Getting a hat-trick” on the day. (At that time, due to our slim fuel reserves brought about by our high empty gross weight versus maximum landing weight of only 50,000 pounds, we did only daytime carrier operations. That later changed.)

That size also made us hated by the Flight Deck and Hangar Deck Officers. Our so-called “Flight Deck Multiple”, or footprint, with wings folded was huge. We simply took up, in their’s and often the carrier CO’s and even sometimes CAG’s (Carrier Air Wing Commanders) eyes, too much room they could use stuffing in more shooters and bomb-droppers. For us VQ bubbas, depending on who had been “read in” on our mission and its value to the Wing and the Battle Group, that meant that sometimes we were made welcome and other times made us the true cross-eyed stepchild in the Air Wing. (At the time I flew in the EA-3B we didn’t do the extensive pre-deployment work-up cycle stateside. We joined the Air Wing when it in-chopped the Med as a Detachment and left when the carrier left the Med for home)

The Whale was NOT easy to bring aboard, in the least. The Pratt & Whitney J-57 was a straight axial-flow engine with attendant lag in spool up and the jet had the low thrust-to-weight ratio of its era. So, pilots had to constantly be anticipating their next power response well ahead of when that was going to be needed. They learned the individual characteristics of each boat we cruised on, as each seemed to have its own characteristics. Some moved in a unique way, others’ turbulence aft of the ship, the ‘burble’, was unique.

The distance between the pilot’s eyes and the hook point to capture the cross-deck pennant was significant, so most pilots I flew with, in both the EA-3B and later, when I was a navigator up front in the KA-3B, flew the Whale seeing the ball in the optical landing system, the “Meatball,” about ½ ball higher from what was considered optimal in other aircraft. The Whale had very narrow main landing gear track, and at the high tire pressures called for in carrier operations, when combined with a perhaps excessive descent rate, maybe a little bit of left or right wing down, or even worse, an in-flight engagement of hook before the wheels actually hit the deck or a too-flat attitude could lead to, well, spectacular results. Not in a good way. Which see: Whale Dance. (I’ll save that for another time).

Oh, did I forget to mention, we didn’t have ejection seats. In the late 1940’s ejection seat technology wasn’t very good and when needed most, on launch and recovery, one was already outside the speed and altitude envelope. So, we had individual parachutes, two overhead ditching hatches, one in the cockpit and other in the EW compartment, a large emergency bailout hatch on the right side of the EW compartment and the main entry/exit door that could be blown and locked down as a bailout slide. Looking back at it, out of the 282 Whales manufactured, over 125 were either lost or damaged enough to be struck from the register including several EA-3B’s. We tended towards dark humor as a result. “What are you going to do to me? Make me fly Whales? Off the Boat? You don’t scare me, there’s a reason it was originally known as ‘All 3 Dead,’ I’m a dead man walking already.”

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The other thing the Whale had working against it was both the airframe design age (Late 1940’s) and actual manufacturing age. The last Whales came off the El Segundo line in January 1961. By the late 1970’s, they’d been rode hard and put away wet. Aircraft parts failed more frequently, and parts were hard to find for both our sister squadron, VQ-1 in Guam and us. The Maintenance Man hours/flight hours ratios were not good at times. On more than one occasion we would literally have to divert from an in-flight mission back to Rota to get the plane fixed, leaving the Det on the boat to wait, often days, for our return. That loss of capability often hurt.

On the other hand, the back-end systems were being constantly updated. We had a mix-and-match of “Old, but reliable,” “Old, and needs a lot of TLC” and “New, cool (For 1978) tech” gear. But constant catapult shots and arrested landings take their tolls on anything electronic and we sometimes worked with some systems working a little less well than we would have liked. But the data we could collect was wide across the spectrum and a good crew at all five stations could collect a massive amount of useful information.

What was the hardest system to operate?
“Each of the five operator positions, four in the EW compartment and one in the cockpit was equipped with receiver equipment able to collect data from various parts of the RF spectrum, with some cross-coverage between individual stations. In the most general sense, it depended on the operator himself. (No women flew the EA-3B when I was flying these missions) Some operators could be running different bands of the spectrum through two receivers, one going in each ear and know when he had a ‘hit’ just from the audio sounds generated by the specific receiver. He could then look at the signal analysis equipment and know if he had an emitter worth focusing some detailed analytic attention upon. Sometimes we focused on what the emitter was and the weapons system associated with it and other times we wanted to know where it was radiating from. Sometimes, both. Adding in other source data, we were able to build a much more complete picture of what was happening involving the platform, etc. That was the stuff worth getting.

That being said, for me, the hardest system to get to work right was the massive data recorder, using what was for the 1970s, state-of-art wide magnetic tapes to record any data of high interest we were collecting. The tapes were heavy and huge, and the recorder was a bitch to operate. You’d thought you’d recorded a real signal of interest only find out when it got back for analysis that it didn’t collect squat.”

What was the most effective system and why?
“The generation of EA-3B I flew in was equipped with an updated ‘system of systems’ contracted and put together by GE, called Seawing. As a collective system, it was incredibly effective in extending the carrier battle group commander’s situational awareness. When all the receivers were working well and with an experienced crew of operators, we were able to do a job, with just five of us, that many larger platforms couldn’t do. Plus, the system allowed us, in the right scenarios, to be incredibly effective in giving carrier air strikes valuable I&W of the air defence systems they were facing and how effective their countermeasures may be, in real time.”

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How effective was it and why?
“The EA-3B was, when properly tasked by the BG commander and/or often “Higher Authority,” incredibly effective. We had an inherent taking flexibility that neither of the predominant land-based assets possessed. We were part of the Carrier Air Wing we were assigned to and we felt it our duty to look out for our fellow fliers as best we could and to help them do their mission, be it offensive or defensive. When teamed up with the E-2, S-3 and the EA-6B we could add a significant ISR and I&W package to any operation, before we called it “ISR” or “I&W.” That came in very, very handy when the carrier group would start to nose its way south or east in the Med towards littoral nations that may not have seen us as the loveable liberty risks we really were.

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We always considered a huge compliment if, when debriefing any operation where instead of just taking off and heading over the horizon on our own (“Don’t ask and we won’t have to lie to you”) we worked with the fighter and attack squadrons, they’d ask “How the hell did you guys know that? That made a huge difference!”

How well would it have survived in a full-scale war with the USSR?
“Like all air assets, that depends. Because we normally operated at high altitudes, well above where most of the Air Wings of that era operated, we had incredible stand-off range from any of the SAM’s that then equipped the Soviet Med Fleet’s and their allied nations’ assets. Plus, with the equipment we had, the Whale’s max speed and other factors, any land-based aircraft intercept would be very hard-pressed to get to where we were when he launched, much less get to where we’d be by the time he got to the first point. We were way more concerned about the Soviets’ subs sinking “mother.” After all, that’s where the food was! Plus, the Soviets maintained an AGI off Rota pretty much 24/7/365. We knew Homeplate was a primary target. Something you simply accepted.”

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What was your most memorable missions and why?
“The ones I feel most comfortable in talking about were a series of daily reconnaissance missions we flew in early 1979 off Libya while operating from USS Eisenhower. Tensions were more than a little ratcheted up and there was some genuine concern that the Libyans might do something stupid. We flew two-three missions a day, with two crews swapping out between launch and recovery cycles. We had a bird with tight systems and the mission ‘take’ was good. (We’d write up a daily mission summary and send it out via message).

When we returned, our Commanding Officer, a man I always held in the very highest respect, for a whole different number of reasons, came out and met us on the parking ramp in front of the squadron. He told us to our faces that we had done “spectacular” work out there. He took me aside and told me he’d been up at a regular conference at  Commander in Chief, Europe ( Commander in Chief, Europe) headquarters and that then CINCEUR, General Haig, had told him he’d been reading my nightly messages and asked him to pass on his personal “Attaboy” to me specifically for the missions and the results we were getting.

As a junior officer, flying a ‘Cats-and-Dogs’ aircraft, in an obscure squadron and with a personal reputation among some of the ‘older’ folks for being a bit of a loose cannon and overall crazy man, to know that what I was doing was being noted at that level and that our missions were being briefed daily to the National Command Authority, was pretty affirming stuff.”

Tell me something I don’t know about the aircraft?
“Until the advent of the FA-18, no US Navy aircraft normally cruised at the altitudes and speeds the Whale did. Our most fuel-efficient flight was 420-480 knots TAS and well in the 30,000 feet and well above altitude range. The FA-18 only matched us on its emergency fuel ‘bingo profile.'”

Describe the aircraft in three words
“Big, fast, challenging.”

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From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

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Ugly and formidable, the A-6 Intruder was a lethal enforcer of US foreign policy for over a third of a century. We spoke to Bomber/navigator Captain Andrew ‘ComJam’ S. Niemyer about his time on Grumman’s ‘Iron Tadpole’, an impressively effective all weather attack aircraft. 

“Most of the people who fallaciously claim I owe them money know me as ‘Comjam.’ (And a few remember an even earlier callsign ‘Dirty Duck’)”

What was the role of the aircraft?

“Three simple words: All Weather Attack. We meant all three.  When briefing the Intruder to guests, I would say ‘When it’s a dark, cold, stormy night and the bad guys are all hunkered down inside, trying to keep warm and dry, we’re there to ruin their night. Because we can’.”

What was the best and worst features of the aircraft?

“From a  bomber/navigator (BN) point of view, the overall radar/terrain avoidance/TRAM (Target Recognition Attack Multi-sensor (FLIR/Laser) system absolutely rocked.  Working together, along with the pilot’s display which was also part of the terrain avoidance and the bombing system, we really had a very robust capability.  With the digital Armament Control Unit, ACU, we could deliver huge varieties of dumb bombs and PGM’s.  The IMU (Inertial nav system), working with the radar (Unless we were not radiating to avoid being ESM’d by the bad guys) to generally identify a target, then rolling out the FLIR to confirm identifying the target, locking it up in the system, then lazing it to get absolute precision and then letting the ACU tell the pilot exactly when to commit the system to automatic bomb release was pretty damn slick.  A very tight system in the Intruder was a wonder to behold.

Again, as a BN, when the inertial system or the weird analog/digital memory unit would go stupid on you, it would cause a raft of headaches.  A degraded system could lead to decreased accuracy in both navigation on bombing, although we trained from the first day in the Sim at the RAG in systems degradations, for obvious reason.  But it sometimes sucked up a lot of your attention if it went bad at the wrong moment, and that was attention you really didn’t want to divert from your basic duties to get safely to the IP, ID the target and drop on it .  So, you would downgrade the system and work hard to recall everything you were now going to have to enter manually or work around.  Which is why most BN’s carried not only a NATOPS Pocket Checklist, but also a huge pocket gouge book with all those steps and procedures in them.”

What was the hardest system to operate?

“First, know that I transitioned to the Intruder as a senior Navy Lieutenant Commander, with around 2400 hours in the A-3.  So I had a lot to “unlearn” as well as a huge new set of systems to learn from scratch.  Many of my peers had been flying the A-6 since they earned their wings, and so stuff I found a PITA, they did not and vice versa.  I tried to make up with old age and treachery what I seriously lacked in youth and skill.

For me, the hardest was really tuning the inertial navigation system while in flight.  You could do that several ways and really being good at it was as much art as it was science.  I was really getting the hang of it at the 400-500-hour point, which is when time caught up to me and I flew my final Navy flight as a Naval Flight Officer as a mid-grade Commander.”

What was the most effective system and why?

“Two of them: The radar system in the A-6E, the Norden (Yes, that Norden) AN/APQ-148.  This was a combined ground mapping/terrain mapping radar that was so precise that you could do) a so-called “Self-Contained GCA” down to minimums, even painting clearly the runway remaining marker boards on either side of the runway.  I did them a couple of times for the fact that I could do it.  Some of my best bombing scores on ranges were done using the radar only and not the FLIR/Laser, it was that good.  When combined with the Moving Target Indicator (MTI) system, you could easily lock up and track a moving target and get a great target lock, bomb solution and whack that mover cleanly.

The other system?  The most effective one the A-6 had from Day One: The Pilot-Bombardier/Navigator team, hands down. It took the two of you, working in absolute synchrony, to make the Intruder completely function at its peak efficiency.  Each one had specific duties, but both had to have 100% reliance and trust the other was doing his job.  In bad weather/night, terrain following, it was an absolute act of total and complete trust.

The BN’s radar display was a map as seen from overhead.  The pilot’s display, with silhouettes of seven “slices” of terrain at ascending distances from the aircraft, giving a synthetic horizontal view of that same terrain.  Together, you made it through to the IP and the attack phase.  You looked out for one another in every way possible and totally trusted what the other said and did.  Flying together as often as possible, you could make that airplane do all that it was ever asked to do, and then some.”

How effective was it and why?

“Amazingly so, as its long combat history so amply proves.  One of the best stories comes from the Vietnam War: A single Intruder night mission did some truly precision bombing on the outskirts of Hanoi one night.  No one else went downtown that night.  Next day, Hanoi reported it had fought off a mass attack of B-52’s.  Its systems kept improving with each version, and the late A-6E’s, with highly improved digital systems stayed very effective until it was forcibly retired in 1996.

The fact that it was well-suited for systems improvements, had exceptional range and was remarkably robust due to its great Grumman heritage all played a part on why it proved so successful.  Granted, the early DIANES system were very problematic, but the fundamental airframe was tough.  NAVAIR remained dedicated to keeping the good stuff and improving the things that needed fixing.”

How well would it have survived in a full-scale war with the USSR?

“What’s the target? In all Strike warfare, that’s your first question.  Some targets were naturally far more highly defended than others, and that would of course drive ingress and egress routes, tactics and SEAD planning.  We had tough losses in Vietnam, the various skirmishes in the 80’s and in Desert Storm, so the answer would have to be is it in Russia, proper?  Is it war-at-sea? Is it a client state/ally of the USSR? What’s my target? That will drive my weapons load and my tactics.  My defensive load, i.e. chaff/flares may also have some variables based on the answers.

Bottom line: Yes.  But how many would have?  That would have depended on the targets they were assigned.”

What was your most memorable missions and why?

“I flew the Intruder exclusively in the US Naval Air Reserves, and for a lot of complex reasons that require ample amounts of adult beverages to tell, we were less than a week from finally deploying for Desert Storm when the war ended.  So, no combat missions in the Intruder for me. But two do stand out:

That being said up front, our Air Wing, due to its proximity to the Naval Strike Air Warfare Center at NAS Fallon, NV was employed extensively to try the proposed tactics that were developed for the active air war phase of the war.  I, along with most of my squadron, frequently flew practice missions into the Fallon complex during the months between August 1990 and January 1991.  We knew what we were doing and why, and we felt we were at least doing something to contribute to keeping our peers both safer and more lethal.

The other mission was flown in mid-September 1992.  It was from NAS Alameda, CA to the Fallon complex, specifically to bomb in the Range Complex known as Bravo-15.  We were loaded with 12 25# practice bombs, a.k.a. “Blue Death.”  We flew a low-level route across northern California and then down into the range.  We “split” the bomb load, the pilot doing six practice drops using his bombsight and I did six “systems” runs, using the FLIR/laser.  We had a good time, came back low over the Sierra Nevada and down into the San Francisco Bay Area, and landed with no drama back at Alameda.  Another day, another low level, another set of bombing targets.  And it was the last flight I ever made as a fully NATOPS-qualified Naval Flight Officer in my wildly improbable Navy career.

Speaking of ‘memorable’, I totally forgot one of the most memorable moments in my wildly improbable time in Naval Aviation (Folks almost universally started and spent their entire careers in one aircraft type/mission; I did three: reconnaissance, over-water pathfinding/navigation and Medium Attack) One year, since we were heading as a squadron to to join the rest of our Air Wing (CVWR-30) for two weeks at NAS Fallon, NV, we decided to do a ‘max effort’ and managed to do a 12-plane fly over of the Golden Gate Bridge and San Francisco Bay.”

Was it better than the Royal Navy’s Buccaneer?

“I have zero Bucc time, so I don’t feel qualified to answer.  If you haven’t flown in both, then it’s simply semi-informed opinion.  From what I know, I think the Bucc had some real strengths, but also had its own weaknesses.  Likewise, the Intruder.  Both had the ability to put ordnance right where you needed it, when you needed.  I will note that while the Intruder did indeed look like a flying chicken drumstick with wings, the Bucc looked like the inspiration for Queen’s ‘Fat-Bottomed Girls’ ;)”

Tell me something I don’t know about the A-6…

“The A-6 had no published maximum speed ever listed in the NATOPS manual.  Under the limitation section, where “Maximum Speed” is listed, are simply the initials “LBA.” Limited By Airframe. No matter the altitude, push the throttles as far forward as you want, you can’t overspeed it.”

Describe the aircraft in three words

“Ugly, lethal and effective.”

How did the United States, which invented the first fixed wing powered aircraft, fall so distantly behind the Europeans in military aviation by the end of World War I? The US got a slow start for several reasons, including a general apathy for the war and a lack of institutional will. An underrated villain, though, was the problematic application of intellectual property protection, a problem that the United States defence establishment continues to struggle with.

Intellectual property protection and national security have long been intertwined. For as long as espionage has existed, spies and agents have tried to steal and copy foreign technology.  Early modern kings used patent protection to provide monopolies for important supporters, as well as to reward efforts at innovation in military technology.

 

When the development of military equipment (and especially naval equipment) became cost-prohibitive for private companies at the beginning of the 20^th century, the government stepped in to support research and production.  This came with a price (detailed in Katherine Epstein’s wonderful book Torpedo), which usually included ownership of the patents and trade secrets associated with the resulting technologies.

Modern military aviation began just as industrialisation began to overtake war. The successful first flight of the Wright Flyer in December 1903 was a magnificent engineering achievement, especially given the limited resources available to the Wrights. The brothers moved aggressively to counter anyone who used anything approaching their system of guidance, which they interpreted broadly to mean anything that changed wing surface in order to affect manoeuvrability (for more, see Lawrence Goldstone’s Birdmen). The Wrights hoped that the United States government would come through with a big cash payment for rights to the machine, and in fact refused to even demonstrate the flight in front of large audiences out of fear of theft.

Unsurprisingly, this made it difficult for other inventors to build upon their achievements. Almost any aircraft could run afoul of the “wing change” claim, even though the particular ‘wing warping’ technique used by the Wrights was not replicated in many other aircraft of the era. In 1909, the Wrights sued Glenn Curtiss for patent infringement following the developing of his own aircraft, which used lever-controlled aileron to manage manoeuvrability.  The legitimacy of the Wright’s claim remains in some dispute, and the suit played out across a host of legal venues in several different countries, but never resulted in a significant finding for the Wrights.

The Wright’s obsession with litigation, combined with the unfortunate death of Wilbur, slowed innovation within the firm and made it ever more important to profit from already existing intellectual property.  At least one history describes them as “patent trolls,” but this term usually connotes a genuine grifter, not an over-zealous inventor. Wright Co. suffered, but so did the rest of American aviation as inventors hesitated to develop new technologies out of fear of debilitating lawsuits from the Wrights.  Some pre-emptively avoided the problem by paying off Wright Co. ahead of time, but the threat of lawsuits generated bad blood and deterred sharing.

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As a result, despite having a huge economy and a vast industrial base, the United States found itself breathtakingly behind European standards as the war began.  Rather than build its own aircraft, it relied on European producers, straining industries already working at near maximum capacity.  US pilots would enter the war flying foreign aircraft, with the US aviation industry far behind its competitors.

The patent fight wasn’t the only reason for US unpreparedness for World War I.  The Army had not devoted sufficient attention to aviation in the years before the war, leaving responsibility with the Signal Corps, which was under-resourced and struggled to develop a strong procurement plan or any theories of offensive and defensive warfare.  Unlike in Europe, the executive did little to push the Army into developing a more aggressive aviation strategy. Moreover, the US aviation industry struggled even to produce European models under license, as US production methods were not well-suited to the craftsmanlike approach of the early aircraft production.

Eventually, the prospect of war in Europe drew the conflict into clearer focus.  The United States government pressed the major aircraft manufacturers (including Wright and Curtiss) to enter a ‘patent pool’ which would ensure access to critical inventions but ensure the payment of a reasonable fee. Not coincidentally, this gave the government a stronger hand in negotiations with manufacturers, driving down overall prices.  Most historians (but not all) concur that the dispute dramatically slowed the development of US aviation, both in

the military and civilian sectors. Eventually, clearing the tangles enabled the United States to develop a thriving, multifaceted aviation industry that would serve the country well in the Second World War.

Theoretically, strong patent and trade secret protection encourages innovation by giving inventors incentive, as well as a mechanism to protect any information that they share with other inventors.  But the system sometimes breaks down. Inventors, reluctant to give up exclusive rights in the civilian market, balk at selling out to the government.  Department of Defense officials can be overzealous in their pursuit of the data, trade secrets, and patents necessary to maintain the production of military equipment after the original producer has lost interest.  And governments sometimes use intellectual property law as a cudgel to hammer small businesses, or to undercut unwanted competition. The turn of the 19^th century saw tremendous changes in the legal context of the production of military technology, and the turn of the 20^th century seems to have seen something very similar.

Dr. Robert Farley teaches at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky.  He is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology.

Make this happen! Support the crowdfunded Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes by pre-ordering your copy of our book here 

From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as

“the thinking-man’s Top Gear… but for planes”.

The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.

FEATURING

• Interviews with pilots of the F-14 Tomcat, Mirage, Typhoon, MiG-25, MiG-27, English Electric Lighting, Harrier, F-15, B-52 and many more.
• Engaging Top (and bottom) 10s including: Greatest fighter aircraft of World War II, Worst British aircraft, Worst Soviet aircraft and many more insanely specific ones.
• Expert analysis of weapons, tactics and technology.
• 
• A look into art and culture’s love affair with the aeroplane.
• Bizarre moments in aviation history.
• Fascinating insights into exceptionally obscure warplanes.

• Convinced? Pre-order your copy here 

 

 

 

 

I want to support air museums during lockdown by raising awareness of their many treasures. With this in mind I have contacted several museums and asked them to share the story of their favourite exhibit (if you are part of an air museum and wish to take part please contact me here or by Twitter or Facebook). Let’s start with Newark Air Museum and their exceptional Gloster Meteor. Over to Museum Trustee, Howard Heeley. 

 

“I have always liked how Newark Air Museum [NAM] has acquired airframes associated with aircraft development and testing. My favourite aircraft in the collection that illustrates this policy is Gloster Meteor VZ608.

VZ608 was constructed as a standard FR.9 and saw squadron service with 208 Squadron, before being transferred to the Gloster Aircraft Company for conversion to testing duties.

In early 1951 VZ608 was transferred to Rolls-Royce at Hucknall, Nottinghamshire. Here its engine nacelles were extended and modified to house a reheat system; a fifteen-month test programme saw VZ608 undertake both static and flight trials of the system.  In early 1954, VZ608 was modified again, with an elementary thrust reverser being fitted to the port jet pipe.

In the early 1950s work was also underway at Hucknall on the V-TOL [Vertical Take Off and Landing] concept, using an experimental test-rig to investigate control and stability factors affecting V-TOL flight. Eventually this led to their designing the TMR [Thrust Measuring Rig], which affectionately became known as the ‘Flying Bedstead’. Two TMRs were constructed and these undertook a range of tethered and free flights whilst at Hucknall.

Rolls-Royce also ran a parallel development programme to the TMR, which saw the development of the RB.108 vertical lift engine for use in the Short SC.1 Research Aircraft, which had been developed by Short Brothers & Harland Limited in Queens Island, Belfast. At the time an advantage of the RB.108 design was that it was able to generate nearly 10 pounds of thrust per pound of engine weight, a significantly better performance that other existing engines.

VZ608 was selected for modification to undertake the initial flight trials of the RB.108. Fitment trials with the engine began in 1955 with the RB.108 positioned in the fuselage aft of the cockpit, replacing the main fuel tank. Underwing fuel tanks were added to extend endurance but in this configuration VZ608 was limited to 30 minutes flying. The orientation of the engine could be altered in flight to simulate vertical flight, with a replica of the Short SC.1 air scoop fitted to accurately simulate SC.1 aerodynamics.

Correspondence and Log Book entries in the NAM Archive from test-pilot Alan Bavin confirm the details of the first running of the RB.108 lift engine as follows. “Following on from our interesting meeting the other day and our discussions about my old Meteor VZ608, I am enclosing a copy of my log book page which records the very first running of the RB.108 lift engine in flight. As you see, it took place on 23^rd October 1956. Prior to that, I completed windmilling tests on 14^th September with the bare engine and further similar tests with the lower spoiler [we called it a coal scuttle] the engine windmilled backwards”

He continued, “The early engine, once lit and running in a low idle condition, had to be inched up to flight idle by a manually operated bleed valve. It also had no Acceleration Control Unit [ACU] which necessitated very careful throttle handling. Flight idling was at 14,000 rpm and top speed was 17,500 rpm. Later engines would automatically run up to flight idle after light up and the ACU would allow for extremely rapid throttle handling both up and down the range. I think the intake you have on VZ608 at the moment is the one used on the SC.1”.

Following on from the flight trials film footage in the NAM Archive also shows VZ608 being used to assess ground erosion and foreign object ingestion. This involved running the aircraft over a variety of loose materials on the ground, whilst the effect of the jet efflux from the RB.108 was monitored and recorded. The RB.108 subsequently proved itself and VZ608 was eventually transferred to the fire section at Hucknall.

In February 1970 NAM arranged an exchange deal involving the hulk of Meteor F.8 WH443 and was thereby able to rescue VZ608 from the fire dump. The airframe, with outer wings removed was transported by road to the museum’s Winthorpe Airfield Site as a ‘special’ wide load by permission of the Ministry of Transport.

Befitting its role in aviation testing and the V-TOL programme in particular, the VZ608 planform was incorporated into the NAM logo. During the mid-1990s a structural survey of the airframe revealed major corrosion on various spar sections and a major restoration programme was completed; this work, included replacement of the damaged spars.

 

Meteor FR.9 VZ606 is now displayed inside NAM’s Display Hangar 2, alongside Sea Harrier ZA176 and various engines and objects associated with VTOL development in the UK.

 

Support the crowdfunded Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes by pre-ordering your copy of our book here 

From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as

“the thinking-man’s Top Gear… but for planes”.

The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.

FEATURING

• Interviews with pilots of the F-14 Tomcat, Mirage, Typhoon, MiG-25, MiG-27, English Electric Lighting, Harrier, F-15, B-52 and many more.
• Engaging Top (and bottom) 10s including: Greatest fighter aircraft of World War II, Worst British aircraft, Worst Soviet aircraft and many more insanely specific ones.
• Expert analysis of weapons, tactics and technology.
• 
• A look into art and culture’s love affair with the aeroplane.
• Bizarre moments in aviation history.
• Fascinating insights into exceptionally obscure warplanes.

• Convinced? Pre-order your copy here 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Geoff Richards was an aerodynamicist at BAe Kingston. Here he details more about the Small Agile Battlefield Aircraft. 

With the Soviet Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopter under development, the BAe Kingston Future Projects team began to look for ways to counter this new threat. The study was dubbed SABA, for Small Agile Battlefield Aircraft, and aimed to develop a vehicle that could out-manoeuvre and destroy helicopters like the Havoc and also provide combat air support to forces on the ground by attacking enemy armour and supply vehicles. It was to operate in all weathers, day and night, from dirt fields and have good loiter time and a high-subsonic maximum speed so as to reach wherever needed as quickly as possible. Several configurations were studied, including one with a pusher propeller and a twin-boom tail layout and another a tailless jet with a forward-swept wing and a weapons turret under the fuselage. Bringing in a requirement to carry as many as six AIM-132 (ASRAAM) air-to-air missiles as well as a gun helped to narrow down the choice of wing planform to a conventional minimal sweep one with enough span to fit the missiles under the wing. This requirement was a response to the suggestion that Soviet helicopters would operate in groups rather than singly.

Two configurations emerged as favourites. The P.1233-1 had a canard layout, a wing swept slightly forward and an unducted fan pusher propeller system powered by a modified T-55 engine. It also featured a dorsal air intake for the engine, dorsal and ventral fins and a rudder mounted under the nose.

The P.1234-2 was a more conventional ALF-502 turbofan-powered aircraft with twin fins and side-mounted intakes forward of the wing, like the Hawk. It was seen as a reserve should the new propulsion system of the P.1233-1 prove impractical. Both configurations included full-span flaperons for manoeuvrability and good short-field performance, an infra-red seeker and laser ranger targeting sensor in the nose and a conventional tricycle undercarriage.

As the name implied, both were small, with a span of 11 m and maximum take-off weight of five or six tonnes. The small size helped survivability, giving low optical and radar signatures. The P.1233-1 also had a low infra-red signature, helped by mixing cold air into the engine exhaust. The main line departments at Kingston were called in to look into various aspects in more detail and this is where I came in as one of a small team to do a detailed wing design. The other two members, Jack Wedderspoon and Ian Cairns, both came from BAe Weybridge, bringing their experience of the Airbus A320 wing design.

We applied our respective design tools to the project, including CFD methods, and showed that both configurations were able to achieve the design agility target of a 180° turn in five seconds with a 150 m radius. SABA was publicly announced in late 1987, but although it reportedly attracted a good deal of enthusiasm from the military, government funding was not forthcoming.

There was a later version, the turbofan P.1239 with radar-stealth features and an unusual central weapons bay holding vertically-launched missiles, but the approaching end of the Cold War provided the final blow to SABA prospects. As with so many projects on my CV, it failed to leave the paper stage.

‘I absolutely love this book. Seriously well-informed, seriously funny, authoritative and full of passion for its subject. No one writes about aviation like Joe Coles. We’re lucky to have him. The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is my aviation book of the year.’

– Rowland White

Convinced? Order your copy of our book here 

From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as

The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.

• 

For forty four years potential foes have feared and respected the F-15 Eagle. An utterly uncompromised air superiority fighter of vast proportions, it has a combat record second to none. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Major Shari Williams (rtd) flew the F-15C, taking it to war in 2003. We spoke to her to find out more. 

 

by Paul Woodford

In an earlier Air-Minded post, I wrote about the early days of aerial refuelling and the initial development of USAF tanker aircraft and refuelling methods. This post is about the USAF jet fighters, interceptors, and attack jets that depend on those tankers to get to where they’re going and back home again.

In World War II, US Army Air Force bomber crews called escort fighters ‘little friends.’ In the late 1940s the brand-new US Air Force contracted for a jet escort fighter, a plane that became the F-101 Voodoo. Jet engines use a lot of fuel, but aerial refuelling tankers were coming into common use, so the Voodoo was designed with aerial refueling capability. If you’ll indulge me, for the remainder of this post I’ll save screen toner by referring to aerial refuelling as AAR (air-to-air refuelling, the acronym used in the biz).

In the early 1950s, the USAF was of two minds on AAR: it employed both probe and drogue refuelling (the tanker trails a hose with a stabilising drogue chute on the end; receiving aircraft fly up to the drogue and plug in with a probe) and boom refuelling (the tanker extends a boom which connects to a slipway in the receiving aircraft). Probe and drogue was great for little friends but not so great for big friends. Fuel transfer through a rubber hose is slow, and bombers need a lot of fuel. Over time the big friends and boom refuelling won out, at least with the USAF: with a high rate of fuel transfer bombers can top off quickly; fighters, whose internal fuel plumbing might be damaged by high transfer rates, take on gas at a lower rate, which can be selected by the tanker’s boom operator.

Even today, though, the USAF still uses both methods. All our bombers, strategic airlifters, command & control and surveillance aircraft, tankers themselves, fighter and attack aircraft, plus certain specialised mission aircraft and VIP transports (think Air Force One) use boom refuelling. USAF helicopters & tilt-rotor aircraft use probe & drogue refuelling; so do allied nation aircraft and the Navy & Marine Corps aircraft USAF tankers are often called upon to support.

Back to the Voodoo, which became operational in 1957. Both AAR methods were in wide use at the time, so the F-101 was equipped with a retractable probe and slipway. The probe was stowed in the nose when not in use; the slipway was on top, aft of the cockpit. The first photo shows an F-101A, the long-range escort fighter version of the Voodoo, plugged into a KC-97 tanker boom. The second photo shows an RF-101 reconnaissance variant with its retractable refuelling probe extended, about to plug into the drogue on the end of a refuelling hose (you can also see the closed slipway on top, the light grey panel halfway between the cockpit and the tail).

Another early jet fighter, the F-84 Thunderjet, although not used in the bomber escort role, also incorporated equipment for both AAR methods: a slipway in the left wing root for boom refuelling, and probes on the tip tanks for drogue and hose refuelling (the later swept-wing versions of the F-84, the Thunderstreak and Thunderflash, kept the slipway but did not have the tip tank probes).

The last of the so-called ‘hermaphrodite’ fighters was the F-105 Thunderchief, which became operational in the late 1950s. The Thud had both a slipway and retractable probe, both mounted in the nose. Here are two photos of Thuds taking gas. In the first photo, note how the refueling hose is connected to the end of the tanker’s boom, a method still in use by USAF KC-135 tankers. In the second photo, the F-105 on the boom is a two-seat G model used for Wild Weasel surface-to-air missile suppression during the Vietnam War (with F-4 Phantom IIs waiting their turn on the tanker’s wing):

By the way, the Thud was one of the few USAF fighters that could conduct buddy refuelling, a technique often used by carrier-based Navy and Marine fighters.

Curiously, the interceptor variant of the Voodoo, the F-101B (CF-101 in Canada), did not have AAR capability. Well, it did at first … when the F-101B became operational in 1959 it was equipped with the retractable nose probe, but a fleet-wide modification in the 1960s replaced the probe with a nose-mounted infrared seeker and AAR capability was lost. The interceptor Voodoo, perhaps because of its longer two-seat cockpit, never had the slipway. This photo of an F-101B shows the hump of the IR sensor that replaced the retractable nose probe, as well as the absence of a slipway behind the cockpit.

USAF F-80 Shooting Star and F-86 Sabre fighters (except for a very few modified for test programs) were not AAR-capable. Nor were the first USAF jet interceptors, the F-94 Starfire and F-89 Scorpion. The F-102 Delta Dagger, the single-seat delta-wing interceptor that became operational in the mid-1950s, did not conduct AAR on normal missions, but could be fitted with a removable refuelling probe for long overseas flights. Photos of F-102s with the removable probe in place proved hard to find, and I thank my friend Joe Coles of the aviation blog Hush Kit for coming up with this one:

The later F-106 Delta Dart interceptor was not AAR-capable when first introduced, but was later modified with a slipway for boom refuelling.

Other USAF jet fighters and attack aircraft of the 1950s and 1960s were fitted with AAR probes for hose & drogue refuelling only. These included the F-100 Super Sabre, F-104 Starfighter, A-37 Dragonfly, and the F-5 family of Freedom Fighters and Tigers.

Later USAF jet fighters and attack aircraft, including all those in the current inventory, are fitted with slipways and can only refuel by boom. These include the F-4 Phantom II, F-111 Aardvark, F-15 Eagle & F-15E Strike Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-117 Nighthawk, A-7 Corsair II, A-10 Thunderbolt II, F-22 Raptor, and F-35 Lightning II.

Thank you for reading Hush-Kit. Our site is absolutely free and we have no advertisements. If you’ve enjoyed an article you can donate here. At the moment our contributors do not receive any payment but we’re hoping to reward them for their fascinating stories in the future.

Convinced? Pre-order your copy of our book here 

From the cocaine, blood and flying scarves of World War One dogfighting to the dark arts of modern air combat, here is an enthralling ode to these brutally exciting killing machines.

The Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes is a beautifully designed, highly visual, collection of the best articles from the fascinating world of military aviation –hand-picked from the highly acclaimed Hush-kit online magazine (and mixed with a heavy punch of new exclusive material). It is packed with a feast of material, ranging from interviews with fighter pilots (including the English Electric Lightning, stealthy F-35B and Mach 3 MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’), to wicked satire, expert historical analysis, top 10s and all manner of things aeronautical, from the site described as

“the thinking-man’s Top Gear… but for planes”.

The solid well-researched information about aeroplanes is brilliantly combined with an irreverent attitude and real insight into the dangerous romantic world of combat aircraft.

FEATURING

• Interviews with pilots of the F-14 Tomcat, Mirage, Typhoon, MiG-25, MiG-27, English Electric Lighting, Harrier, F-15, B-52 and many more.
• Engaging Top (and bottom) 10s including: Greatest fighter aircraft of World War II, Worst British aircraft, Worst Soviet aircraft and many more insanely specific ones.
• Expert analysis of weapons, tactics and technology.
• 
• A look into art and culture’s love affair with the aeroplane.
• Bizarre moments in aviation history.
• Fascinating insights into exceptionally obscure warplanes.

• Convinced? Pre-order your copy here